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A decentralisation of autonomy to firms in the urban sector of China was carried out 
from the late 1970s in a gradualist or experimental manner to ensure a “reform without 
losers”. Both line ministries and local governments were “early winners” who became in 
favour of the status quo. A meaningful economic reform stopped by the end of the 1980s. The 
1990s was spent fixing the political, economic and social damages caused by the reform. A 
series of efforts have been implemented by the central government to “get the economy back 
to plan” since the mid-1990s. The relationship between government and industry was dancing 
at the tune of two-step forward and one-step backward. 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was an opportune move to reap 
the fruits of the reforms. On the threshold of opening up its foreign trade regime, the central 
state reclaimed its authority as final decision makers, although the local authorities had been 
the “driving forces in the process”. A comparative analysis of sector-specific government-
industry relations since the Five Year Plan (FYP) reveals a tendency on the part of the 
industry to “drag its feet” throughout China’s WTO negotiations.  
This dissertation has developed a “ministry-sector horse trading” model to understand 
China’s trade concession for entering the WTO. The three independent variables are 
government-industry relations, sectoral competitiveness and market structure. The negotiators 
refused to give concessions on “high stake” sectors where the economic bureaucracies have 
high incentives to develop the industries; on uncompetitive sectors due to their loss-aversion 
tendency to minimise domestic political, economic and social damages; and on concentrated 
sectors for the presence of unified pressure from the enterprises. To maximise gains, 
negotiators tend to fight hard for “high stake”, uncompetitive and high concentration sectors, 
but easily back down on “low stake”, competitive and low concentration sectors. A horse-
  
trading strategy was adopted by negotiators after weighing the three indicators. That explains 
the dependent variables of huge concession on the agricultural and textile industries, but little 
concession on the banking, telecommunications and automobile sectors. 
As a consequence, the WTO negotiation outcome was “efficiency-reducing”. It allowed 
the economic bureaucracies some time to decide if they were willing to give up their control 
of “high stake” sectors, impose great adjustment costs on sectors that were internationally 
competitive, and protect monopolistic profits of concentrated sectors. The “efficiency-
reducing trade concession” challenges the common belief that China’s WTO accession would 
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Chapter 1: China’s Entry into the World Trade Organisation 
 
Financial market, agriculture, telecommunications, and automobile were the 
sectors on which we would not give concessions to the counterpart during the 
negotiation of WTO membership. China’s automobile industry was the most 
protected sector. They imposed significant pressure on the negotiators. 
-----------Long Yongtu (2005: 24) 
 
1.1       Introduction 
The People’s Republic of China officially entered the World Trade 
Organnization (WTO) in December 2001. It took 15 years for China to conclude the 
negotiations on its accession. Mr. Long Yongtu, chief negotiator of the Chinese WTO 
negotiation team, provided us with a rough picture of the government stance towards 
trade negotiation. But he also provided some misleading information. Although the 
government was supposed to protect the agricultural sector from competition after 
trade liberalisation, the effort to protect it was much less than those for banking or 
telecommunications services. The bilateral negotiation between China and the United 
States ended up with the sacrificing of the Chinese agricultural sector for an early 
conclusion of other issues. Thus, the trade concession which is the dependent variable 
of the study should be understood clearly. 
In China’s “big bang” trade liberalisation, all sectors were supposed to give 
certain but varying concessions. Negotiators adopted a “horse trading” strategy by 
protecting some industries while giving up the others. Accordingly, the concession 
was relatively little in the former sectors but huge in the latter. The definition of 
concession in this thesis is consistent with de Dreu et al.’s (1995: 119) argument that 
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a competitive industry that seeks to maximise gains regards the decreases in their 
gains as concession, while an uncompetitive industry that seeks to minimise losses 
regards the increases in their losses as concession.  
This thesis selects five industries, namely, agriculture, textile and clothing, 
automobile, telecommunications services and banking, for the purpose of observing 
the variations of the dependent variable. These five sectors were among the final 
seven issues in Sino-American negotiation for China’s WTO accession. These issues 
were put aside to the year 1999, as no party was willing to accept the counterpart’s 
offer. However, they had to make further concession to break the deadlock for the 
purpose of sealing the deal by the end of that year.  
 
1.2 The Central Argument 
This thesis has developed a “ministry-sector horse trading” model to 
understand China’s choice of trade concessions for entering the WTO. The three 
independent variables are government-industry relations, sectoral competitiveness and 
market structure. The negotiators refused to give concessions to their foreign 
counterparts in first, “high stake” sectors where the economic bureaucracies have high 
incentives to develop the industries; second, uncompetitive sectors due to their loss-
aversion mindset of minimising domestic political, economic and social damages; and 
third, concentrated sectors for the presence of unified pressure from the enterprises. 
To maximise domestic support, negotiators tend to fight hard for “high stake”, 
uncompetitive and high concentration sectors, but easily back down in “low stake”, 
competitive and low concentration sectors. A horse-trading strategy was developed 
between negotiators through weighing the three indicators. That explains the 
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dependent variables of huge concessions on agricultural and textile industries, but 
little concessions in banking, telecommunications and automobile sectors. 
The independent variables of sectoral competitiveness and market structure have 
been widely discussed in the literature of international political economy. This 
dissertation is different from prior efforts in its incorporation of these variables into its 
model that includes the discussion of government-industry relationship. Government-
industry relations are essential to the understanding of the various foot-dragging 
efforts of economic ministries in the central government during the process of trade 
liberalisation negotiation. The central government’s decision to grant autonomy to 
firms during the decentralisation process casts a doubt on the convergence of sectoral 
and bureaucratic interests. The devolution has been successful in some sectors like 
textile industry, but not in others like telecommunications services. Accordingly, the 
relation between the government and industry is sector-specific. A close relationship 
implies that the government has strong incentives to work for the benefit of its 
subordinate industry. A loose relationship on the other hand implies that the 
government’s decision is primarily driven by its bureaucratic interests that are not 
necessarily beneficial to the industry. 
During the Sino-American negotiation on China’s WTO accession, the Ministry 
of Information Industry, Ministry of Finance, and State Planning Commission (SPC) 
had strongly opposed the liberalising of trade in their respective subordinate 
industries, namely telecommunications services, banking services and automobile 
sector. The two ministries and SPC were closely related to the industries that were not 
willing to join the WTO. On the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture had exerted 
much less effort in protecting its sector as the ministry had little control over 
household production; the sector had seen more challenges than opportunities after 
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trade liberalisation. In another case, the State Bureau of Textile, which has kept a 
loose relationship with the textile and clothing industry, did not fight hard to lift US 
quota on Chinese products during the bilateral negotiation; this was inspite of the fact 
that the industry was eager to join the WTO for the bigger market it offered. 
As a consequence, the WTO negotiation outcome was “efficiency-reducing”. It 
allowed the economic bureaucracies some time to decide if they were willing to give 
up their control of “high stake” sectors, impose great adjustment costs on sectors that 
were internationally competitive, and protect monopolistic profits of concentrated 
sectors. The “efficiency-reducing trade concession” challenges the common belief 
that China’s WTO accession would have a huge positive impact on the country’s 
marketisation reform. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Issue 
1.3.1 Theoretical Significances 
Structural force is fundamentally important to the study of international relations 
(IR) theories, including international political economy (Waltz, 1959; Axelrod and 
Keohane, 1985; Wendt, 1992; Gilpin, 1987). Polanyi (1944) reminds us of the state’s 
resistance towards the transformation of global market integration. The New Political 
Economy has prompted an understanding of the state as “the new hierarchies of the 
global economy cut across national boundaries” (Gamble et al., 1996: 10). In a more 
specific issue like the negotiation of trade liberalisation, Putnam’s (1988) “two-level 
games” leads us to open up the country’s black box of the country as a unitary 
decision maker (also see Evans, 1993).   
The focus of the literature on contemporary Chinese politics has been changing 
from leadership of the government to leadership of the society. Most China specialists 
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admit that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made almost all of the “big decision(s)” 
during their respective terms (Barnett, 1985: 7; Bachman, 1986). However, political 
reforms in the last three decades had witnessed a change of focus from elite factions 
towards bureaucratic politics (Unger ed., 2002). Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s (1988) 
“fragmented authoritarianism” snapshots the evolving relationship between leaders 
and government (also see Lieberthal and Lampton eds., 1992). The influence of the 
bureaucracy was on the rise (Teiwes, 1995: 21; Paltiel, 2001; Lin, 2004a). Although 
state leaders, like Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao still make the ultimate decisions 
(Swaine, 1995: 3; Fewsmith, 1999; Groombridge, 2000: 183; Goldstein, 2001: 837-8; 
Breslin, 2005), the emerging technocrat-style bureaucracy has become an 
indispensible force in the decision making of economic policies. 
In the specific issue of China’s trade liberalisation, Political scientists 
concentrated on the studies of the leadership and bureaucratic interests that influenced 
the process of China’s WTO accession (Satchit, 1999; Pearson, 2000; Lai, 2001; 
Sheng, 2002; Liang, 2002; Zeng, 2004; Zeng ed., 2007). However, scholars who 
emphasised the role of leadership found it difficult to explain Why the Chinese 
government reneged on the trading offer immediately after chief negotiator Long 
Yongtu concluded the negotiation with the United States in 1997 (Pearson, 2000: 343) 
and why Zhu Rongji’s offer in April 1999 brought him serious criticism among the 
ministries. While the scholars who noticed the importance of bureaucratic interests 
could not easily answer how the leaders managed to return to the negotiation table and 
conclude the deal with their US counterparts in the same year that they were under 
harsh domestic backlash. 
 On the other hand, economists analysed the same process through the 
understanding of comparative advantage and market structure of the Chinese 
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economy (Bach et al., 1996; Anderson, 1997; Wang, 1999b; Chen and Feng, 2000: 
324; Wu, 2001; Lardy, 2002; Chen, 2002a). However, that is confusing as we realise 
that concession was made in both competitive and uncompetitve sectors, where the 
former is textile industry and the latter is agricultural industry.  The analysis on 
market structure is also misleading, as the concession was made on textile industry 
but not on automobile industry, both of which were relatively low concentrated. 
Besides, there is a lack of communication between political scientists and 
economists. Some analyses of political economy incorporated the two explanations by 
simply assuming that bureaucratic and sectoral interests are identical (Wang, 1999a: 
43; Pearson, 2000: 350-2, 361; Liang, 2002; 717; Lawrence, 2008: 163-4). However, 
validity of such an assumption is questionable. We may get some clues from 
emerging literature on government-industry relations of contemporary China, like 
developmental state (White, 1988; Breslin, 1996; Xia, 2000) or regulatory state 
(Yang, 2004; Deans, 2004). But the two theories are hardly applicable to this issue as 
they did not treat the relationship as sector-specific (see Chapter 2 for an extensive 
review of the literature on government-industry relations). Studies on government-
industry relations in individual sectors like Mueller (1998) on telecommunications 
sector or Harwit (2001) on automobile sector did not provide us with satisfactory 
answers because of a lack of comparative perspective. This “tiny” difference among 
sectors becomes huge when negotiators are not willing to make any concession and 
have to resort to “horse trading” to break the deadlock. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It identifies some 
key variables of domestic causes to trade liberalisation and fills a void by developing 
a comparative perspective of government-industry relations across sectors in a single 
country. The theoretical framework helps us understand the “big bang” trade 
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liberalisation of post-socialist states during their transition of marketisation. 
Especially applicable to China, the thesis captures the dynamics of the state’s 
withdrawal from the economy through market-oriented reform. It compares the 
relations between governments—at both central and local levels—and industries 
across different sectors and different time periods. It provides a supplementary 
understanding to the evolution of a developmental state or regulatory state.  
 
1.3.2 Empirical Significances 
The study of government-industry relations on the threshold of trade 
liberalisation throws light on the underlining lyrics sang by Chinese leaders and the 
government at the negotiation. Top leaders were pushing for an early conclusion of 
WTO accession, while economic ministries with vested interest in their subordinate 
industries were reluctant to make concessions. What is more significant is the 
discovery that the government intended to comply with WTO commitment after its 
accession, regardless of its capability of doing so. According to Elizabeth C. 
Economy’s (Yu et al., 2003: 16-7) observation, there were a number of bureaucratic 
actors that attempted to block China’s GATT/WTO accession; and when China 
became a WTO member, “these same bureaucracies are rising up and trying to put up 
bureaucratic blockades to the actual implementation of China’s WTO commitments”. 
The thesis explains and highlights the agencies that are likely to refuse to comply with 
its commitment or develop other measures to protect its subordinate industry. It 
provides testable evidence for Chinese decision makers to figure out which industry 
needs further market-oriented reforms to minimise the risk of trade disputes. It also 
helps foreign investors and traders make wiser decisions in dealing with China within 
the WTO framework. 
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1.4 Review of and Scholarly Explanation to Government-Industry Relations 
1.4.1 Line Ministries vs. Local Authorities in Government-Industry Relations  
In the 1970s, the SPC helmed the central-planning system. It took charge of 
formulating the five-year-plan (FYP), a top-down initiative that other relevant 
ministries will have to follow. The yearly plan, which was prepared by the State 
Economic Commission (SEC) and based on the framework provided by the FYP, 
would then be disseminated to the economic ministries for their implementaton. The 
ministries would then work out short-term plans for their respective sectors and set 
out directives for the implementation of the SOEs. Ministry of Finance (MOF), the 
collection and distribution body for all revenue, allocate funds to the SOEs based on 
the state budget for the following year (Hassard et al, 2007). Sector-specific contracts 
were signed between the SPC and the economic ministries that used to behave as 
intermediaries between the higher authorities and grass-roots SOEs in the FYP. The 
contracts or industrial policies were different across the sectors, partially due to the 
strategic concern of the SPC and bargaining power of the supervising agencies.1 In 
order to fulfill the contract, the ministries retained certain administrative and 
fiscal/financial control of the enterprises in their subordinate industry (Ministry of 
Finance, 1983, 475-8; Zhang, 1991: 28; Shen ed, 1999: 534). 
Local governments became significant players and further complicating 
government-industry relations. A large number of SOEs came under the jurisdiction 
of the local governments (Montinola et al. 1995), although some of big SOEs were 
                                               
1
 In 1981, the central government assigned the contract of input and output to nine sectors (hangye baogan), 
namely, petroleum, non-ferrous metals, petrol chemicals, metallurgy, civil aviation, coal, railway, post and electric 
power. For example, the petroleum sector signed a three-year output contract in 1981 and another seven-year 
contract in 1984. The sector of non-ferrous metals signed a contract of fixed-rate of finance (caizheng dingbi 
baogan). Petrochemical National Corporation agreed to be responsible for the loss and profit after tax remittance. 
Metallurgical sector signed an input-output contract while the civil aviation agency adopted a profit and foreign 
exchange retention system. The coal industry signed an input-output contract among the coalmines in the unified 
distribution system. The railway agency agreed to finance the railway construction. 
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retrenched in the 1990s (Cai and Treisman, 2006). The local governments were made 
responsible for the day-to-day supervision of these enterprises. Meanwhile, a revenue-
sharing system was introduced in 1980 and reformed in 1994 between central and 
local governments. The system gave local authorities more incentives to intervene in 
the business practices of the SOEs (Lee, 1986: 68; Oi, 1992: 100; Yusuf, 1994: 75; 
Walder, 1995; Zhang, 1999b; Wong, 2000; Zhao, 2003a).   
Taking into account of the authorities of both line ministries and local 
governments, the firms were struggling in a “tiao-kuai” structure, especially in the late 
1980s (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996). The 1990s saw a “soft centralisation” of authorities 
to counter “local protectionism” which worked in favour of the line ministries 
(Mertha, 2005). The central state’s capacity to implement nationwide supervision 
started to draw more scholarly attention when a trend of recentralisation, reregulation   
and retrenchment became apparent (Lin, 2004b, 2007; Pearson, 2005). Besides, as the 
dependent variable is the concessions in bilateral trade talks, the government-industry 
relations in this thesis refer to the link between line ministries and their subordinate 
industries, as most local governments were not actively involved in the negotiations, 
nor were they aware of the negotiation details (Wei, 2007: 5). 
 
1.4.2 Sector Specific Government-Industry Relations: “High Stake” Sectors and “Low 
Stake” Sectors  
As Kitschelt (1991: 455) reviewed, “national institutions explain why similar 
sectors in different countries are associated with varying governance structures and 
why different sectors in the same country develop similar industrial strategies”. 
However, by identifying industrial strategies as similar does not provide sound policy 
recommendations in a country. To explain the different origins of successful industrial 
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sectors and less successful sectors in Japan, Kitschelt developed a technology-driven 
theory of sectoral governance structures. 
Kitschelt’s view was echoed by scholars who studied sector-specific 
government-industry relations. For example, although France was widely believed to 
have a “strong” state compared to that in the United States, Cawson et al.’s (1987) 
study showed that government-industry relations in France differed in the 
telecommunications and consumer electronics sectors. Atkinson and Coleman (1989) 
agree that traditional treatment of state-society relations at the macro level failed to 
explain the rich diversity at the lower levels—meso or micro level. Accordingly, they 
recommend that scholars pay enough attention to government-industry relations at 
sector level to supplement or even supersede the existing studies.  
On the assumption that the government serves the society in democratic 
countries, the analysis of government-industry relations at sector level placed great 
emphasis on the autonomy or strength of the state. Katzenstein ed. (1978) regards the 
autonomy of the bureaucracy as an important criterion of the “strong” state in 
advanced industrial countries. Hall’s (1983: 46) study of Britain and France explains 
that the state would be “strong” if a small number of government officials were 
capable of making final decisions.  
However, in central-planning economies like China, the government dictated 
activities and decision making in the industry. The research interest changes to 
varying degrees of sectoral autonomy against the government. In China, during the 
transition period of marketisation, bureaucratic politics is responsible for much of the 
variation in government-industry relations across sectors. The “contracts” between 
government and industry or “industrial policies” in the early 1980s were different 
across sectors due to the strategic concern of the SPC and bargaining power among 
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the supervising agencies. Spearheading the hierarchical system, the SPC had holistic 
rather than sector-specific concern. The line ministries tried to obtain favourite 
industrial policies for the development of their subordinate sectors. However, the 
bargaining could not always satisfy all the requests of sectoral governors. For 
instance, losers, like the Ministry of Agriculture (see Chapter 4 for details), could not 
get enough state budget to support their sectoral polices. To rectify, the ministry 
decided to maintain a loose and separate government-industry relationship. Hence, 
although the agricultural sector became a “low stake” sector to the government, it 
gained from the greater autonomy attained.  
This thesis differentiates the sectors by comparing the autonomies granted by 
the central government. The sector is “low stake” if it has minimal government 
intervention. Firms in the sector can make independent decisions regarding the plan of 
production, capital investment, alliance management, and etc. The separation of the 
government from the industry allows the latter to determine its own area of interest 
that may not be convergent with that of the government. The government has less 
capability and incentive to protect sectoral interests. In contrast, the sector is “high 
stake” if it cannot make independent business decisions. The sector does not have its 
own interests. Sectoral interest is a reflection of bureaucratic interest. Accordingly, 
the government had more incentive to protect the sector.  
The relationship between government and industry in contemporary China 
varies across sectors in different time periods. Although scholars are aware of this fact 
(MacIntyre, 1990; Wade, 2002; Haggard, 2004), only a handful adopted a 
comparative approach to interprete the variations in a particular country, especially 
China. Pearson (2005: 297) selects some strategic sectors to support her argument that 
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the pattern of government-industry relation lies somewhere between state control and 
state regulation; however, she did not give a systemic sector-specific comparison. 
This thesis will not attempt to uncover the causes of these variations, but will 
focus on the impact of these varying government-industry relations on the policy-
making of the “big bang” trade liberalisation by the central government. Kitschelt 
(1991: 493) in his conclusion recommends that trade policies should be sector-
specific, as “no single trade regime, whether it encourages open competition or erects 
protectionist barriers, is likely to further industrial growth across all sectors”. 
Adopting a sector-level analysis does not mean the irrelevance of national 
characteristics. For example, Anderson and Hayami (1986: 1) observe a pattern of 
agricultural protection in East Asian countries that “as economies grow they tend to 
change from taxing to assisting or protecting agriculture relative to other sectors, and 
that this change occurs at an earlier stage of economic growth the weaker the 
country’s comparative advantage in agriculture”. However, this proves that the 
evolution of government-industry relations in China’s agricultural sector took a much 
longer time and did not necessarily yield the same result because of its uniqueness. 
 
1.4.3 Separating the Government from the Industries 
There were two attempts to separate the government from the industries in the 
1980s and 1990s. Temporary Provisions for Further Expanding the Autonomy of 
State-Owned Enterprises promulgated in 1984 granted decision-making autonomy to 
the SOEs in ten areas with partial success (Walder, 1984: 65; Blecher, 1989; Child 
and Lu, 1996: 76).2 The second attempt was made by the State Council in 1992 to 
grant autonomy in 14 areas but the effort did not fully achieve its goals, either.3  
                                               
2
 Six of them were retained by the supervising agencies, including plan of production management (shengchan 
jingying jihua), capital investment (zijin shiyong), allocation of wage and bonus (gongzi jiangjin fenpei), asset 
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Administrative reform and industry restructuring in 1998 was arguably a 
decisive move to separate the government from the industries. Dali Yang (2004) 
observes an evolution of government-industry relation, as the government was 
changing from “planner” to “regulator” (also see Deans, 2004). According to Yang, 
China’s government restructuring since the late 1990s has seen a gradual 
rationalisation of the administrative state and enhancement of the regulatory 
apparatus. The planning agencies were remade to cut off government-industry 
relations so as to prevent arbitrary intervention. A regulatory body was established to 
regulate activities in the sector and to ensure a level playing field.   
 
1.5 The Emergence of a Regulatory State and Its Implications to Trade 
Negotiation  
The idea of a regulatory state was introduced by the United States after the 
Progressive Movement and widely implemented by the largely different European 
countries in the 1980s. The American experience reconciles the rival terms of 
regulation and competition by developing a new rationale of “regulation-for-
competition”. The country has seen a huge expansion of public authority since the 
New Deal (Moran, 2002). In Europe, the new form of government-industry relations 
is replacing the positive, interventionist state (Bugaric, 2007). The emergence of a 
                                                                                                                                       
management (zichan chuli), personnel and labour management (renshi laodong guanli), and procurement of 
materials that are under unified redistribution (tongpei wuzi xuangou). Besides, autonomous right of alliance 
management (lianhe jingying zizhuquan) did work in practice and the right of floating production price along the 
planned price (chanpin jiage fudongquan) was guided by the price regulatory agency. Only two autonomies, the 
right to establish internal organisation (neibu jigou shezhi quan) and sales (chanpin xiaoshou zizhu quan), were 
effectively granted to the enterprises (Qiye shiquan sheng duoshao, 1990: 37). 
3
 The second attempt at decentralisation was based on the principles of the first one in 1984. Among the ten areas 
of autonomy in 1984, the right of sales was divided into two autonomies of domestic sales and international trade; 
management of labour and personnel was separated into management of labour and management of personnel; the 
right of allocating working capital (liudong zijin zhipei quan) was carved out of the right of asset management; the 
right of refusing extralegal payments to the government (jujue tanpai quan) was also added. According to a survey 
by the SETC, production, procurement of input material, sales, and pricing were fully decentralised to the 
enterprises; the other rights, especially management of personnel, management of labour, investment, rights of 
international trade, and the right of refusing extralegal payments to the government were not transferred to the 
enterprises at all (SETC, 1995, quoted from Pan, 1994: 8). 
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regulatory state in Europe reflected the triumph of market and business interests over 
the state. The regulatory state in capitalist economies is “premised upon a neo-liberal 
combination of market competition, privatized institutions, and decentred, at-a-
distance forms of state regulation” (Braithwaite, 2000: 222). 
Few studies have expanded the understanding of regulatory state to the field of 
trade negotiations. Scholars of regulatory state agree with Adam Smith “by 
eliminating both public and private monopolies and liberalizing trade” and also agree 
with Keynesian forms of regulating banking, stock markets and labour standards 
(Braithwaite, 2000: 226). The liberalisation of global trade, as Vogel (1993) argues, 
requires the re-regulation of different countries. However, the emergence of 
“regulatory protectionism” reminds us to give more attention to the much overlooked  
regulatory body (Baldwin, 2000). Convergence of domestic rules in different 
countries facilitates the spread of freer markets (Lutz, 2004). A divergence generates a 
new form of protectionism.  
This author agrees that regulatory rules matter in international trade to gradually 
become the primary concern in bilateral or multilateral trade disputes. However, a 
more fundamental question must be raised here: To whose interests have the 
regulatory rules been serving in trade issues? The illusion of independent regulation, 
as Moran (2002) pointed out, is never clear. The regulation power would be 
apportioned out to the regulated interests (Wolfe, 1986), or be promoted by vote- and 
money-seeking politicians, powerful business interests and powerful bureaucrats 
(Stigler, 1971). If the regulatory body is not independent as designed, the “regulatory 
protectionism” would not be based on the grounds of “economic efficiency and risk 
management” (Moran, 2002: 398), but attributed to other factors. These factors vary 
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between countries and between sectors. Three scenarios need to be examined: public 
interest scenario, the regulated interest scenario and the “powerful outsider” scenario. 
“Public interest” scenario: The regulatory body was designed by economists as 
selfless and altruistic. The regulatory rules were implemented to rectify “market 
failures” by protecting the public from monopolistic behavior at one end and 
preventing destructive competition at the other end. The “public interest’ scenario 
takes place in a political situation where costs and benefits are widely distributed 
(Wilson, 1980). Accordingly, public interest determines trade preferences.  
“The regulated interest” scenario: The “capture” theory contends that regulatory 
rules primarily serve regulated interest rather than the public. According to Stigler 
(1971), by voting for and providing resources to the party, the industry is capable of 
influencing the regulatory state in exchange for subsidies, control of entry, inter-
industry cooperation, and price fixing. The capture theory was improved upon by a 
group of studies, including Lowi’s “interest-group liberalization” (1969), Edelman’s 
“symbolic politics” (1985), Bernstein’s “life cycle” (1993), and Peltzman’s “vote 
maximizer” (1984). The capture scenario mostly happens in a political situation where 
costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated, or benefits concentrated but costs are 
widely distributed (Wilson, 1980). 
If the capture theory holds true, we should expect to see interest groups 
initiating and controlling the process of trade negotiations. Furthermore, interest 
group pressures should account for the outcome of trade negotiations. We should see 
a conflicting pattern: powerful businesses gaining from trade negotiations or sectors 
with powerful businesses making no concession. Concession can only be made if 
domestic compensation is guaranteed by the negotiators. 
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“Powerful outsider” scenario: Bureaucracies that are shielded from the interest 
groups are powerful enough to influence the regulatory body. Levine and Jennifer 
(1990) call the rationale “post-revisionism”, study of the process of politics. As 
Derthick and Quirk (1985) argued, the bureaucratic interests overcame the regulated 
interests in the development of deregulation in the United States. The regulatory 
commissions in the United States at the time were heavily dependent on the three 
major branches of government, namely the President, Congress and Federal Courts, 
which were powerful enough to make the regulatory bodies deregulate the industry. 
Destler’s (1995) study of American trade politics revealed a similar causality. The 
Congress that was particularly susceptible to pressure from organised interests was 
able to channel trade pressure to the executive branch of the government. That was 
one of the major reasons for the implementation of the American liberal trade policy 
through most of the post-war period. 
By the logic of the “Powerful outsider” scenario, the regulatory body is inferior 
to other organisations that hold the relatively unexercised authority of revising the 
regulations. The bureaucracies or political entrepreneurs must be powerful enough to 
overcome the pressure of interest group, especially in a situation where the costs are 
concentrated but benefits are widely distributed (Wilson, 1980). The President 
primarily responds to the voters. This is consistent with the public interest scenario. 
However, if the regulated industries are powerful enough to generate enough votes, it 
may also serve the regulated interest. If that is the case, the result is consistent with 
the regulated interest scenario. The bureaucratic interest is relatively independent of 
the voting preference of the President. Their interests are probably shaped by 
economic ideologies. They will intervene if they believe that a new form of 
governance is serving public interest. But a lack of economic ideology makes us 
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believe that the regulation will be “manipulated” by bureaucracies that have their own 
narrow-minded interests. 
 
1.6 The Emergence of a Regulatory State in China and Its Implications to WTO 
Negotiation  
Dali Yang (2004) observes an evolution of a regulatory state out of the Western 
capitalist economies (also see Deans, 2004). The emergence of a regulatory state in 
China was primarily driven by the need to separate the government from industry 
through the abolishing or transforming of deeply embedded economic bureaucracies 
into regulatory bodies at a distance. The reform, according to Yang (2004: 56), 
“helped reduce overlapping functions” in the central government “that induce 
infighting and gridlock”. For example, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
founded in 1998 provided “more even-handed” regulation among telecommunications 
services providers and “engendered competition by breaking up” existing monopolies 
that were quested by the American negotiators (Ibid: 56). By curbing the bureaucrats’ 
parochial interests, “the government reorganisation made it easier for Chinese 
negotiators to strike trade deals that require sacrifices in some sectors that had 
previously possessed much bureaucratic clout” (Ibid: 57). Having constrained 
governmental power, the role of the Chinese leadership became more “crucial” in the 
conclusion of the WTO agreement (Ibid: 58, 303). 
Yang identifies three major factors for the origin of regulatory state in China, 
namely, the importance of leadership, the rhythm of domestic politics and the role of 
crisis as catalysing events for politicians to adopt certain reforms. Accordingly, his 
understanding of regulatory state in China was, to a large extent, consistent with that 
of a “powerful outsider”. 
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The reforms in China since the late 1990s have been in the situation of 
concentrated loss and divided gains that needed strong political entrepreneurs. Yang 
identifies the importance of leadership, but not the ideology that was prevailing 
among political entrepreneurs at that time. Idea is one of the important variables in the 
understanding of the regulatory state. The regulatory body that serves public interest 
needs the guidance of an economic ideology to reach its goal. A new idea is necessary 
for political entrepreneurs if they want change in the status quo. It provides strong 
moral, theoretical or instrumental support to reformers in the face of resistance from 
incumbent regulatory bureaucracies and interest groups. Yang’s analysis did not 
provide us with a comprehensive picture of prevailing economic idealogy at the 
moment. If crisis, as Yang argues, is the catalysing force, it would be more 
convincing to say that the reform is reactive rather than proactive. In China, there was 
a lack of a clear agenda for reforms guided by the ideas. It just shows the similarities 
between reforms and regulatory reform, which may or may not have the same goals. 
Empirical evidence since the “regulatory reform” in 1998 has proved that 
government-industry relations did not evolve into a form of regualotory state as 
expected. Firstly, the supervising ministries that were supposed to transform into 
regulatory bodies were reluctant to delink themselves from the industries. They 
remained a significant factor in the trade negotiation. Government reform in the late 
1990s did not leave an institutional void for the emergence of a “regulatory” state. 
The economic bureaucracies refused to give up their stakes in the industries. A 
consensus was reached in the central government right before the industry 
restructuring that in the ninth FYP (1996-2000) that the state would retain 1,000 SOEs 
in the sectors of electric power, automotive, electronics, iron and steel, machinery, 
chemicals, construction materials, transport, aerospace and pharmaceuticals. These 
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SOEs held around 70% of SOE fixed assets and generated about 80% of profits and 
taxes (Hassard et al, 2007: 96; Nolan, 2001). The decision to reform SOEs through 
“retaining the large state enterprises and releasing the small ones” (zhuada fangxiao) 
was controversial, as it separated the government from small SOEs but enhanced its 
relationship with the large ones.  
The results prevented the newly transformed or established regulatory bodies 
from regulating the economy at a distance. The specialised economic departments that 
were downgraded and reorganised into industrial bureaus (gongye ju) and placed 
under the management of the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) did not 
necessarily make a shift from direct management to macroeconomic regulation. 
Yang’s observation might be applicable to the textile sector where the supervising 
agencies under the SETC “lost the right to supervise and intervene in the enterprises 
and institutions” that in turn guaranteed relatively fair regulatory rules in non-SOE-
dominated sector (2004: 41). However, the State Bureau of Textile retained its 
corporatist interests in 20 SOEs. It also has the discretion of allocating 20% of the 
export quotas that always go to its subsidiaries, undermining fair-play in the sector 
(Lu, 2001: 14). The newly founded “regulatory body” also did not function as 
expected. For example, Yang (2004: 38) believes that the creation of the MII as a 
“regulatory power” in 1998 was “used not to monopolize but to promote competition 
through a breakup of China Telecom and the entry of new players”. However, this 
author regards the breakdown of one monopoly (China Telecom) as an attempt to 
create four monopolies in their respective subsectors. There was little competition 
between the monopolies across the subsectors. Under the umbrella of the MII, their 
dominance was not challenged by the entry of new players either. China Unicom is 
still subject to the discriminatory policies of the MII until the latter becomes the major 
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stakeholder (Liu, 1999: 16). The relationship between Telecom and Unicom changed 
from competitive to supplementary accordingly. The government reorganisation did 
not make it easer for Chinese negotiators to strike trade deals in telecommunications 
services as argued by Yang (2004: 57). The “China-China-Foreign” (CCF) joint 
investment system allowed foreign companies to hold more than 70% of the shares 
that was much higher than what had been agreed with the United States in 1999. The 
MII terminated fragmented supervision by incorporating rival ministries in 1998. The 
unified supervisor fought hard to prevent Chinese negotiators from giving majority 
shareholding to foreign companies. The founding of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was considered by Yang 
(2004: 61) as another attempt to “further separate government ownership, enterprise, 
and management”. However, the SASAC’s practice of reshuffling leadership between 
the four telecommunications service providers indicated a continuous political 
intervention rather than a conduct “in accordance with the Company Law”. 
To conclude, an effective and independent regulatory state has yet to take shape. 
A government-industry nexus is still significant. The government refused to stay back 
and perform only in case of market failure. “Regulatory” bodies with the vested 
interest of benefiting certain subordinating enterprises found it hard to clear away 
man-made obstructions to smoothen trade. An embedded “regulatory state” did not 
stay back in trade negotiations for the sake of its stake in the industry.  
However, it should be reminded that government-industry relations vary across 
sectors. Sectors with a loose government-industry nexus, like textile, have greater 
potential of seeing the emergence of regulatory state in the future. In contrast, it 
would be difficult for the government to give up intervention if it has tight 
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relationship with the subordinate industries, like banking and telecommunications 
services.  
All in all, the study of government-industry relation sheds light on the 
convergence/divergence of bureaucratic-sectoral interests. It is the prerequisite to 
understand the state’s decisions on trade liberalisation. By incorporating the 
independent variable of government-industry relations into the model of “ministry-
sector horse trading”, we will have a better understanding of China’s trade 
















Chapter 2: A Comparative Perspective of Government-Industry 
Relations and Sector-Specific Trade Concessions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The central state in the early 1980s decided to grant autonomy to SOEs that 
used to operate according to the Five Year Plan. Government-industry relations then 
became sector-specific. The comparative study of government-industry relations 
across sectors contributes to the sectoral analyses of the post-socialist economy during 
the transition period of marketisation. The result casts doubts on the emergence of a 
regulatory state in contemporary China. 
The emergence of a regulatory state requires a limited role for economic 
bureaucracies in trade negotiations. Trade preferences are primarily shaped by market 
and business interests. However, the “regulatory” bodies in China were not created in 
an institutional void. The economic bureaucracies with high stake in their subordinate 
industries continuously intervened in trade negotiations.   
This chapter develops a “ministry-sector horse trading” model to understand 
China’s trade concession for entering the WTO. The three independent variables are 
government-industry relations, sectoral competitiveness and market structure. The 
negotiators refused to give concessions to their foreign counterparts in “high stake” 
sectors where the economic bureaucracies have high incentives to develop the 
industries; they were also reluctant to release their uncompetitive sectors to foreign 
competition due to their loss-aversion mindset of minimising domestic political, 
economic, and social damages; likewise they were under unified pressure from 
enterprises not to release their concentrated sectors. To garner domestic support, the 
negotiators tend to fight hard for “high stake”, uncompetitive and high concentration 
 23
sectors, but easily back down in “low stake”, competitive, and low concentration. A 
horse-trading strategy was adopted by negotiators through weighing the three 
indicators. That explains the dependent variables of huge concessions on agricultural 
and textile industries, but little concessions on banking, telecommunications and 
automobile sectors. 
As a consequence, the WTO negotiation outcome was “efficiency-reducing”. 
It allowed the economic bureaucracies some time to decide if it is willing to give up 
their control of “high stake” sectors, imposed great adjustment costs for sectors that 
were internationally competitive, and protected monopolistic profits of concentrated 
sectors. The “efficiency-reducing trade concession” challenges the common beliefs 
that WTO accession would have a huge positive impact on China’s marketisation 
reforms. 
 
2.2 The Domestic Sources of Trade Concession 
Hiscox (2008) mentions that the political economy approach should combine 
both economic and political analyses in the understanding of trade policies. Economic 
analyses, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model and Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
emphasise economic effects as one of the important factors determining trade 
preferences. Political analyses, on the other hand, explain how the same preferences 
lead to different trade policies between different kinds of political institutions. This 
section reviews the domestic sources of trade concession and explains why they are 





2.2.1 Comparative Advantage 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model identifies three basic factors that determine a 
country’s trade politics. These are land, labour and capital. Accordingly, China, which 
is well endowed with cheap labour, is expected to export labour-intensive goods 
(textile and clothing), and import products that require intensive use of land and 
capital (agricultural products and automobile).  The former sectors are willing to 
maximise their gains through trade liberalisation while the latter is willing to 
minimise its loss through protection. No sector is supposed to make concessions to its 
foreign counterpart. Thus, Heckscher-Ohlin model does not provide answers to why 
the state gives concessions in some sectors but not the others.  Similarly, Jones (1971) 
and Mussa (1974) argue that trade preferences differ between sectors with export 
industries and sectors with import-competitng industries. Jones and Mussa, however, 
are also unable to explain why a state made concession on one sector but not the 
others. 
 
2.2.2 Individuals Divided by Real Incomes 
The Stolper-Sameulson threorem (1941) could not provide us with satisfactory 
answers, either. According to the Stolper-Sameulson therorem, trade benefits sectors 
that are locally abundant, but not sectors that are locally scarce. By this logic, in 
China, trade policy preferences should be different between workers and the people 
who own the capital. The former is relatively abundant and is likely to support greater 
trade openness for a raise in wages. The latter is relatively scarce and is more likely to 
adopt a protectionist approach, as it is unable to see the potential of open trade. 
However, a political division between workers and owners was not significant enough 
to influence trade policies at the threshold of China’s WTO accession. The workers’ 
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union that was supposed to impose great impact on trade policies was not as well 
organised as those in United States or Australia. Unions at that time were quasi-
governmental institutions. Without an effective channel to voice their preferences, the 
workers’ influence on Sino-American trade talks was minimal. 
 
 2.2.3 Political Institutions 
As Hiscox (2008: 112) emphasises, political institutions determine how the 
policy preferences of different groups are “weighted” in the final policy outcome. The 
analysis of China’s political institution usually starts with the consensus that its 
system is a non-democratic regime. Compared to democratic systems, the analysis of 
non-democratic regimes, like China, is usually straightforward. The trade policy is, to 
a larger extent, determined by the leadership. Leaders who are insulated from public 
election would adopt a trade policy that benefits their own interests. By studying the 
non-democratic leadership, we should be able to understand the intricacies of its trade 
policies.  
However, the literature on contemporary Chinese politics has been changing its 
focus from the leadership to the government and to the society. Most China specialists 
admit that Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping made almost all of the “big decision(s)” 
during their respective terms (Barnett, 1985: 7; Bachman, 1986). However, political 
reforms in the last three decades had witnessed a change from elite politics to 
bureaucratic politics (Unger ed., 2002). Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s (1988) 
“fragmented authoritarianism” snapshots the evolving relationship between the 
leaders and government (also see Lieberthal and Lampton eds., 1992). The influence 
of the bureaucracy was on the rise (Teiwes, 1995: 21; Paltiel, 2001; Lin, 2004a). 
Although state leaders, like Jiang Zeming and Hu Jintao, still retain the power of 
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making ultimate decisions (Swaine, 1995: 3; Fewsmith, 1999; Groombridge, 2000: 
183; Goldstein, 2001: 837-8; Breslin, 2005), the emerging technocrat-style 
bureaucracy has become an indispensible force in the decision making of economic 
policies. 
The “capture” theory might be more helpful to explaining the domestic political 
source of foreign trade policy in China. Having discussed in the literature of 
regulatory state, bureaucracies captured by the industry would have “important effects 
in terms of foreign economic policies” (Hiscox, 2008: 118). However, the “capture” 
theory could not summarise the government-industry relations in China (see pages 16-
20). A more subtle understanding of government-industry relations would help to 
develop a clearer model to explain China’s trade concessions. 
 
2.3 “Ministry-Sector Horse Trading” Model of Trade Negotiation 
Putnam’s (1988) “two level games” suggests that negotiators have to engage in 
the game at both national and international levels and cannot overlook either of them. 
At the national level, negotiators seek power by forming coalitions among domestic 
interest groups. At the international level, negotiators seek to maximise their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressure and at the same time minimise the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.  
At that critical round of Sino-American negotiation, then Chinese Premier Zhu 
Rongji with strong political support from the President sat at the international 
bargaining table. The political leaders did not have any private interest in protecting 
any particular sector. They just wanted to conclude the WTO agreement on an early 
date. At the international level, the WTO members requested China to liberalise its 
planned economy. The request was sector-specific because of imbalanced 
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development among the industries. In the final year of negotiations, there were seven 
issues that no party was willing to make voluntary concessions. A horse-trading 
strategy became the only possible way to sign the deal. It requires negotiators to 
protect some sectors while giving up the others. The selective concessions created a 
win-set for negotiators at the national level. To enlarge the size of the domestic win-
set, negotiators had to compare sectors by weighing their competitiveness, market 
structure and relationship with the government. An aggregate of the three variables 
using the ministry-sector horse-trading model accounts for the final result of Sino-
American negotiation for WTO accession.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Trade concessions are usually made on “low stake” sectors 
A “low stake” sector is the sector where the government has no relationship with 
the industry. As the government cannot directly benefit from the sectoral interest 
through administrative or fiscal/financial links, it places its prior concern on its own 
bureaucratic interests. The difference between sectoral and bureaucratic interests 
causes a divergence in trade preference. Accordingly, trade concessions are usually 
made on “low stake” sectors. In contrast, a “high stake” sector where the government 
has strong links and similar trade preference and is willing to protect the sector.  
The Chinese governments have a special interest in industries inherited from the 
central-planning period that in turn influences their decision towards liberalisation 
(Hillman, 1989). By identifying the “low stake” and “high stake” sectors, this author 
differentiates supervising agencies with sectoral interest from those with bureaucratic 
goals. Trade preferences are divergent in “low stake” sectors like agriculture and 
textile where their supervising agencies are primarily concerned about their 
bureaucratic interests. In contrast, trade preferences are convergent in “high stake” 
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sectors like telecommunications services, banking and automobile as their supervisors 
are primarily concerned about sectoral interests. Accordingly, trade concession is 
easier to concede to in “low stake” sectors than “high stake” sectors.  
 
Sub-Hypothesis 1.1 The Closer the Administrative Relation between Government and 
Industry, the Higher the Stake the Bureaucracy has in the Sector 
Although the government had attempted to cut off ties with enterprises in the 
1980s and 1990s, the line ministries still retained certain administrative power to 
supervise the industry. This thesis hypothesises that the closer the administrative 
relation between them, the higher the stake the bureaucracy has in the sector. 
The administrative control the supervising government has over the industries 
can be in the decision making of the production plan, procurement of input materials, 
pricing of the product, etc. The government considers enterprises under its control as 
a part of its planning organ. The success of a subordinate industry is considered the 
supervising agency’s administrative accomplishment. An unsuccessful industry casts 
doubts on the supervisor’s administrative ability and jeopardises the agency’s interest 
of maximising “its likelihood to remain in office or its legitimacy to rule” (Chen and 
Feng, 2000: 324). Accordingly, the supervising agency will be supportive of the 
opening-up of the trade regime if the industry expects greater returns from its 
involvement in international trade or it helps to prevent the dismantlement of the trade 
barrier if the industry is not ready for international competition. The government that 
has little administrative relations with the industry has relatively less incentives to 
work for sectoral interests. It does not have direct responsibilities for the performance 
of the industry. 
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Sub-Hypothesis 1.2 The Closer the Fiscal/Financial Relation between Government 
and Industry, the Higher the Stake the Bureaucracy has in the Sector 
Since the fiscal decentralisation in the early 1980s, the Chinese state permitted 
revenue sharing among the supervising ministries, local authorities and firms in a 
“tiao-kuai” structure (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996) that varies across industries.  
In the presence of a strong fiscal/financial incentive, the government will be 
active in working for the interest of the industry whether in the form of corporate 
governance or predatory governance. The government exercising corporate 
governance is profit-seeking (Nee and Su, 1996). Better performance of the industry 
generates more returns to both the government and firms. Meanwhile, the government 
relies on the firms to evaluate the prospects of opening up to international 
competition. Suppose the industry is reluctant to join international free trade, its 
supervising agencies that value fiscal/financial benefits will prevent the 
dismantlement of the entry barrier. The government that exercises predatory 
governance is rent seeking. The supervising agency has less concern for the 
performance of individual firms. Instead, it pays more attention to its political control 
of the rent generated by the industry (Lin and Zhu, 2001: 312). The external 
competition imposes a threat to domestic enterprises that are disadvantaged by their 
fiscal/financial burden. The declining returns of the subordinate enterprises cannot 
sustain rent paid to the supervising agency. For example, the MOF had more 
predatory interests than corporatist interests in the banking industry and therefore 
strongly opposed to the opening-up of the sector (see Chapter 8 for details). Thus, 
both corporatist and predatory states have reasons to protect their subordinate industry 
if the industry is not competitive in a free market. 
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To conclude, an institutional embeddedness of domestic political economy 
shapes the responses of economic bureaucracies to the trade negotiation. The 
supervising agencies would not bother to be involved in trade negotiations if they 
have high stake in their subordinate industries.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Trade concessions are usually made on more competitive sectors 
A sector is considered competitive if it enjoys some comparative advantages in 
the global market, like productivity, profitability, labour or capital intensity, economy 
of scale, technology and quality of service. The industry that enjoys these comparative 
advantages tends to join international trade, as an expanded market brings more profit 
that in turn contributes to the further development of the industry (Ricardo, 1971). 
The illusion of a state-run export-oriented strategy is actually based on the industry 
which is able to gain from trade liberalisation (Krueger, 1990: 109). 
If an industry is not competitive in free trade or is in its infancy stage, it will ask 
the government for protection (Corden, 1974; Dixit and Norman, 1980; Baldwin, 
1985). Although fierce competition provides industry players with a good opportunity 
of learning advanced technology, managerial skills, etc. that are beneficial to the 
industry in the long run, it also heightens the industry’s chance of collapse or takeover 
by long established multinationals. It is not a serious problem from the Ricardian 
point of view or the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model as the force of international 
specialisation will push enterprises and workers to other industries that are 
internationally competitive. However, the industry would of course like to prolong the 
protection for as long as possible (Francois and Wooton, 2001: 401). 
During the trade talks, negotiators tend to give concessions on competitive 
sectors to protect uncompetitive ones. According to de Dreu et al (1995: 97; also see 
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Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992), “losses are more aversive than equivalent gains are 
attractive, loss framed negotiators should display greater resistance to concession 
making and settle less easily than negotiators with a gain frame”. The hypothesis is 
also confirmed by Keohane’s (1986: 4) observation of US-Japan trade talks in the 
1980s where negotiators tended to seek “unilaterally to repeal the law of comparative 
advantage” for the purpose of “moving toward a (trade) balance with Japan”. As the 
Japanese government did not guarantee American firms’ market share in Japan’s 
semiconductor chips sector, the United States did not fight hard to secure potential 
gains in the sector but impose retaliatory tariffs to minimise its potential loss in the 
other sectors (Bhagwati, 1987: 567). 
In China, giving concession in uncompetitive sectors jeopardises the survival of 
the domestic industry. The closure of factories and the large number of layoffs may 
lead to social unrest. Accordingly, the negotiators have made concerted efforts to 
shield losses making firms (Chen and Feng, 2000). Besides, Chinese negotiators had 
more incentives to give up potential gains to prevent equally weighted potential 
losses. The competitiveness of China’s export is, to a large extent, determined by its 
cheap product pricing and acceptable quality. Cheap labour and undervalued RMB 
guarantee cheap Chinese products in the international market. The joint venture with 
the injection of  foreign direct investments (FDIs) and transfer of technology and 
management know-how help Chinese products meet world specification and quality 
requirement (Adams et al, 2006). Exports generated by foreign-invested enterprises 
accounted for about 46% of China’s total exports in 1999 (Zhang and Song, 2000). 
China has less incentive to help the FDIs maximise their competitive potential.  
As concluded by Frieden and Rogowski (1996: 38), the impact of the exogenous 
easing of trade is sector-specific; political cleavages will be sectoral, a divide between 
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those relatively competitive on world markets and those relatively not; and their trade 
preference will differ accordingly. Although comparative advantage accounts for 
much of the sectoral differences, it is more complicated if we take into consideration 
the interests of individual firms. As Yoffie (1993: 1) argues, despite the relevance of 
comparative advantage, firms and governments are “what really matter in determining 
international trade”. The next section explains how market structure influences the 
result of trade concessions. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Trade concessions are usually made on less concentrated sectors 
Market structure describes the status of individual firms in the industry. This 
thesis simply categorises the market structure into two, namely, competitive market 
and oligopoly/monopoly. Competitive market is characterised by a very large number 
of enterprises producing a homogeneous product or service. Oligopoly is a market 
dominated by a small number of firms that own more than 40% of the market share. 
Monopoly is the market with only one provider of the product or service. 
Oligopolies or monopolies in a closed economy determine their profit mainly 
through the control of price and volume of products offered to the market (Atje and 
Hufbauer, 1996: 24). Their interests are representative of the sector because of their 
market status. The interests of other small enterprises are usually overlooked for their 
small presence in the market. Monopolies/oligopolies are capable of lobbying the 
government in a unified voice. 
In a competitive market with an absence of monopolies or oligopolies, 
enterprises’ interests are diversified and their action is poorly organised. For example, 
intra-industry disputes in French and American footwear and semiconductor sectors in 
the 1970s prevented the industries from realising their preferred trade policy (Milner, 
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1987: 651). Business association may solve the collective-action problem in the 
industry (Caves, 1976). However, its action is still less efficient than the monopoly as 
a unitary actor.  
As mentioned earlier, negotiators are loss aversive. They tend to give up 
potential gains to prevent potential losses. The argument is reinforced by Bauer et 
al.’s (1972) observation in the United States where an uncompetitive industry exerted 
more political pressure on protection than a competitive industry’s pressure for 
liberalisation. From enterprises’ point of view, according to Bauer et al., the benefits 
of trade liberalisation will be small and diffuse, while the benefits of protection will 
be sizable and tangible. However, after introducing the variable of market structure, 
the difference in competitiveness is less significant. Milner (1987: 651) challenged 
that in a concentrated sector that consisted of a small number of enterprises, the 
benefit of liberalisation and protection was equally weighted. As the benefit of trade 
liberalisation is not diffusively distributed in the sector, the competitive enterprises 
“may act to realize their preferences just as much as protectionist groups do”. Thus, a 
concentrated market structure minimises the difference of sectoral impact of 
competitive and uncompetitive industries. However, it does not have any impact on 
negotiators’ preference. Even though the sectoral pressures from competitive and 
uncompetitive groups are equally strong, the negotiators tend to give up potential 
gains to prevent potential loss. 
In China, sectoral pressure as an independent variable has become more and 
more apparent since the separation of government and industry (Pearson, 2000). The 
enterprises became vocal at the threshold of WTO accession to make their interests 
heard. The sector with high concentration, like banking, had reportedly pushed 
negotiators to protect their interest. In contrast, Chinese peasants who were much less 
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organised did not manage to prevent negotiators from giving trade concessions. 
China’s market structure has some relatively unique features that are different those of 
capitalist countries. Firstly, non-cooperative action between oligopolies/monopolies is 
treated as a special case that is more in common with the competitive market.  Eyal’s 
(1994) analysis of non-cooperative natural monopolies reminds us of the possibility of 
non-cooperative behaviours between oligopolies or monopolies that challenge the 
existence of coherent sectoral interests. The research on natural monopolies that are 
characterised by increasing returns to scale of production is primarily based on the 
assumptions that their actions were mainly driven by pure economic reasons and they 
are free from political repression. In China, the assumption should be treated more 
carefully, as the firms become monopolies for political reasons rather than economic 
reasons. They are usually SOEs or SOE-inherited firms controlled by different 
supervisors in the central government.4 If each of the dual-monopolies is connected to 
different bureaucracies that have competitive claims of supervision of the industry, a 
unitary support by the government will be constrained after its power and resources 
are consumed by the in-fighting (Pearson, 2005: 309; for empirical analysis, see 
China’s telecommunications industry in Chapter 6). Secondly, in China, business 
associations did not represent sectoral interest at that time. They exist as quasi-
governmental organisations that mainly respond to requests from higher-level 
agencies. The presence of economic associations in China during the period of study 




                                               
4
 According to Tang (2007: 189), the uniqueness of China’s monopoly is the combination of three different kinds 
of monopolies, namely natural monopoly as the excuse, behavioural monopoly as the means, and administrative 
monopoly as the institutional guarantees.  
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2.4 A Holistic Concern for Horse Trading Concession 
Government policy maximises the net support it can obtain from the populace. 
A horse trading strategy was adopted by negotiators through weighing the various 
concerns.  Taking into account all these factors, there are eight scenarios leading to 
different degrees of government’s incentives for concession (Figures 2.1 and 2.2).  
Scenario A-D: The supervising agency refrains from intervening in “low stake” 
sectors. Having cut off government-industry relations with the sector, the supervising 
agencies lose its sectoral interests and switch to bureaucratic interest that might not be 
convergent with that of the industry. The negotiators thus have more incentive to give 
trade concession on “low stake” sectors. In “low stake” sectors, firms are 
predominately non-state actors. Less concentrated sectors have less capacity to protect 
their interests, because it is difficult for a large number of enterprises to speak in one 
voice. The incentive for concession is the strongest when the sector is internationally 
competitive, as the negotiators tend to give up potential gains to prevent potential 
loss. 
Scenario E-H: The supervising agency has vested interests in protecting its 
“high stake” sectors. It has few incentives to give trade concession on its subsidiaries. 
The incentive will be fewer if the sector can generate a unified pressure on the 
government. The reason for concession will be the least if the negotiators are in a 
loss-framed position. 
An aggregate concern of the three variables (Figure 2.2) tells us that negotiators 
tend to fight hard for sector G while easily back down on sector B. The concession is 






Figure 2.1 Independent Variables in the Model of Ministry-Sector Horse 
Trading Concession: Sectoral Strength, Competitiveness and Market Structure 
 
            Government’s stake  Competitiveness                  Market structure      
             in the sector 
 
                                                High concentration   ….A (+2) 
                                                    Competitive (+1) 
                                                Low concentration (+1) .…B (+3) 
                           Low (+1) 
                                               High concentration   ….C (+1) 
                                                      Uncompetitive 
                                                Low concentration (+1) ….D (+2) 
Industry        
                                               High concentration………..E (+1) 
                                                    Competitive (+1) 
                                          Low concentration (+1) ….F (+2) 
                            High   
                                                High concentration……….. G (0) 
                                                      Uncompetitive 
                                                Low concentration (+1) ….H (+1) 
 
Note: (+1) =stronger incentive for concession; high concentration includes 
monopolistic and oligopolistic markets; low concentration includes a situation of 
competitive market and uncooperative monopolies/oligopolies 
Examples: B (textile and clothing sector); D (agricultural sector); G 
(telecommunications service; banking industry); H (automobile industry: non-
cooperative oligopolies);  
Source: compiled by the author 
 
Figure 2.2 An Aggregate Result of the Model of Ministry-Sector Horse Trading 
Concession 
                      
G            (C,E,H)            (A,D,F)                B   
 
  State protection                                                                                    Trade Concession 
0                 +1                     +2                    +3 
                        Telecom/       Auto        Agriculture       Textile 
                       Banking  
 
Note: B (textile and clothing sector); G (telecommunications service; banking industry); 
H (automobile industry); D (agricultural sector) 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
 
2.5 Methods of Measuring the Independent Variables 
The independent variables in the thesis are competitiveness, market structure 
and government-industry relations. The measurement of competitiveness and market 
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structure is based on the review of economists’ analysis of the industry. The focus of 
this thesis is to adopt a new way of analysing government-industry relations. 
As mentioned earlier, the enterprises started to gain autonomous rights in 10 
areas in 1984 and again in 14 areas in 1992. For analytical convenience, this thesis 
incorporates them into 10 areas of autonomy, including plan of production 
management, capital investment, allocation of wage and bonus, asset management, 
personnel and labour management, procurement of materials, autonomous right of 
alliance management, right to decide on pricing, right to establish internal 
organisation, and sales. A qualitative analysis is adopted to understand how the 
autonomy was nominally granted to firms but effectively retained by the government. 
Government’s control of these 10 areas of autonomy is also quantified by coding each 
of them as 10% of government-firm connection. For each autonomy (An), state 
control (Cn) is coded as full control (100%), partial control (50%) and little control 
(0). Thus, the formula is: 
 
Administrative connection with the firms (AF) = A1*C1+A2*C2+…+A10*C10 
 
 
As the government is probably connected with some enterprises but not all in 
the industry, the thesis will examine the market share of these enterprises to 
understand the significance of the relationship to the whole industry. The market 
share (MS) is also applied to quantify the relationship between the government and 
industry: 
 





The thesis also analyses the fiscal/financial connection between the government 
and industry to understand the extent the government is fiscally relied on by the 
industry. Aside from the tax revenue remitted to the MOF, this thesis is interested in 
the amount of profit to be transferred to the supervising agencies in form of either 
dividend or rent. 
To conclude, this chapter reviews the domestic sources of trade concessions. As 
the existing thereom or model is not directly applicable to an understanding of 
China’s trade concession for entering the WTO, the thesis develops a “ministry-sector 
horse trading” model to explain the topic. Having introduced the independent 
variables through the model, the next chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of 
















Chapter 3 China’s Trade Concessions in Sino-American WTO 
Negotiation       
 
3.1     Introduction 
This thesis selects five industries, namely agriculture, textile and clothing, 
automobile, telecommunications services and banking to observe the variations of the 
dependent variable. The five sectors were among the final seven issues in the Sino- 
American negotiation for WTO accession. These issues were put aside to the year 
1999, as no party was willing to accept the counterpart’s offer. They had to make 
further concessions to break the deadlock so that they could seal the deal by the end of 
the year.  
The thesis evaluates the concession by taking into account the three sources of 
information: negotiators’ statements through both internal and public documents, a 
comparison of sectoral requests with the final Sino-American agreement and a 
comparison of sectoral expectation prior to WTO accession with sectoral performance 
in the post-WTO era. Having considered the three sources of information, the 
dependent variable across sectors is China’s concession in agricultural, textile and 









Table 3.1 Indicators of Trade Concessions 






Internal document and 
public statement claimed 
a concession in the 
sector 
Yes Yes No No No 
Sectoral request was 
NOT met by the final 
agreement 
N.A. Yes No No No 
Sectoral performance in 
the post-WTO era was 
worse than expected 
Yes Yes No No No 
Concession Yes Yes No No No 
Note: N.A. = not available 
Source: compiled by the author 
 
3.2    Concessions on Agricultural Sector 
At the WTO negotiation table, major issues on the agricultural sector for 
Chinese representatives were to terminate export subsidies and eliminate non-tariff 
measures as requested by their American counterpart. Chinese and foreign scholars 
found that the agricultural sector was under-protected by the government in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The cheap agricultural products gave the US and other WTO members an 
illusion that the Chinese government must have provided huge export subsidies to the 
peasants. They requested that the Chinese government maintain its subsidies for the 
agricultural sector at a zero level.5 Though the Chinese government did provide some 
subsidies to the agricultural sector, the amount was not as huge as what the US had 
estimated. Besides, the subsidies did not go to the peasants alone. Most of them went 
to the intermediate agencies (Chen, 2000). In the Fifth WTO Working Meeting, China 
decided to terminate its export subsidies on the agricultural sector (Chen, 2000). The 
decision exposed the agricultural sector where the low price was caused by domestic 
industrial-agricultural price scissor to the danger of foreign anti-damping sues.  
                                               
5
 China had officially abolished its direct export subsidies in 1991. 
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The Sino-US Agreement on Agriculture that was signed during former Premier 
Zhu Rongji’s visit to the US in April 1999 was mainly to eliminate China’s non-tariff 
measures against American agricultural products.6 Wen Tiejun from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) complained that when US Minister of Agriculture celebrated the 
conclusion of the bilateral agreement in April 1999,7 his Chinese counterpart never 
even had the chance of reading the document. Ma Youxiang, vice leader of the State 
Bureau of Development and Planning in the MOA, managed to join the Sino-
American trade talks, but had little influence on the final deal (Yang, 2000: 88). The 
MOA was very pessimistic when China entered the WTO (He, 2000). They 
complained that the biggest challenge for China’s economy would be in the 
agriculture sector. The sector expected a RMB 6-7 billion loss because of the Sino-
American agricultural agreement (Ministry of Agriculture, 1999: 44).  
Sino-US Agreement on Agriculture was reached earlier than the other issues—
like automobile and telecommunications—because it was easier for Chinese 
negotiators to make concession on agricultural issue first (China Rural Economy 
Editorial Board, 2000: 355). In return, American agreed to firmly support China’s 
accession within the year 1999 (China, U.S. Issue Joint Statement on China’s WTO 
Accession, April 10, 1999). Because of the Sino-American agricultural agreement, 
other WTO members, including the EU, Canada and Japan, also became supportive of 
China’s entry by the end of 1999 (Zuo and Song, 1999: 645). A stricter regulation on 
China’s subsidies on agricultural sector was made to other WTO members to 
conclude the negotiations.  
                                               
6
 In accordance with the agreement on agriculture, China lifted the 30-year ban on American wheat from the seven 
states in the Northwest where was bothered by disease, lifted the ban on citrus fruit from Arizona, Texas and 18 
counties in Florida, 21 counties in California except for Los Angeles County that experts considered had some 
technical problems and needed more explanatory data, and ratified American quarantine regulations on meat while 
retaining the right of random inspection. 
7
 American Minister of Agriculture praised the deal as “a breakthrough for American agriculture sector”.  
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In the end, China agreed to terminate import quota for all categories of 
agricultural products. A tariff rate quota was applied on some goods that were not 
competitive in international trade, like oil crops, wheat, corn, rice and cotton. China 
pledged not to provide export subsidies to the agricultural sector, something that 
neither the US nor the EU had agreed to implement for their own sector (Johnson, 
2000; Wen, 2000: 92).8 China’s average agricultural tariff rate, committed to decline 
from about 21% in 2001 to 17% by 2004 and from 31% to 14% on American priority 
agricultural products in the same time period, would even be lower than most of the 
developing countries (Yu and Frandsen, 2002). The reduction rates in grain, cotton, 
meat and soybean oil were much greater than the requirement by the Uruguay Round 
of agricultural agreement. The transition period for China was only five years 
compared to the 10-year transition period granted to developing countries. 
Chinese peasants ended up as the only losers of the deal (Bhalla and Qiu, 2004: 
77; Zuo and Song, 1999: 651). Former Premier Zhu Rongji repeatedly stated that the 
greatest impact after China’s WTO accession would be on the agricultural sector and 
the billions of peasants (Ma, 2001; Sun and Meng, 2002; Lin and Zhang, 2003: 71). 
His concerns were confirmed by the performance of Chinese agricultural trade after 
accession. China’s trade surplus experienced a slight growth in the first year of WTO 
membership before dipping significantly (Figure 3.1). China’s agricultural trade 





                                               
8
 It managed to secure farm subsidies at 8.5% of the value of domestic farm production in the range allowed by the 
developing country. 
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Trade surplus WTO membership
 
Source: compiled from data in China Agricultural Yearbook, various issues. 
 
 
3.3    Concessions on Textile and Clothing Sector 
China’s textile and clothing (T&C) sector was competitive in global trade in the 
1980s and 1990s. The enterprises requested for the lifting of export quotas from 
importing countries through the negotiation. Prior to the negotiation, the State Bureau 
of Textile (SBT) was informed by the State Council to prepare for any possible 
concessions. The SBT accepted the decision without any complaints (interview, 
January 2009).  
In face of pressure from American negotiators, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) easily backed down on T&C issues. Without 
protest from the SBT, Chinese negotiators decided to protect the automotive sector by 
sacrificing the T&C sector. Some key results of Sino-American negotiations on T&C 
sector with reference to China’s WTO accession are as follows: 
The Sino-American agreement in 1994 that produced the first quota on several 
classes of top-of-the-bed products effectively reduced China’s exports to American 
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market (Scaling the Great Wall hard for U.S. home, 1997: 12). The two parties also 
agreed to limit the growth in Chinese exports of silk to the US to 1% each year (Chen 
and Nomani, 1994: A3). Although the US adopted a sweeping method of effectively 
reducing T&C imports from developing countries in the mid 1990s, “China was alone 
in having its growth rate cut back so severely” (Moore, 2002: 68).  
During the fifth negotiation in February 1997, both sides agreed to sign a 
safeguard provision until the end of 2008 against all products subject to the 
Agreement of Textile and Clothing (ATC).9 During the 2005–2008 period, China 
would be the only WTO member that was subject to quota restrictions on its textile 
and apparel products (Lardy, 2001). The deal was consolidated in the final agreement 
of China’s WTO accession (World Trade Organisation, 2001). The agreement was 
also applicable to countries that did not impose quotas on China’s T&C exports 
previously (Liu and Sun, 2004: 60). 
To maintain China’s quotas on foreign cars and spare parts imports till 2005, the 
MOFTEC in November 1999 allowed other countries to keep their quotas on Chinese 
textile and clothing products till the same year when the MFA expires.10 According to 
the agreement, Chinese negotiators would maintain 86.5% of textile products under 
American quotas until 2005 and 73.3% under EU quotas (Dickson, 2001, quoted from 
Williams et al, 2002: 580). American negotiators insisted on extending their quota for 
another five years from 2005 when the MFA was finally phased out as a condition for 
their support of China’s WTO membership (Moore, 2002: 70). Chinese negotiators 
rejected the request. In response, the US realised that emergency safeguard measures 
remained “the only realistic option which countries can lawfully take to combat fair 
                                               
9
 The safeguards can be applied “almost automatically” with no necessity of consulting Chinese government 
(Hufbauer, Wong, and Sheth, 2006: 30). 
10
 The GATT members reached the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC) during the Uruguay Round to 
terminate the MFA by 1 January 2005. 
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import competition from China” (Panitchpakdi and Clifford, 2002: 76). Accordingly, 
they pushed Chinese negotiators to make a further concession in the final agreement, 
a special safeguard against China’s T&C exports, effective until 2013. According to 
the special safeguard agreement, “(I)n the event a WTO Member believes that imports 
of Chinese origin of textiles and apparel products covered by the ATC as of the date 
the WTO Agreement entered into force, were, due to market disruption, threatening to 
impede the orderly development of trade in these products, such Member could 
request consultations with China with a view to easing or avoiding such market 
disruption”(WTO, 2002). 
In short, the T&C sector did not benefit from the WTO agreement. Its demand 
was turned down by the negotiators. Not only were export quotas retained but a new 
safeguard measure was imposed. Chinese T&C products were extremely competitive 
in global trade at that time. Its exports should have experienced notable increase after 
WTO accession. However, WTO membership did not have any impact on the growth 
trend of China’s global market share, compared to the phasing out of the MFA 











Figure 3.2 Annual Growth of Global Market Share of China’s T&C Products 
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Source: compiled from data in China Textile Industry Development Report, various 
issues. 
 
3.4   Little Concession on Automobile Sector 
On October 10, 1992, Tong Zhiguang, chief negotiator from the Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) agreed to lower tariffs on 
automobile and auto parts imports and gradually remove import quota permits. The 
concession from Chinese side was significant enough to push Americans to promise 
that the “US staunchly supports China’s entry into GATT” (Wei, 2002: 695). 
However, the promise made by the MOFERT in bilateral negotiation was not well 
coordinated by domestic players, especially the State Planning Commission (SPC). 
The first voluntary reduction of overall tariff rate was on April 30, 1993. The tariff 
rates of 3,382 categories of imported products were reduced. The automobile products 
were not included in this round after extensive internal debate. The tariffs for 
automobiles were reduced during the second round on December 31 of the same year, 
from 180%-220% to 110%-150%. However, a controversial increase in tariff rate of 
foreign “448-Engine” produced by the First Automotive Works (FAW) from 25% to 
45% was also made. The third round of voluntary reduction, including automobile 
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products in 1994, was opposed by the SPC at the Taxation Committee (shuishou 
weiyuanhui) Meeting in the State Council.11 
In 1994 when Chinese negotiators planned to seal the deal before the 
formalisation of the GATT, Li Xiaosong, vice director of the MOFTEC, publicly 
pledged that it would keep 10% (or 600) of the different categories of products in the 
extra- list that did not conform to the tariff reduction schedule.12 There were 300 
different categories in the automobile sector with a tariff rate higher than 40%. 
Automotive enterprises’ purpose was to keep all these 300 categories in the extra- list 
and leave the other 300 to the rest of sectors. The SPC promised that the passenger car 
would be the last item to give up protection.13 
Requested by the SPC in 1994, the Ministry of Machine Building (MMB) 
collected opinions towards the GATT/WTO from major automobile manufacturers. A 
report submitted to the SPC in September 1994 clearly stated that among the 150 
categories of products, 61 categories should be protected (39 of the whole vehicle, 22 
of the spare parts); 67 categories were allowed for some competition; and 22 
categories were able to join a fair competition (interview, January 2009). The report 
has requested for the protection of the sector for another 5-8 years since China’s entry 
into the WTO, with a possible extension to 8-10 years (Ibid.). 14  Besides, they 
requested for the acceptance of China as a developing country, as the “special and 
differential” provisions of the GATT/WTO allowed developing countries to protect 
their infant industry (Anderson, 1997: 764; Chen, 2002a: 147). Their demand was met 
                                               
11
 For details, see Qichesi fusizhang Miao Yu zai quanguo qiche hangye zhiliang gongzuo yantaohui shang de 
jianghua (Vice-director of Automobile division Miao Yu’s speech at national conference of quality control in the 
automobile sector), 1994. 
12
 But their bottom line was to keep at least 5% of different categories in the extra-list. 
13
 Qichesi fusizhang Miao Yu zai quanguo qiche hangye zhiliang gongzuo yantaohui shang de jianghua (Vice-
director of Automobile Division Miao Yu’s speech at national conference of quality control in the automobile 
sector), 1994. 
14
 See WTO regulations on Government Assistance to Economic Development with a special reference to the 
protection of infant industry. 
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by the government during the 1990s by comparing industry-required tariff rate and 
government-enforced tariff rate (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Comparison of Industry-Required Protection and 
Government-Enforced Protection in Automobile Industry 
 Passenger car Imported engine 
Year 1994 1995 2000 1994 1995 2000 
Lowest import tariff rate 
required by the industry 
(average) 
96.67 70.00 43.33 20 20 19 
Government-enforced tariff 
rate 
180 110 80 35 35 35 
Source: compiled from data in Tariff System of People’s Republic of China (from 1995 
to 2001) 
 
China and the United States started a new round of negotiations after China 
failed to enter the WTO as a founding member. American negotiators again requested 
for the liberalising of the automobile sector (Zhou and Wang, 2001). In response, the 
SDPC expressed its strong stance of protection.15 Finally, Chinese negotiators decided 
to protect the automobile sector by sacrificing the textile and clothing sector. In order 
to sustain the import quota of foreign automobile products till 2005, they allowed 
other countries to keep their quotas on Chinese textile till the same year. They also 
made American negotiators allow them to reduce the tariff rate from 80%-100% to 
25% by the year of 2006 instead of 2005, a five-year transition period acceptable to 
the industry. In exchange, Chinese guaranteed a faster reduction in the first few years 
since its entry into the WTO (Table 3.3). Although the tariff rate was reduced 
especially in the first two years of the entry, foreign automobile products did not enter 
Chinese market as they expected. The passenger car industry was considered as one of 
the most uncompetitive sectors before the WTO accession. Thanks to government 
                                               
15
 Although there was some disagreement between the Department of Machinery, Electronics, Textiles, and Light 
Industry (DMETI) and the Department of Long-term Planning and Industrial Policy (DLPIP) within the SDPC 
(Wang, 2002: 34), the Commission spoke up in one voice that the automobile sector should be protected. The 
DMETI, a result of a merger between MMI and other ministries, was the immediate agency under the SDPC to 
regulate the central SOEs in the automobile sector. The DLPIP was responsible for the annual plan and 
coordination among different sectors. The DLPIP’s request for making further concession in the automobile sector 
was opposed by the DMETI. 
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protection in terms of non-tariff barriers, the automobile sector did not hurt with 
China’s accession to the WTO. The market share of imported passenger cars 
experienced a slight increase in the first two years, but shrank again in the following 
years. By 2006, foreign passenger cars accounted for only 3% of sales in the Chinese 
market (Figure 3.3). The automobile industry became one of major beneficiaries of 
the WTO accession. 
 
Table 3.3 Tariff Rate Reduction and Reduction Rate in Passenger Car Industry 
from 2001 to 2006 (%) 
Products 2001.1 2002.1 2003.1 2004.1 2005.1 2006.1 2006.7 
<3Litres 70 44 38 34 30 28 25 
Reduction rate N.A. 37 14 11 12 7 11 
≥3Litres 80 51 43 38 30 28 25 
Reduction rate N.A. 36 16 12 21 7 11 
Source: complied from data in Ministry of Commerce: Zhongguo jiaru shijie maoyi 
zuzhi falv wenjian (legal document concerning China’s WTO accession), quoted from the 
CEI, 2004: 85 
 
Figure 3.3 Tariff Rates for Foreign Cars and the Market Shares of Domestic-Produced 
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Source: compiled from data in China Automotive Industry Yearbook, various issues 
 
3.5    Little Concession on Telecommunications Services 
The US request for telecommunications services were to 1) create an 
independent regulatory agency and completely separate the administrative link 
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between the government and China Telecom; 2) formulate a transparent and non-
discriminatory law or regulation on telecommunications sector; 3) grant foreign 
telecommunications service providers national treatment, open domestic value-added 
market to foreign investors immediately, and allow foreign companies to invest and 
operate value-added business; 4) provide an agenda of gradually opening up other 
value-added telecommunications service, wireless mobile communication service and 
wire communication service to domestic and foreign companies; 5) terminate China 
Telecom’s monopoly on international telecommunications service and dual-monopoly 
(China Telecom and China Unicom) in the field of basic telecommunications services 
(Quan, 2002: 157).  
However, Chinese negotiators did not show any intention of lifting the ban on 
foreign entry during Sino-American talks (Johnson, 1999a). It also squeezed the room 
of domestic competition from other state-owned telecommunications companies 
controlled by the other Ministries. In 1998, Wu Jichuan, representing the 
telecommunications sector, clearly stated that they were not ready to open up the 
sector (Guojia dianxin zhuguan bumen fuzenren Wu Jichuan shuo, woguo dianxin 
yewu duiwai kaifang tiaojian shangbu chengshu, 1998: 43).  
Minister Wu’s statement, however, did not stop Premier Zhu from making 
concessions during Zhu’s April trip to the United States in 1999.16 The American 
media reported that Chinese negotiators had already agreed on the deal offered by 
their US counterpart. According to Zhu’s offer, China would end geographic 
restrictions for mobile and cellular within six years and allow 49% foreign investment 
in all services and 51% foreign ownership for value-added and paging services in four 
years.  
                                               
16
 According to Johnson (1999a), a ministry official said, “When we left, we had agreed to allow foreigners 30% 
[stake in Chinese companies]…Now suddenly Zhu is offering 49% or 51%. There was no consultation with us.” 
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However, Minister Wu had insisted upon giving only the minority stake to 
foreign companies (Kim, 2002: 448, fn.15). In order to protect sectoral interests, the 
MII uncovered internal disagreement to the public for the purpose of preventing the 
Chinese negotiation team from making too many concessions to WTO members in the 
final deal. He was rumoured to have tendered resignation on two occasions, one of 
which was at a Cabinet meeting to discuss reforms that Premier Zhu proposed during 
his April trip to Washington (Johnson, 1999b). 
Minister Wu and the MII eventually won the internal battle in the State Council. 
The MII, according to Cooper and Chan (1999), considered lifting the ban on foreign 
involvement in the internet sector during talks in September, but insisted on 
protecting long-distance calls and value-added services. The final agreement between 
China and the United States in November 1999 allowed for 50% foreign ownership in 
paging service and internet content provision, and a 49% cap on basic telecom 
services (Lu and Wong, 2003: 79-80).   
China’s telecommunications services were less developed in global trade of 
services. WTO accession would have seen significant inflow of foreign investment, 
but did not. By 2008, there was very little foreign investment in the Chinese market, 
especially in basic telecom services, like fixed line and mobile. Some notable 
exceptions were Telefonica’s 9% equity stake in China Netcom, Vodafone’s 3% 
equity stake in China Mobile, and AT&T in the joint venture called UNISITI (Hsueh, 
2008: 95).   
  
3.6    Little Concession on Banking Industry 
On 22 July 1993 when GATT members were about to conclude the Uruguay 
Round, the newly appointed negotiators from the American side brought up the issues 
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of trade in services in Sino-American negotiation (Bangsberg, 1993: 3A). As a result, 
more ministries such as the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, PBOC, China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission, and China Securities Regulatory Commission 
were added to the coordination group.  
No concrete concession on the banking industry was made by the MOFTEC-led 
coordination group. Premier Zhu at the 1997 annual meeting of the World Bank and 
IMF in Hong Kong stated that a step-by-step approach was needed for the opening of 
the banking sector. In April 1998, Chinese negotiators, mainly staff from the 
MOFTEC, complained that they were not ready to make concession on banking 
industry due to the problems of “domestic coordination” as state banks wanted the 
large domestic market for themselves. The negotiators suggested putting the issue to 
the last (Satchit, 1999: 14-5). Rumours had it that the coordination group decided to 
give up their agricultural sector in exchange for certain benefits for the financial 
sector that was important to the MOF and PBOC (He, 2000). An early agreement on 
the agricultural sector between China and the United States in April 1999 paved the 
way for the negotiation of the other issues. A tentative agreement on the banking 
industry was also reached during Zhu’s April trip. The agreement to gradually open 
up the domestic banking industry included allowing American banks to conduct 
foreign currency business with Chinese clients one year after China’s accession. 
China will allow local currency business with Chinese enterprises starting two years 
after accession, and allow local currency business with Chinese individuals from five 
years after accession. China should allow the joint-invested bank on accession and 
allow the joint-invested bank become American bank five years later.  
SDPC, SETC, MOF and PBOC representatives with interests in the banking 
industry were allowed to sit in at the Sino-American negotiation in November 1999 to 
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negotiate on any further request for concession from the sector. According to Long 
Yongtu (2009), among seven toughest issues in the final round of talks, Chinese 
negotiators successfully protected the interests of the banking industry by not 
submitting to requests for majority shareholding of foreign companies in the sector. 
They had tried “very hard to get the longest transitional periods” for opening up the 
banking sector (Long, 2008a). 
Chinese banks were not competitive against global giants at that time. Their 
capability of surviving foreign competition became a great concern after WTO 
accession. Thanks to the effort of the negotiators, the banks had done much better 
under the WTO mechanism when “foreign-funded banks actually account for a 
smaller share of bank assets in 2003 than they did in 1997” (Naughton, 2007: 459). 
According to data from People’s Bank of China, foreign banks’ share of total banking 
system assets has decreased since WTO accession. It stood below 2% in 2004, 2% in 
2005 and climbed to slightly over 2% by 2006 and 2.4% by 2007. When the 
agreement took effect by end 2006, foreign banks’ share in 2007 was just slightly 















Figure 3.4 The Change of Foreign Banks’ Share of Total Assets in Banking System  
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Note: Total assets include the assets of state-owned banks, Rural Credit Cooperatives, 
Urban Credit Cooperatives, Insurance companies, Trust and Investment Corporations, Non-
deposit Intermediaries, other commercial banks and foreign banks. 
Source: compiled from data in People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank), 2000 – 
2006, quoted from Allen et al., 2007. Data of 2005, 2006 and 2007 foreign assets is from 
Xinhua (2006), the USTR (2008: 82) and Tong (2008), respectively. 
  
3.7    A Brief Introduction to the Comparative Case Studies 
Independent variables including competitiveness, market structure and 
government-industry relations determine the result of trade concession in each sector 
will be explained in detail from Chapters 4 to 8. The thesis will first make a sector-
specific analysis over different time periods before making a comparative analysis 
across sectors. 
Chapter 4 explains relations between the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the 
agricultural industry. Since 1978, agricultural production has been pretty much 
laissez-faire as individual households is left very much on their own. Although the 
sector expected more challenges than opportunities from trade liberalisation, the 
MOA had little incentive to protect the sector. A concession on agricultural industry 
was made for potential gains to the banking industry through “horse trading”. 
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Chapter 5 examines relations between the textile and clothing industry and its 
supervising agencies that were downgraded from ministry to state bureau level. The 
industry was filled with a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises that 
were competitive in international trade. The State Bureau of Textile that had little 
connection with the industry gave “limited” support to the trade liberalisation. The 
sector’s request for lifting import quota against Chinese products was not raised. Its 
interest was sacrificed in exchange for the protection of the automobile industry. 
Relations between SPC and automobile industry were analysed in Chapter 6. 
Since 1987, the autonomy granted to the automobile industry by the SPC has been 
gradually withdrawn, a reversal of major trends of separating government from the 
industry. Although fragmented oligopolies exerted a less coherent pressure on the 
government, the SPC had done a great job in protecting its subordinate enterprises.  
Chapter 7 explores relations between the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
and telecommunications services. The Ministry of Post and Telecommunications 
(MPT) has gradually granted autonomy to local authorities since the early 1980s. The 
industry became dual-monopolies because of the entry of new players in 1994. 
However, the lack of cooperation between the monopolies controlled by different 
ministries has challenged the control of foreign entry barrier. The problem was solved 
in the 1998 government restructuring. The MII’s re-centralised control of the 
uncompetitive industry gave the ministry strong impetus to protect the sector.  
Finally, Chapter 8 analyses relations between the MOF and banking industry. 
The government started to relax its control of the oligopolies gradually in the early 
1980s, but regained certain control of the sector in 1995 and again in 1998. Because 
of close connection, especially strong rent-seeking incentive, the MOF effectively 
protected the sector that was not competitive in international trade of services. 
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Chapter 4: Agricultural Sector with Little Protection from the 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Anderson and Hayami (1986: 1) observed a pattern of agricultural protection in 
East Asian countries. The pattern showed that, as economies grow, the governments 
“tend to change from taxing to assisting or protecting agriculture relative to other 
sectors, and that this change occurs at an earlier stage of economic growth the weaker 
the country’s comparative advantage in agriculture”. However, scholars studying 
China’s agriculture suggested that China’s agricultural policy did not follow the same 
pattern in the 1980s and 1990s, as they did not see an evolution in protective 
measures. For example, Huang et al.’s (2007) calculation of the Nominal Rate of 
Assistance (NRA) in China’s agricultural sector implied that the agricultural sector 
during this period was under-protected.17 The policy outcome was shocking as seen 
through a comparison of the NRA between the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors (Table 4.1). The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (1998: 44), Carter and 
Estrin (2001), Chen (2000: 40–3), and Du (2001: 57) also found that the agricultural 
sector had never been protected by the state in international trade before China’s entry 
into the WTO. In response, Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela (2007) explained that 
experience from the last two decades proved that China was still in the early stage of 
taxing the agricultural sector; a protective policy was foreseeable in the long run.  
 
 
                                               
17
 According to Huang et al (2007: 23), the NRA that is constructed by estimating an NRA on output is used to 
compare the price of a commodity in the domestic economy at the port with the international price of the 
commodity at the border, taking into account inherent differences in product quality where appropriate. A positive 
NRA indicates that the sector is being protected, while a negative NRA points to forms of taxation. 
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Table 4.1 Nominal Rates of Assistance to Agricultural Relative to  
Non-Agricultural Industries, China, 1981 to 1999 
Item/year 1981-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
All agricultural tradables* -45.2 -35.5 -14.3 6.6 
All non-agricultural tradables 41.6 28.3 24.9 9.9 
Note: Assuming all agricultural production is tradable and including product and non-
product specific subsidies. 
Source: Huang et al (2007: 60). 
 
Politically, the support from the peasants is fundamentally important to the 
Communist governance. Throughout Chinese history, there were plenty of lessons 
that the government would be overthrown by the peasants’ rebellions.  The central 
state in comtemporary China takes rural stability as the “overwhelming concern” 
(Han, 2005). However, its good will and supporting policies that were meant for 
gradually revising deteriorating position of the agricultural sector were always 
distorted by the local authorities (Bernstein and Lü, 2000). On the threshold of WTO 
accession, the level of rural instability was already significant, “preoccupying Chinese 
leaders” (Han, 2005). If that is the case, how could Chinese negotiator make such a 
huge concession on the agricultural sector, which would in turn escalate the state-
peasant tensions?  
This study suggests that Chinese negotiator adopted a horse-trading strategy. In 
order to enlarge the size of the domestic win-set, it had to give up the agricultural 
sector, as the negotiators received much less pressure from either the Minsitry of 
Agriculture at the top of the hirachical system or the peasants at the grass root. The 
negotiators did not have to bear the major responsibility of escalating the state-peasant 
tension, as the protests were always scattered and primarily targated at the local 
authorities. Besides, the process of moving to a protective policy on the agricultural 
sector would be very long due to the divergent interests of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA) and Chinese peasants. China’s concessions for WTO accession in the 
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agricultural sector prior to the emergence of protectionist pressure, which is different 
from the experience in Japan and South Korea, made this process even longer and 
more costly. 
 
4.2 Government-Industry Relations in the Agricultural Sector 
4.2.1 The Agricultural Industry 
The agricultural sector in China includes four different subsectors, namely 
forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, and agriculture (which can be further separated 
into grain crops (e.g., wheat, rice, and corn) and cash crops (e.g., cotton, oil crops, 
sugar crops, fruits, and vegetables)). The reliance on grain crops and cash crops 
remained significant but had been declining as their composition of total output value 
in the sector decreased from 80% in 1978 to 57.7% by the end of the 1990s (Table 
4.2). Fisheries and animal husbandry emerged as important alternatives as the two 
subsectors together accounted for almost 40% of the total output value in agricultural 
industry in 1999. 
 
Table 4.2 Composition of Total Output Value of Agriculture, Forestry, 
Animal Husbandry and Fisheries (%) 
Sector/year 1978 1985 1996 1999 
Fisheries 1.6 3.5 9.0 10.3 
Animal husbandry 15.0 22.1 26.9 28.6 
Forestry 3.4 5.2 3.5 3.6 
Agriculture (grain crops and cash crops) 80.0 69.2 60.6 57.5 
Source: China Agriculture Yearbook (2000: 12). 
 
 
4.2.2 Supervising Agencies in the Central Government 
Central control of the agricultural sector was fragmented, as there were as many 
as fourteen different governmental agencies supervising the sector (Shi, 2008: 48). In 
the State Council, the State Planning Commission (SPC) –changed to the State 
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) during the 1998 Administrative 
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Reform – stayed at the top of the hierarchy. Other agencies at the ministerial level 
were the MOA, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) (downgraded to the State Bureau 
of Commerce (SBC) in 1998), the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MOFERT) (changed to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) in 1993). Certain agencies were assigned to supervise the subsector of 
grains that was strategically important for food security (Wen, 2000: 86). These were 
the State Grain Bureau (SGB) and State Administration for Grain Reserves (SAGR) 
which came under the SDPC in 1998. 
The replacement of the commune system with the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) in the early 1980s significantly restrained the MOA’s control of 
agricultural sector. The SGB under the MOC/SBC and the MOFERT/MOFTEC 
became more connected with the sector for their own interests. This section analyzes 
the administrative and fiscal/financial links between individual households and 
different governmental agencies at the national level. The result explains their 
different efforts to protect the sector in the WTO negotiations.18  
 
4.2.3 “Decentralisation” in the Agricultural Sector  
The agricultural sector in the 1980s and 1990s experienced three distinctive 
stages of development. 19  The first stage (1978–1986) freed the peasants from 
administrative control by the MOA in agricultural production through 
decollectivization (Findlay, Martin, and Watson, 1993: 45). The second stage (1985–
1995) liberalized the domestic market controlled by the MOC and the price control by 
                                               
18
 The MOA’s administrative and fiscal control of township and village enterprises (TVEs) is not the focus of this 
study. The commune and brigade enterprises under the MOA in central-planning period transformed to TVEs 
since the introduction of the HRS (Zweig, 1993: 421). Although the TVEs remained supervised by the MOA, most 
of them did not engage into agricultural production.  
19
 For example, de Brauw, Huang, and Rozelle (2002) divided the period of economic reforms in agricultural 
sector into two stages: the early reforms (1978-84) were dominated by decollectivization and the rise in incentives 
for peasants and the later reforms (1985-95), in contrast, have focused on the gradual attempt by leaders to 
liberalize the economy and develop market institutions. 
 60
the SPC. During the third stage (1995–1999) at the threshold of China’s WTO 
accession, the central government implemented a series of policies to regain control 
of the domestic market and international trade in the grain sector (Wang, 2001). 
 
4.2.3.1 Granting Autonomy to Individual Households by the MOA, 1978–1986 
Separating the MOA from individual households was carried out in a manner of 
successful “shock therapy”. The idea of giving autonomy to the industries in China’s 
economic development first appeared in the sector of agriculture.20 Chinese peasants 
“invented” the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1978 in drought-stricken 
Fengyang County, Anhui Province. It would be more appropriate to say that the 
Chinese peasants had no choice but to break the central planning system. They risked 
their lives to sign the contract which allowed individual households to use land that 
was still collectively or state-owned.21 Under the HRS, the peasants had incentive to 
invest in the contracted land for higher agricultural production.22 In the early 1980s, 
the strongest opposition to the HRS in the State Council came from the Agriculture 
Commission and the MOA (Zhang, 1997). They refused to give up their 
administrative control of the communes. However, the State Council approved the 
HRS and agreed that it would be a possible way to free its investment in agricultural 
production. Chen Yonggui (the Vice Premier supervising the agricultural sector) and 
Wang Renzhong (Head of Agriculture Commission) who opposed the HRS were 
removed from their positions. In March 1982, the Agriculture Commission was 
broken down into two consultation agencies called the Rural Group of the Policy 
Research Section of the Central Committee of the CCP (Zhonggong Zhongyang 
                                               
20
 China’s reform started with the agricultural sector. See Ash (1993).  
21
 For details from Fengyang County, see Hinton (1990: 48-73) and Beijing Youth Daily (1993).   
22
 As de Brauw, Huang and Rozelle (2002) found out, the HRS led to sharp increases in output and greater 
efficiency. Also see McMillan, Whalley, and Zhu (1989).  
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Nongcun Zhengce Yanjiushi) and Research Centre of the State Council on Rural 
Development (Guowuyuan nongcun fazhan yanjiu zhongxin). Having cleared out 
hurdle of central opposition, the HRS was set for nationwide implementation. In 
1984, the government assured the peasants by promising that the division of land 
would remain in effect for at least 15 years. By 1986, almost all China’s peasants had 
adopted it (Jae, 2000: 77).  
The prevalence of the HRS brought an end to the administrative control of the 
MOA through state-owned communes. The communes under the MOA used to be 
effective in controlling the production management during the central planning 
period. The introduction of the HRS system in the early 1980s granted individual 
households the autonomy to plan their agricultural production (Kojima, 1988: 720; 
Findlay, Martin, and Watson, 1993: 16). The MOA had shifted its priority from 
micro-planning to macro-supervision.  
The communes used to be an effective planning organ for the MOA to control 
land, labour, and capital. During the central planning period, the commune was the 
basic unit of organisation. The MOA encouraged nationwide communes to copy the 
structure of Dazhai (xuedazhai) (Wu, 2003: 237). Thanks to the HRS, the communes 
were broken down into individual households that became the basic unit of 
organisation (Jiang, 2003: 264).23 The HRS allowed the peasants to rent land and 
invest in infrastructural construction on the designated land. 24  Their rights were 
extended on the base of 15-year land contracts in 1985 and extended again in 1998 
based on 30 years of land use. Labour management was not on longer subject to the 
communes under the MOA. The peasants were responsible for their day-to-day work 
on the contracted land (Hartfort, 1991: 492–4). They were even allowed to leave the 
                                               
23
 The rural cooperatives emerging after the elimination of the communes were different, as they were privately 
owned by the peasants (Tuan, 1991: 506). Their internal organization was free from supervision by the MOA. 
24
 For large projects in the region, households’ investment was collected through various forms of local taxes. 
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land if they wanted to become urban residents.25 The MOA also lost control of the 
peasants’ wages and bonuses calculated using “work points” in the communes 
(Naughton, 2007: 241). Instead, under the HRS the peasants’ income was determined 
by the investment and effort they put into their land. According to Huang and Yang 
(1999: 72–4), by the mid-1990s more than half of the peasants’ net income came from 
non-agricultural activities. The central state had thus successfully freed itself from 
investing in the sector with the introduction of the HRS. State budget on fixed assets 
investment in the agricultural sector decreased by almost half after 1984 (Table 4.3), 
and state banks systematically shifted funds away from farming (Huang and Ma, 
1998). Local governments also passed the responsibility of financing the construction 
of rural infrastructure to private farming families (Wang et al., 2005). Consequently, 
the peasants ended up as the primary investors (Findlay, Martin, and Watson, 1993: 
16, 33).  
 
Table 4.3 Investment in Fixed Assets of State-Owned Units by Sector 
(Composition Percentages: %) (1981-1994)26 
Sector/year 1981-1984 1985-1988 1989-1991 1992-1994 
Total investment 100 100 100 100 
Agriculture* 4.5 2.4 2.6 2.1 
Energy industry 22.3 22.8 27.4 19.8 




12.4 12.0 18.2 
Note: agriculture sector includes farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery, and water 
conservancy. 
Source: Zhongguo guoqing baogao 1978-1995 (1996: 69)  
 
                                               
25
 For the analysis on land disposal, see Liu (1999: 114-5). 
26
 According to China Statistical Yearbook (2001, quoted in Huang and Rozelle, 2002: 4), the ratio of agricultural 
investment to agricultural gross domestic product (AGDP) has monotonically declined since the late 1970s. In 
1978, the state invested 7.6% of AGDP. By 1995, the proportion of AGDP committed to investment fell to 3.6%. 
In 1990, the MOA requested for a growth of state investment. According to the request, the rate of state investment 
on rural infrastructure construction to the state gross investment on infrastructure construction should increase 
from 3.2% in 1989 to 6% in 1995; the rate of rural budget to the state budget should rise from 5.94% in 1989 to 
8% in 1995; and the rate of rural loan to national loan should grow from 8.4% in 1989 to 10% in 1995 (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1990: 37). However, the data in 1995 shows that their request was not approved.  Also see World 
Bank (1991: 37) and Hu (1991: 6). 
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4.2.3.2 Granting Autonomy to Individual Households by the MOC and the SPC, 
1985–1994 
The agricultural sector experienced three instances of relative overcapacity from 
the mid 1980s to 1999. The first was in 1984.27 The state freed itself from purchasing 
all agricultural products by signing contracts with peasants allowing them to sell their 
surplus products on the market. Because of the shortfall in budget, the state gave up 
its monopoly of purchase and marketing (tonggou tongxiao) in 1985. The government 
decided not to pass the rising cost of agricultural products to urban consumers. 
Meanwhile, the government was not willing to absorb all that the peasants produced. 
A dual-track price was the only possible means at the time (Harding, 1987: 103).28 In 
1984, the MOC effectively controlled the sales of nine agricultural products on the 
domestic market (Kojima, 1988: 721). The state gradually liberalized the domestic 
market of agricultural products (Sicular, 1995; de Brauw, Huang, and Rozelle, 2002). 
Meanwhile, the SPC started to relax its control of pricing agricultural products since 
the early 1980s (Sicular, 1995; Tan and Xin, 1999: 51). In addition, the MOC started 
to devolve its control of the procurement of input materials to the Chinese Supply and 
Marketing Cooperative (OECD, 2005). Being responsible for their own income, the 
peasants were free to purchase input materials from domestic market like seeds, 
fertilizer, and agricultural machinery. However, international procurement of fertilizer 
remained the monopoly of the MOFTEC (OECD, 2005: 90).  
 
                                               
27
 The second time of relative overcapacity was from 1990 to 1991. The third time was after 1996.  
28
 For the details of the government decision, see People’s Daily (1985). However, as Lin Yifu found out, a policy 
change of the government’s monopoly for purchase and marketing to contract system did not change their practice 
in 1985. As the agricultural sector experienced huge contraction in 1985, the government retained its control of the 
purchase and marketing (Peng et al, 2008: 238). 
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4.2.3.3 Decentralisation by the MOA vs. Centralisation by the SPC and the SGB, 
1995–1999 
Partially in response to Brown’s (1995) terrifying assertion that China could not 
feed itself, the State Council introduced the “governor’s grain bag responsibility 
system” (midaizi shengzhang fuzezhi) in 1995. Thereafter, a food self-sufficiency 
policy was promulgated under which 95% of food consumption should be supplied by 
domestic products (Chen, 2002: 52). The MOA’s authority in planning grain 
production was further encroached by provincial leaders after the new policy (Xu, 
2001: 162; Song, 1997).29 The MOA reserved its opposition to the policy on the date 
of implementation, but stated publicly in 2000 that the policy that granted provincial 
governors the power to manage grain production and marketing had restrained the 
MOA’s efforts at controlling agricultural production through its nationwide policy 
(Dang, 2001: 52).  
In contrast, both the SPC and the SGB strengthened their control during this 
period. The SPC re-imposed a mandatory price on grain products in 1995. By the end 
of the 1990s, the grain price in the domestic market consisted of two parts, namely the 
floor-purchasing price set by the SDPC and operation cost/profit of the SGB (Colby, 
Diao, and Tuan, 2001: 177–8).30 The grain price for exportation was determined by 
three parts including the floor-purchasing price set by the SDPC, the operation 
cost/profit of the SGB, and the operation cost/profit of the MOFTEC (Crook, 
Langley, and Tuan, 1999: 47). In 1998, private companies’ rights to directly purchase 
grains from peasants were terminated. The SGB regained exclusive control of 
                                               
29
 Although provincial leaders were ultimately responsible for balancing agricultural production and marketing in 
their respective regions, a survey done by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy revealed that the peasants still 
made the planting decision with no intervention from local officials (Rozelle et al. 2006). 
30
 The SDPC introduced the floor purchasing price in the purpose of protecting peasants’ interests. Meanwhile, the 
State Council mandated the SGB to secure profit from grain trade to reduce already huge subsidies. In order to 
guarantee the profit and prevent the inflation, the SGB forced the peasants to lower their sale prices that were even 
lower than the floor prices introduced by the SDPC. 
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domestic grain market, including wheat, rice, corn, and soybeans (Brummer et al., 
2006: 65).31 
 
4.2.4 Administrative Connection between the Government and the Industry in the 
Agricultural Sector by the end of the 1990s 
The replacement of the commune system with the HRS in the early 1980s 
significantly restrained the MOA’s control of the agricultural sector. The SGB under 
the MOC/SBC and the MOFERT/MOFTEC became more connected with the sector. 
This section analyzes the administrative connection between individual households 
and different governmental agencies at the national level by the end of the 1990s.  
A detailed explanation of this complexity is as follows (Table 4.4): 1) Plan of 
production management. As the agricultural production (especially grains) was in 
relative overcapacity in the late 1990s,32 no central agency effectively intervened in 
the production at the time.33 2) Capital investment. The peasants became primary 
investors (Findlay, Martin, and Watson, 1993: 16, 33). The SPC/SDPC had little 
chance of flexing its approval authority as household investment did not exceed US$ 
30 million, which was the minimum requirement for SPC/SDPC’s involvement. 
Foreign investors were hesitant due to non-guaranteed returns and usually chose 
small-scale project investments for the convenience of negotiating with local 
governments rather than the SPC/SDPC (Rozelle, Pray, and Huang, 1999: 36; Ni, 
2001). 3) Allocation of wage and bonus. The peasants’ income was determined by the 
investment and effort they devoted to their land. According to Huang and Yang 
(1999: 72–4), more than half of the peasants’ net income came from non-agricultural 
                                               
31
 Domestic marketing of cotton started to be liberalized in 1999, although foreign trade was still under strict 
control (Fang and Babcock, 2003: 8). 
32
 According to the SBC, 97.3% of agricultural products were balanced between supply and demand, 50% of 
which were relatively overcapacity in the end of 1990s (Lin and Zhang, 2003: 13). 
33
 As Siciular (1988: 678) documented, central concern of “loss of control” waned, when grain surpluses began to 
emerge after the introduction of HRS. The rationale was applicable to explain the situation in the late 1990s. 
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activities by the mid-1990s. 4) Asset management. Except for the projects sponsored 
by the MOA – which was in a small number – for public use (Vermeer, 1997), the 
central government had little control of fixed assets on contracted lands (Findlay, 
Martin, and Watson, 1993: 16).34 5) Personnel and labour management. The peasants 
were responsible for their day-to-day work on their land (Hartfort, 1991: 492–4). For 
regions where there was a short of labour, the rules of hiring labour were stricter but 
still subject to the interpretation of local leaders (Rozelle, 1994: 107–8). For regions 
where there was a labour surplus, the peasants were given more freedom to choose 
their careers in other sectors (Sicular, 1997: 206).35 6) Procurement of material. The 
MOC which was downgraded to the SBC under the State Economic and Trade 
Commission (SETC) in 1998 gradually devolved its control of procurement of 
products like seeds, fertilizer, and agricultural machinery in the domestic market, to 
the Chinese Supply and Marketing Cooperative by the end of 1990s (OECD, 2005).36 
However, the international procurement of fertilizer remained to the monopoly of the 
MOFTEC (OECD, 2005: 90). 7) Alliance management. Individual households were 
able to combine their lands for mass production, subject to the approval of the leaders 
in the village. The central government had little influence on their decisions. 8) Price. 
The prices of most agricultural products were market-determined except for strategic 
ones like grain. Grain price in the domestic market was set by the SDPC and SGB, 
while grain price for exportation was determined by the SDPC, SGB, and MOFTEC. 
9) Internal organisation. The MOA lost control since the abandonment of the 
commune system in the first half of the 1980s. 10) Sales. The SGB regained 
monopolistic control of some prime food grains, including wheat, rice, corn, and 
                                               
34
 Veeck ed. (1991) describes how the contract was disrupted by local leaders in Heilongjiang province. 
35
 Farm labours chose to work in either private enterprises or rural township and village enterprises (TVEs) in the 
region or construction sector and service sector in coastal cities (Gale, Somwaru, and Diao, 2002). 
36
 Zhang et al. (2005, quoted from Huang et al. 2007)’s survey of households in eight provinces revealed that the 
peasants were able to purchase all of their chemical fertilizer on their own.  
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soybeans (Brummer et al., 2006: 65). 37  The export of agricultural products was 
supervised by central agencies including the SDPC as the ultimate decision maker and 
the Cereal, Oil, and Foodstuffs Importing and Exporting Corporation (COFCO) under 
the MOFTEC as the practical trader (Crook, Langley, and Tuan, 1999: 47; Carter and 
Rozelle, 2002: 28; Carter et al., 1998).38  
A brief survey reveals the fragmented nature of state control over the 
agricultural sector. Surprisingly, the MOA exerted little administrative supervision of 
the sector.39 As long as the precondition of food self-sufficiency was guaranteed, the 
MOA was relatively irrelevant. Instead, the SGB and MOFTEC had more exposure in 
the sector (10% and 15% of full control respectively).40 They were able to influence 
peasants’ agricultural production through their administrative control of price, sales, 
and importation of foreign input materials. The agricultural sector was relatively “low 
stake”, enjoying a lot more autonomy (85% of full autonomy) than other sectors. The 







                                               
37
 Domestic marketing of cotton started to be liberalized in 1999, although foreign trade was still under strict 
control (Fang and Babcock, 2003: 8). 
38As Crook, Langley, and Tuan (1999: 48) documented, the central COFCO had been competing with provincial 
COFCO branches under local authorities since 1992. According to Carter and Rozelle (2002: 28), there were about 
200,000 foreign trade companies engaging in agriculture trade. However, strategic agricultural products, like food 
grains, were still subject to state control. 
39
 Among the 10 areas of autonomy in individual households, full control was coded as 100% control, partial as 
50%, and little as zero. Accordingly, the administrative connection between the MOA and agricultural sector in 
1999 was: (AC)=0 
40
 The administrative connection between the SGB and agricultural sector in 1999 was: 
(AC)=10%*50%+10%*50%=10%. The administrative connection between the MOFTEC and agricultural sector 
in 1999 was (AC)=10%*50%+10*50%+10%*50%=15% 
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Table 4.4 Administrative Connection between Government and Industry in the 
Agricultural Sector by the end of the 1990s 









1. Plan of 
production 
management 





Little SDPC 7. Alliance 
management 
Little MOA 
3. Allocation of 
wage and bonus 





Little MOA 9. Internal 
organisation 
Little MOA 
5. Personnel and 
labour 
management 
Little MOA 10. Sales Partial SDPC, 
SGB,  
MOFTEC 
Source: compiled by author 
 
4.2.5 Fiscal/fiancial Connection between the Government and the Industry in the 
Agricultural Sector by the end of the 1990s 
Fiscal connections between the MOA and individual households were few at the 
threshold of China’s WTO accession. Chinese peasants remitted their tax revenue to 
the MOF at the centre and township/village administrations at the local. The MOA did 
not receive private revenue income from the industry like the MII did.41 Its sectoral 
policy was mainly supported by the central budget allocated by the MOF. The budget 
covered the administrative expenditure of the MOA, central investment on irrigation 
system, and education and research in its affiliated institutions.  
“Peasant burden” was a well-known problem and could not be effectively 
solved up till then. However, the MOA did not bear direct responsibility for it. By the 
end of the 1990s, peasant burden was generally composed of four categories. They 
were: tax revenue remitted to the MOF, five tongchou to the township, three tiliu to 
the village, and other fees paid to various governmental institutions (OECD, 2005: 
                                               
41
 The MOA retained its private revenue income from the TVEs. But most of the TVEs were not doing business in 
agricultural sector. 
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99). Since the dissolution of the communes, townships and villages were responsible 
for collective welfare in the countryside. Five tongchu and three tiliu were used for 
education, infrastructure construction, and administration expenses. These were the 
main sources of the huge burden on the peasants. Although the central government 
had repeatedly mandated township and village administrations to relieve the burden, 
little was done.  
The amount of tax revenue remitted to the MOF did not change after the 
implementation of the HRS. As documented by Aubert and Li (2002: 162), the 
agricultural tax by 1999 was fixed at 15.5% of the normal grain yield according to the 
law promulgated in 1958. The practical tax collected from the peasants was at a lower 
rate of 12.5% (Table 4.5).42 This part of the tax was less than the fees remitted to the 
townships and villages (Kwiecinski and Li, 2002: 43) but had been rising since the 
late 1990s.43  
Table 4.5 Agricultural Tax Remitted to the Central Government 
(RMB Million-current prices) 
Year 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Tax revenue 5665 7265 12812 18238 16308 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004) 
 
To conclude, there were very few fiscal/financial and administrative connections 
between the MOA and individual households after the introduction of the HRS. 
Surprisingly, the SGB and MOFTEC had exerted more administrative intervention 
than the MOA in the sector. Since the agricultural reforms, the sector became “low 
stake” which in turn led to the possibility of divergent interests between the 
government and peasants. The following sections will explore the sectoral interest and 
                                               
42
 Other agricultural-related tax included animal husbandry tax, land-use tax, contract tax, and special agricultural 
products tax. 
43
 According to Aubert and Li (2002: 166-7), agricultural-related tax was on the rise in the late 1990s. In the year 
of 1999, the distribution of tax and fees shouldered by Chinese peasants was: agricultural tax (31%), village tiliu 
(28%), township tongchou (21%), and other administration fees (20%). 
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bureaucratic interests of individual supervising agencies at the threshold of WTO 
accession. 
 
4.3 Sectoral Interests on Trade Negotiation 
Generally speaking, the agricultural industry as a whole had expected to see 
more challenges than opportunities if Chinese negotiators accepted American requests 
to lift its non-tariff barriers against US products.  
Economists disagreed on the potential competitiveness of China’s agricultural 
sector in a liberalized international trade. Mainstream researchers preferred to analyze 
the competitiveness through the understanding of its international comparative 
advantages. They generally agreed that Chinese agricultural products were 
competitive if they were labour-intensive, but uncompetitive if they were land-
intensive (Table 4.6) as China’s agriculture was labour-rich but land-scarce. 44 
Accordingly, the sector as a whole was not competitive. To be specific, in the 
subsectors, land-intensive agricultural products including grains, vegetable oil seeds, 
cotton, and wool accounted for more than 50% of the total output value in the 
agricultural industry in 1999. They requested for state protection as they were not 
competitive. In contrast, labour-intensive agricultural products including animal 
products, horticultural products, and processed agricultural products accounted for 
less than half of the total output value. They requested for trade liberalization as they 




                                               
44
 Also see Wen (2000: 90) 
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Table 4.6 Scholars’ Estimates of the Competitiveness of  
China’s Agricultural Industry 





Grains Cotton Oil crops 








Competitive N.D. Uncompetitive 




N.D. Competitive Uncompetitive N.D. Uncompetitive 
Note: N.D.: not discussed 
Source: compiled by author 
 
Carter (1999) questioned the methodology by asserting that comparative 
advantage was an important variable but it was not the only one. According to his 
analysis, not all of the trade flows in agricultural products were determined by 
comparative advantage. For example, the demand of sugar was strongly affected by 
domestic output and weakly by per capita household income and relative prices. 
Increasing importation of wheat after the WTO accession was expected as the key 
reason of increasing income. Wang et al. (1998) also contended that the comparative 
advantage in terms of relative price would have little impact on bilateral agricultural 
trade between China and the United States. Chen, Xu, and Duan (1999) found that 
China’s growing exports of agricultural products during the period from 1980 to 1996 
correlated with the decreasing comparative advantage. As the negative correlation 
challenged mainstream views, they explained that the growth of world demand and a 
favourable market distribution effect were the alternative causes of export growth. He 
and Tian (1999) indicated that the comparative advantage of the labour-intensive 
sector such as livestock had been declining due to inferior product quality and poor 
marketing that had become important indicators of competitiveness. 
The government’s evaluation concluded that the agricultural sector was not 
competitive in international free trade, as some individual researches by MOA 
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officials hinted that their analyses were in line with mainstream argument. For 
example, Du Ying (2001) (Director-General, Department of Sectoral Policy and Law, 
Ministry of Agriculture) argued that China was competitive in labour-intensive 
subsectors (such as animal products and horticultural products) but uncompetitive in 
land-intensive subsectors (like grains and cotton). As the production of grains and 
cotton that were strategically important for food security accounted for more than half 
of agricultural output (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2000), the sector overall 
was believed to be uncompetitive.  
 
4.4 Sectoral Pressure on Trade Negotiation 
Huang et al. (2007) characterized China’s agricultural production in the 1980s 
and 1990s as laissez faire. Since the introduction of the HRS in the early 1980s, 
individual households enjoyed autonomy in the areas of investment, asset 
management, and production. They had been responsible for their own survival in 
domestic market. According to Crook (2001: 16), most peasants had little knowledge 
of the WTO and the impact of joining the WTO at the time. Besides, there was no 
administrative channel for them to express their requests. It explains Anderson and 
Hayami’s (1986) assertion that “farmers in China are not yet in a position to form a 
strong lobbying force for agricultural protection”.45 In contrast to hot debates among 
economists, the voice from agriculture producers was almost absent. Accordingly, 
agriculture producers exerted little pressure on the MOA to protect the sector, 
compared to enterprises in other sectors.  
In addition, though agricultural production was laissez faire, the domestic 
market and international trade of agricultural products remained the monopoly of 
                                               
45
 Frederick Crook who retired from the Markets and Trade Division of the Economic Research Service at the US 
Department of Agriculture also said that, “China’s farmers had little input in China’s decision to join the WTO” 
(Chen, 2002). 
 73
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Sicular, 1988, 1995; Perkins, 1988; Lin, 1992; 
Watson, 1988; de Brauw, Huang, and Rozelle, 2002; Carter et al., 1998). These 
enterprises were reluctant to lift entry barriers, as foreign competition would 
jeopardize their monopolistic profit. They were able to influence their supervising 
agencies – the MOC or MOFERT/MOFTEC – to retain state control.  
To conclude, regarding the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, both 
independent economists and the MOA generally agreed that the sector was 
competitive in labour-intensive products, but uncompetitive in land-intensive 
products. The sector as a whole expected to see more challenges than opportunities 
after China’s WTO accession. However, agriculture producers in the sector could not 
effectively express their concern to the government. They imposed little pressure on 
the MOA to protect the sector during the WTO negotiations. Having given up control 
of the sector, the MOA directed its focus to bureaucratic interests which were not 
convergent with sectoral interests at the time. The next section explores the 
bureaucratic interests of individual supervising agencies in trade negotiation. 
 
4.5 Bureaucratic Interests in Trade Negotiation 
Relations between the agricultural sector and different central agencies 
determined the degree of their efforts to protect the sector during the negotiation. The 
MOA, SGB, and MOFTEC were close scrutiny. 
The MOA was pursuing its own bureaucratic interests which were not 
necessarily convergent with sectoral interests. The MOA’s bureaucratic interests were 
to achieve administrative accomplishment and maintain fiscal sustainability. It was 
supposed to control agricultural production. Its major tasks were to preserve 
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agricultural productivity and guarantee food security.46 However, by achieving these 
goals, its importance in the State Council decreased, which in turn led to the 
possibility of a lower state budget from the MOF (Chern and Yu, 1999: 199; Yang 
and Huang, 1999: 272). By comparing the state budget allocated to the MOA and 
agricultural production (Figure 4.1), we can see that when China experienced relative 
overcapacity in agricultural production (in 1984, 1991, and 1996 respectively), the 
ratio of budget on agricultural sector over the total state budget declined immediately 
in the following years. The dilemma between administrative goals and fiscal target 
imply that the MOA was less concerned about the potential impact of the WTO 
negotiations. Unreasonable concessions for the sector could be used as a good excuse 
for the MOA to request for central funding for further development. The MOA cared 
more about its own interests rather than the needs of the peasants. Its stance was 
consistent with the negative protection of the sector in the 1980s and 1990s observed 




















                                               
46
 Other functions of the MOA included research and development, infrastructure construction, inspection service, 
and etc.  However, the MOA’s capability of regulating the sector was weak. For example, empirical evidence by 
Jin et al. (2002) demonstrates the declining effectiveness of China’s agricultural research capabilities. 
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Figure 4.1 State Budgets Allocated to the MOA and Overcapacities in 





























Ratio of state budget on agricultural sector over total (%)
Relative overcapacity in agricultural production
 
Source: Zhongguo caizheng nianjian (Finance Yearbook of China). (2001: 357) 
 
The SGB under the MOC/SBC was preoccupied with its own financial problems 
caused by institutional reasons and consequently had little interest in protecting the 
sector. First of all, food security or food self-sufficiency was a national strategy that 
needs coordination from all government agencies. The SGB’s administrative task was 
to guarantee the smooth flow of agricultural products from peasants to consumers. In 
order to protect the peasants, the SGB was requested to purchase as much grain as the 
peasants were willing to sell to the government since 1998. However, overcapacity in 
agricultural production led to a huge financial burden on the SGB (Cheng, 1997). 
Accordingly, the State Council requested that the SGB guarantee its profitability by 
selling agricultural products at a higher price than its purchase price. In order to 
protect urban residents and curb inflation, the SGB had to decrease the purchasing 
price even lower than the floor price recommended by the SDPC (Schmidhuber, 
2001: 34; OECD, 2005: 86; Shangguan et al., 1998: 124). During the WTO 
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negotiation, the SGB had no incentive to protect the agricultural sector. Instead, 
importation of foreign agricultural goods might reduce domestic production that in 
turn might relieve the SGB’s financial burden, as long as food self-sufficiency was 
secured. 
The MOFTEC’s major task was to enter the WTO which would increase 
China’s foreign trade and partially benefit the trade companies under its control. The 
trade companies had frequently complained that the MOFTEC pursued its own 
“narrow interests” without any concern for protecting the domestic agricultural 
sector.47 In order to exploit the differences between domestic and international prices, 
there were several times during the 1980s and 1990s when food shortage was 
associated with huge exports while overcapacity confronted huge imports.48 In face of 
great pressure from WTO members to open up China’s economy, the MOFTEC 
would push domestic the agricultural sector for more concessions but at the same time 
protect its trading companies for its own monopolist profits (Yang and Huang, 1999: 
272).  
The MOA’s indifference, together with the SGB and MOFTEC’s interests in 





                                               
47
 The legal procedure of importation documented by Crook, Langley, and Tuan (1999: 44-5) was: the SGB 
submitted an import proposal to the State Council through the MOC; after the approval by the State Council, MOF 
allocated foreign exchange to SGB through the MOC that purchase foreign agricultural products from China’s 
National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export (COFCO) under the MOFTEC. 
48
 According to Shangguan et al (1998: 128), there were four times of grain shortage between 1984 and 1996, three 
times of which were associated with grain net export. Among the nine years of overcapacity, five of them saw net 
import. The most serious case happened in 1995 and 1996. 
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4.6 China’s WTO Commitment and Its Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
4.6.1 Concessions in the Agricultural Sector 
The American negotiators strongly requested for China to open up its 
agricultural and automobile sectors (Zhou and Wang 2001). The GATT/WTO 
coordination group was founded in the State Council accordingly. As national security 
pertaining to food self-sufficiency was not a great concern at the time, bureaucratic 
interests prevailed throughout internal coordination on agricultural issues. The MOA 
was always purposely excluded from the meeting by the organisers (Interview in 
Beijing, February 2009). Through domestic coordination, Chinese negotiators were 
able to make great concessions in the agriculture sector (Wen, 1999: 35). It was also 
rumoured that Chinese negotiators decided to give up the agricultural sector in 
exchange for some benefits for the financial sector that was important to the MOF and 
the People’s Bank of China (He, 2000).  
China agreed to terminate import quota for all categories of agricultural 
products. A tariff rate quota was applied to some goods that were not competitive in 
international trade like oil crops, wheat, corn, rice, and cotton (Table 3.4). China 
pledged not to use export subsidies in the agricultural sector, something neither the 
United States nor the European Union had agreed to (Johnson, 2000; Wen, 2000: 
92).49 Its average agricultural tariff rate, committed to being reduced from about 21% 
in 2001 to 17% by 2004 and from 31% to 14% on American priority agricultural 
products, would be lower than those in most developing countries (Yu and Frandsen, 
2002). The reduction rates in grain, cotton, meat, and soybean oil were much greater 
than the requirement set in the Uruguay Round of agricultural agreement. The 
                                               
49
 It managed to secure the farm subsidies at 8.5% of the value of domestic farm production in the range allowed 
by the developing country. 
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transition period for China was only five years, half of the 10-year transition period 
granted to other developing countries.  
Table 4.7 China’s Commitment to the Agricultural Sector 





Grains Cotton Oil crops 
Competitiveness Yes Yes No No No 
Tariff rate quota 
(TRQ) 
N.A. N.A. TRQ TRQ TRQ 
Final rate of state 
ownership of the 
trading companies 
0 0 90% for 
wheat, 60% 
for corn, 50% 
for rice 
33% 0 by 2004 
Average tariff rate 
by commitment 
















quota tariff by 
2005 
Note: N.A.: not applicable 
Source: compiled by author 
 
However, the trade monopoly of the MOFTEC did not change significantly. 
Although China committed itself to granting a certain amount of trading rights to non-
state-owned enterprises, hidden barriers remained (Goodman, 2003). According to 
Hsu and Tuan (2001: 4), domestic quota-holders had no right “to import directly from 
abroad, to choose their trading partners, or to choose a specific type of commodity”. 
Chinese peasants ended up as the only losers in the deal (Bhalla and Qiu, 2004: 77; 
Zuo and Song, 1999: 651). Premier Zhu Rongji had repeatedly stated that the greatest 
impact after China’s WTO accession would be on the agricultural sector and billions 
of peasants (Ma, 2001; Sun and Meng, 2002; Lin and Zhang, 2003: 71). 
 
4.6.2 China’s Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
Agricultural industry as a “low stake” sector did not receive enough support 
from the MOA during the negotiation. In the first year of WTO membership, the 
MOA decided to regain its control of production plan. The MOA directed the peasants 
to adjust their output according to regional comparative advantages, like producing 
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wheat in the areas of Hebei-Shangdong-Henan provinces and producing corn and 
soybean in North-eastern provinces (Ke et al., 2003: 5). However, government-
industry relations in the agricultural sector were very loose compared the other 
sectors. 
The MOA, which had divergent interest with the industry, found it easier to 
comply with the WTO commitment, even though the commitment was huge 
concessions. As Zhang (2000: 7) observes, Chinese government did not change its 
discriminatory policy toward the agricultural sector after giving concessions either. 
As expected, by complying with the concessions, the agricultural industry which was 
not competitive in global trade suffered from the flood of imports. 
One of the major commitments was to reduce the tariff rate as scheduled. The 
Chinese government has done more than commit to the duties. China pledged to 
reduce its simple average import tariffs for agricultural products from 21% in 2001 to 
18.5% in 2002 and 17 % in 2004 (Huang and Scott Rozelle, 2002: 12). However, the 
actual tariff rate was reduced to 15.8% in 2002 and 15.57% in 2004 (Table 4.8).  
Table 4.8 China’s Tariff Rates for Agricultural Products in 2002 and 2004 (%) 
All agricultural products 2002 2004 
Simple average rate committed 18.50 17.00 
Simple average rate fulfilled 15.80 15.57 
Source: simple average rate committed in 2002 and 2004, see Tian (2002), quoted from 
Ke et al. (2003: 2); simple average rate fulfilled in 2002, see Ke et al. (2003: 2); simple 
average rate fulfilled in 2004, complied from the data in Customs Import and Export Tariff of 
the People’s Republic of China, 2004 
 
There was a significant drop of the tariff rate in the subsectors of soybean, wine, 
and beef. For example, the import tariff rate for soybeans was reduced from 114% 
before 2000 to 3% in 2000 due to the Sino-US agreement (Lapres, 2000). The import 
quotas and import licences on soybeans were also phased out immediately (Lin, 2000: 
105). 
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According to the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) report on 
China’s WTO compliance (2004: 6), “China has become one of the fastest growing 
overseas markets for U.S. farmers”, as American agricultural exports largely fulfilled 
the potential recognized by the negotiators during the years leading up to China’s 
WTO accession.  
If there was any incompliance to complain about in the agricultural sector, it 
would go to the SDPC/SDRC and the “regulatory body” at the border. By 2004, the 
SDRC continued to retain price control on certain agricultural products (USTR, 2008: 
64–5). It also controlled the quotas in the TRQ system by allocating them primarily to 
the state trading enterprises (Ibid: 7). Also, American exporters complained that 
Chinese customs and quarantine officials at the borders did not provide predictable 
and transparent regulatory regime for sanitary and phytosanitary standards (Ibid: 33).  
The Chinese government’s little concern for protection led to the poor 
performance of Chinese agricultural trade after the WTO accession. From 2002 to 
2005, its annual growth rate of agricultural imports was 31.5%, much faster than the 
annual growth rate of exports that was 11.6% (Chen, 2006: 227). Imports from the 
United States in 2003 exceeded US$5.4 billion, which was more than twice the level 
in 2002 and more than five times the level in 1999 (USTR, 2004: 51). The figure 
jumped to over US$8 billion in 2008 (USTR, 2008: 64). China’s trade surplus 
experienced a slight growth in the first year of WTO membership and then dropped 
significantly (Figure 1.1). China’s agricultural trade moved from surplus to deficit 
position in the post-WTO era. As Chen (2006: 234–6) indicated, “China’s agriculture 
as a whole has been losing comparative advantage at an accelerated rate since entry 
into the WTO”. Affected by the flood of imports, its comparative advantage in labour-
intensive products has been declining and its comparative disadvantage in capital-
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intensive products has been worsening dramatically. China’s WTO accession most 
certainly did not benefit its agricultural sector. 
 
4.7    Conclusion 
All in all, the agricultural sector expected to see more challenges than 
opportunities under the WTO framework. Chinese peasants, in contrast to their 
counterparts in Japan, Korea and Taiwan (Hayami, 1988), were not organised enough 
to impose effective pressure on their government for agricultural protection. It might 
be true that the peasants would become more and more powerful, as the reduction of 
producers makes them easier to organise, but a lack of administrative and fiscal 
connections between the agricultural sector and the MOA implies that the sector 
would face sustained discrimination at home and fierce competition from abroad. An 
evolution of protective measures suggested by Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela 

















The world textile and clothing (T&C) industry that did not require high 
technical input or a highly skilled labour force (Comino, 2007: 821) witnessed a shift 
in global comparative advantage from developed industrial economies to less 
developed industrial economies, especially China, during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Almost at the same time of this transformation, the T&C sector has 
become “one of the least liberalised and most highly protected industries in the 
international economy. Treated as a special case, this sector was exempt from most 
trans-industry regulations developed under the auspices of the GATT/WTO” 
(European Commission, 2004: 259).  
The Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA) was to “achieve(ing) the expansion of trade, 
the reduction of barriers to such trade, and the progressive liberalization of world 
trade in textile products” (GATT, 1975: 3-19). The agreement allowed the United 
States some time to adjust to foreign competition from China, while at the same time 
gave Chinese companies orderly access to the American market (Wang, 1987). The 
MFA was widely criticised as a discriminatory policy against developing countries 
(see for example Cline, 1990). According to Chadee and Jing (2003, 228), China’s 
T&C exports to markets affected by the quotas accounted for 30% of the total volume 
of export in the late 1990s. It was widely believed that China’s export would 
experience dramatic increase after WTO accession, as the international trade regime 
would help to lift export quotas from importing countries (For example, Zhong and 
Yang, 2000). China’s State Council Development Research Center (CSCDRC) was 
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pretty optimistic about the prospects of the T&C sector after China’s WTO accession. 
According to CSCDRC’s estimate, the exports of textiles would double between 1998 
and 2005, creating 2.85 million jobs in the textile industry (23.5% increase) and 2.61 
million jobs in the clothing industry (52.3% increase) (Egan and Steinhoff, 2000: 18; 
Liu and Sun, 2004: 56). However, the sectoral performance after China’s WTO 
accession shows that the entry seemed to be irrelevant to the strong growth trend of its 
exports. WTO membership did not significantly promote the exports as expected by 
most scholars. But it did prevent China from fully exploring its huge potential as 
indicated by a comparison of its entry to WTO entry since 2002 with the MFA phase-
out since 2005 (Figure 3.2). 
The sector was less strategically important than the other sectors in the final 
round of WTO accession negotiation. However, a trade concession would exaggerate 
the effect of the massive labour force reduction in the textile and clothing sector 
which was labour-intensive. It seemed that the former explanation is plausible as the 
fear of political instability brought by a massive laid-offs did not prevent negotiators 
from backing down on American requests. By contending with the “political 
instability” explanation, Blecher (2002) provides us with the argument of the 
ideological hegemony of the market and state. Accrding to Blecher, the vast majority 
of working class remained politically passive. Their protest or strike was not 
threatening enough to determine the government’s decisions, like trade negotiation. 
However, the social class explanation is not valid here, as the workers was divided 
between those from central SOEs and other sorts of enterprises, including local SOEs, 
private enterprises, and etc. As Frazier (2006) oberserves, the decline in state sector 
employment and the release of the small or median SOEs were “major contributing 
factors” to the massive laid-offs. Cai (2002), from the perspective of social 
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movement, concluded that laid-off workers from small SOEs were less able to take 
forceful action.50 Accordingly, we cannot simply conclude that trade concession was 
made on the textile and clothing sector because the sector became less strategically 
important or the working class were not powerful enough to influence the 
government’s decision.   
This chapter argues that little administrative and fiscal/financial connections 
between the supervising agency and T&C industry caused a low degree of interest 
convergence that in turn made a request for trade liberalisation impossible. The 
decision was made to retain the central SOEs’ privilege at the expense of the rest of 
the sector to prevent large-scale worker unrest. Chinese negotiators adopted a horse-
trading strategy by sacrificing the T&C sector for protecting other sectors in the final 
China-US agreement. WTO accession had made limited impact on China’s T&C 
industry, as the agreement allowed importing countries to retain most of their quotas 
against China’s exports till the phase-out of the MFA.  
 
5.2 Government-Industry Relations in T&C Sector 
5.2.1 The Textile and Clothing Industry 
By the end of the 1990s, China’s T&C sector can be divided into two different 
sub-sectors, namely textile sector and clothing sector. The textile sector includes 
primary manufacturing industries of natural fibre, cotton textile, wool textile, bast 
fibre textile, silk textile, knitting and others (Table 5.1). The clothing sector includes 
garments, hand wears and foot wears. The industry in the 1980s and 1990s composed 
of three different groups of enterprises in terms of their relationship with the 
                                               
50
 According to Cai (2002), laid-off workers from enterprises under the central government accounted for about 9 
per cent of the total, whereas those from small and medium enterprises constituted more than 90 per cent in 1998 
reform. 
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government: non-SOEs, local-government-controlled SOEs and central-government-
controlled SOEs. The number of SOEs under the central government significantly 
decreased through the years. It reduced from 65 to 39 by end 1989 (Wu ed., 1999: 52) 
to only 20 by the end of the1990s. 
 
Table 5.1 Share of Gross Output Value among different Sub-sectors of 
T&C industry (%) 
Item 1995 1996 1998 1999 
Textile Industry 74.77 72.33 68.95 70.02 
 Primary manufacturing industry of natural fibre 3.51 3.93 3.19 3.73 
Cotton textile industry 36.94 34.33 33.31 34.45 
Wool textile industry 9.93 10.15 9.06 8.71 
Bast fibre textile industry 1.32 1.13 1.30 1.21 
Silk textile industry 12.98 12.39 11.80 12.01 
Knitting industry 8.40 8.42 8.18 8.30 
Others 1.69 1.97 2.12 2.36 
Clothing industry 25.23 27.67 31.05 29.98 
 Garments 22.01 24.26 27.08 26.15 
Hand wares 0.30 0.38 0.56 0.48 
Foot wares 1.84 1.92 2.20 2.06 
Source: compiled from data in Almanac of China’s Textile Industry, 2000: 127   
 
5.2.2 Supervising Agencies in the Central Government 
The Ministry of Textile Industry (MTI) was the supervising agency of the sector 
till 1993 when it was replaced by China National Textile Council (CNTC). The 
function changed from micro-regulation to macro-guidance. The CNTC was renamed 
and upgraded to State Bureau of Textile (SBT) under the direct supervision of the 
State Economy and Trade Commission (SETC) in the 1998 administrative reform. 
However, the number of administrative staff was reduced from 500 to 280 in 1993 
and to 80 in 1998. The SETC took over the function of supervising the restructuring 
of the T&C sector, signalling the institutional demise of the SBT. Specifically, the 
chemical fibre industry has been administratively controlled by China Petrochemical 
Corporation since April 1983 while the machinery industry has been co-administrated 
by the MTI and the Ministry of Machinery Industry (MMI) since 1982. MTI is 
 86
responsible for issuing the orders and MMI is responsible for supervising the 
production; the rest of the subsectors were directly supervised by the 
MTI/CNTC/SBT.51  
 
5.2.3 Reforming the T&C Sector  
The T&C sector reforms, the core of government efforts to reform state-owned 
industries inherited from the central-planning era, experienced two significant 
developments in the 1980s and 1990s. The first concerned the government’s pilot 
efforts to separate the MTI/CNTC from individual T&C firms through 1984 to 1997. 
The second has been the industrial restructuring of “retaining the large state 
enterprises and releasing the small ones” (zhuada fangxiao) since 1998. 
 
5.2.3.1 Separation of T&C Enterprises from the MTI/CNTC, 1984-1997 
The MTI separated from the Ministry of Light Industry (MLI) in January 1978 
to oversee the production of the textile industry throughout the country. In the early 
1980s, the State Council at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s 
Congress granted “six priorities” to the sector, including the supply of raw materials, 
fuel and power, innovation and its transformation and infrastructure construction, 
bank loans, foreign exchange, imported foreign advanced technology and 
transportation. However, this did not last long as the Ministry of Finance experienced 
a shortfall in budgetary resources in 1981 (Almanac of China’s economy, 1982: V-88-
92); since 1982, it has been a buyers’ market for the textile sector (Ministry of Textile 
Industry, 1984: 323).  
                                               
51
 The silk textile industry came under the administration of the MTI in 1987. The clothing sector was transformed 
from the MLI to the administration of the MTI in 1987. See Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu fuzhuang hangye 
huagui fangzhi bumen shixing hangye guanli de tongzhi (The notification by the General Office of the State 
Council regarding the transformation of the clothing sector to the industrial management under the Ministry of 
Textile Industry), 29 November 1986.  
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In the same year, the central government decided to decentralise the 
administrative control of the development plan from the MTI to local governments 
(Findlay and Li, 1992: 115).  
In 1984, the State Council No. 67 Document clearly granted ten rights of 
autonomy to the SOEs. However, as Moore (2002: 117) argues, the administrative 
departments refused to give up their supervisory roles that in turn led to an incomplete 
reform. Except for production plan management, capital investment and asset 
management, the MTI decided to give up its authority in seven areas (Zhongguo 
fangzhi gongye gaige kaifang 30nian biaozhixing shijian, 2008: 11).  
After the T&C sector became buyers’ market in 1982, the administrative control 
of the production has been in the form of limiting the output, especially in the cotton 
textile and wool textile industries (Gu ed. 2002: 7). The MTI retained its control of 
production capacity of the cotton textile and wool textile industries, issuing 
production quotas to different provinces through central planning. As for other sub-
sectors, the MTI has delegated its authority to the local governments.52  The MIT and 
its successors have gradually strengthened control of output cutbacks as they believed 
that the devolution had contributed to the duplication of projects and the misallocation 
of resources in the sector (Wei, Shen, and Wang, 2002: 193-9). The State Council 
since 1991 has started a long-term programme for reducing capability and limiting 
production (Moore, 2002: 127). The policies seemed controversial, as the government 
strengthened its control of T&C production on one hand but reduced the categories of 
textile products that were under the central planning (Editorial Office of Textile 
China, 1986: 173). There were 19 categories of textile production under mandatory 
                                               
52
 For official document, see Guowuyuan bangongting zhuanfa fangzhibu, guojia jiwei, guowuyuan shengchanban 
guanyu yange kongzhi mianfang, maofang shengchan nengli he jiaqiang huaxian shengchan nengli guanli yijian 
de tongzhi (The notification by MTI, SPC, and State Council Production Office, transmitted by the General Office 
of the State Council regarding the suggestion of strictly controlling the production capacity of cotton textile, wool 
textile, and chemical fibre textile), 24 January 1992. For an analysis of surplus production capacity in the cotton 
textile industry, see Jiang (2001: 132-3). 
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planning by the MIT in 1983 (Jackson, 1992: 232). In 1984, the number of textile 
productions that were under mandatory planning was reduced to three, while 13 were 
under guidance planning and another three were opened to market forces (Almanac of 
China’s Economy, 1985: V-43-5). The policies implied that the central agency would 
not intervene in the production management of the local SOEs so long as the sector 
was not over-producing.  
To cut production, the MTI looked at putting a cap on capital investment and to 
the purchase of textile machineries. The MTI formulated three-year and five-year 
plans for the investment on infrastructure construction and technology upgrading. The 
percentage of after-tax profit paid into the Production Development Fund was also 
reduced in 1983 when the MTI decided to cut production (Jackson, 1992: 254). Small 
projects were subject to the decision of local governments. The MTI had the authority 
to approve the medium-sized project. The investment on big project would require the 
approval of the State Planning Commission (SPC) (Almanac of China’s Economy, 
1997: 182-4). The policies had been followed to the end of the 1990s. 
Any purchase of textile machineries, especially advanced textile manufacturing 
equipment,53 transfer of the fixed asset from one SOE to another, lease, upgrade and 
replacement of the asset would have to be submitted for the approval.54  The CNTC, 
in 1993, retained the right to approve the purchase of important textile machineries.55 
However, the MTI/CNTC’s supervision in these areas was not successful. The 
market mechanism was gradually taking shape in the sector. As the number of non-
state enterprises had been increasing over time, the supervising agencies felt less 
                                               
53
 Zhongyang caijing lingdao xiaozu bangong huiyi tingqu fangzhi gongyebu huibaoshi lingdao tongzhi de 
jianghua yaodian (key points from the leadership responding to the report by the Ministry of Textile Industry at 
the Central Finance and Economics Leading Group working meeting), January 3, 1986 
54
 See provisional regulations regarding the production management of textile industrial enterprises in March 1982, 
regulations of asset management in textile industrial enterprises on 22 August 1988, and regulations of asset 
management in textile machinery and equipment enterprises on 24 February 1992 (Chapter 7). 
55
 For example, see Zhongguo fangzhi zonghui guanyu yinfa “guanyu mianfang xishaji shengchan xukezheng he 
mianfang xishaji zhungouzheng de shishi banfa” de tongzhi, 10 October, 1996. 
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capable of planning for the sector. For example, the MTI implemented its first 
Industrial Policy in 1989 to stop the “over-construction” of the sectors of cotton 
textile, wool textile and silk for the purpose of protecting the urban SOEs. However, 
the policy could not put a stop to the development of Town and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs). 56 MTI was replaced by the CNTC in 1993. The function of the CNTC was 
one of macro-guidance rather than micro-regulation as in the days of the MTI. In 
1996, the CNTC, with the approval by the SPC, promulgated that the SOEs’ annual 
output plan would be governed by market forces (Yazhou fangzhi yuekan, 1996, 
Vol.27, No.5: 80-1). 
Other than these three areas, the MTI/CNTC had gradually granted autonomy in 
seven areas to enterprises or local governments. 
 Allocation of wage and bonus: Prior to 1984, wages were paid in accordance to 
a centralised wage fixing system.57  After the reform, enterprises had the right to 
decide on the wages of their staff and allocate profit within the enterprises so long as 
the tax revenue remitted to the central government was guaranteed.58 However, Sabin 
(1992) and Woo (1992)’s survey of individual enterprises revealed that the local 
bureaus of the MTI have taken charge of the administrative control since then.59 
When the local bureaus were gradually transformed into independent corporations 
after the abolition of the MTI, the effective control of wages and bonuses went to the 
corporations or local governments. 
                                               
56
 Light industries had the same problem; the MLI failed to prevent competition in the sector of appliance electrics 
(Zhou, 1998: 15-6). The market system took root in these two sectors. The central-planning ministries became 
useless. See Zhu Rongji fuzongli zai quanguo fangzhi gongyeting juzhang huiyi shang de jianghua (The speech by 
vice-premier Zhu Rongji at the meeting with the governors of the national textile bureaus), 26 December 1991.  
57
 See provisional regulations regarding the production management of textile industrial enterprises in March 1982. 
The MTI and the Central Bureau of Labour that was renamed Ministry of Labour and Personnel in 1982 were both 
held responsible for the wage system.. 
58
 Record of the 55th State Council Executive Meeting. 
59
 According to Sabin (1992: 244)’s study of Qinghe Woolen Textile Mill, after paying taxes and fees, the mill was 
allowed to designate 40% of the remaining for production development, 30% for the welfare fund, 20% for 
bonuses, and 10% for the reserve fund. The rate was different from that of the Nanning Silk and Ramie Textile 
Mill. According to Woo (1992: 283), the Nanning Textile Bureau allowed the mill to designate 20.6% of the 
retained profit for production development, 47.9% for the welfare fund, and 31.5% for bonuses. 
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Personnel and labour management: Prior to the reform, the appointment of 
management cadres in the SOEs was the responsibility of the MTI, while the overall 
recruitment, promotion and dismissal of workers was left to the enterprises and labour 
bureaus of local governments. 60  The higher management reported directly to the 
ministries or local government and was responsible for meeting the production 
targets. After reforms in the 1980s, the task of deploying professionals, usually 
university graduates, to the “textile system” was assigned to the regional government. 
In the 1990s, the allocation of about 10-20% of graduates to the SOEs was done by 
the CNTC; by the end of the 1990s, this “textile system” of job allocation was 
discontinued when the arrangement with the universities was terminated (Li, Shuwan. 
2003: 458). 
Procurement of material: The MTI retained nominal authority of supervising 
the purchasing practices of most domestic supplies from companies under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).61 The import quota of international 
procurement comes under the SPC and the import permit requires the approval of the 
MOFERT. The local SOEs usually sought for local branches of the MOC and the 
MOFERT/MOFTEC for the channel of domestic and international procurement 
respectively. Prior to 1984, the procurement price of the input was tightly controlled 
by the MOC and gradually subject to market mechanisms since then.62 The MTI and 
its successors did not have the administrative power to decide on the procurement 
price.  
Alliance management: Since the early 1980s, management autonomy was 
granted to the enterprises. Local SOEs were allowed to go into joint ventures with 
                                               
60
 The local governments were usually in charge of the labor quotas. 
61
 The SOEs ran the risk of purchasing the input resources by circumventing the central-planning system when the 
resources were scarce (Qian et al, 1991). 
62
 The central government relaxed its control of the cotton price in the mid 1980s, but readopted strict controls in 
1987 when the product was in shortage. 
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domestic or foreign companies. However, the authority of supervision was varyingly 
taken over by the local governments. The practice of amalgamating enterprises into 
regional conglomerates usually came under the jurisdiction of local governments 
which also provided the financial backing (Williams, Kong, and Shen, 2002: 585).  
Price: The SPC, assisted by the specialised economic departments, played the 
key role of determining the price of procurement throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
Since the early 1980s, T&C manufacturers were allowed to adjust the pricing of their 
products. The MTI, after the 55th State Council Executive Meeting in 1984, decided 
to loosen its control of the prices of cotton products and polyester-cotton blends. Deng 
and Yang’s (quoted from Jiang, 2001: 143) field study in 1991 indicated that although 
textile products are determined by the government, most textile transactions between 
manufacturers and commercial departments were regulated by the market.  
Internal organisation: Provisional regulations regarding the production 
management of textile industrial enterprises in March 1982 laid out the guidelines for 
the internal organisation of the SOEs. The hierarchical structure included three layers 
of administration, namely, factory (changbu), workshops (chejian) and work groups 
(banzu). The governor of each layer was accountable to the immediate authority 
higher up regarding the number of workers, quality of output and production 
efficiency. The local SOEs were gradually allowed to make adjustments to their 
internal organisation. 
Sales: The administration of domestic trade has been controlled by the MOC 
since its founding in 1952. T&C products from the SOEs were distributed to the MOC 
or its local branches under the supervision of MTI or its local bureaus. Since 1983, the 
SOEs have enjoyed limited autonomy in domestic market and are able to sell their 
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above-plan output (Aggarwal, 1994: 69).63 As for international trade, the export rights 
were fully controlled by the MOFERT-CHINATEX alliance and their local branches 
in the 1980s. The MTI started to share the authority through the operation of China 
Textile Resources Company in the early 1990s.64 However, their control has been 
gradually restrained through the reforms of the allocation system. The mechanism of 
auction that covers 27 textile products has been introduced since 1994 (Qiu, 2005: 
19). As for the export quota, the MTI had “petitioned” China’s leadership for a greater 
role in quota management for a long time in the 1980s, but failed (Moore, 2002: 145).  
 
5.2.3.2 Restructuring the SOEs in the T&C Industry, 1998-1999 
In the face of heavy losses incurred by the SOEs, 65  Beijing initiated SOE 
reforms with the priority given to the T&C sector in 1998. The central government 
shrugged off its responsibility of supervision through streamlining the work force and 
eliminating the loss-making enterprises. The number of the SOEs decreased from 
2839 in 1997 to 2226 by the end of 1999. By selling the assets of small SOEs to the 
private sector, the government concentrated its effort on restructuring the large-sized 
SOEs. The T&C industry came under the SBT by the year 1999. Meanwhile, the 
government started to grant trading rights directly to textile manufacturers (China: 
Textile industry reform in China: WTO accession may boost efforts, 1999: 12).  
 
5.2.4 Administrative Connection between Government and Industry in the T&C 
sector by the End of the 1990s 
                                               
63
 Lack of budgetary resources in the early 1980s, the MOC was unable to purchase all the products from the T&C 
sector (Naughton, 1995: 125-6). Accordingly, the MOC gradually lost its control of internal trade. For example, in 
1992, the MOC controlled only 22.6% of domestic trade of T&C products (Almanac of China’s Economy, 1993: 
154-5).  
64
 In the sub-sector of silk textile, the China National Silk Import and Export Corporation (CHINASILK), one of 
the major trading companies, was affiliated to the MOFERT/MOFTEC, while the China Silk Industrial 
Corporation (CSIC), as a rivaling company, was under the control of the CNTC. 
65
 According to Yeung and Mok (2004: 943), 1,667 or 55% of SOEs in the T&C sector were loss-making ones in 
1996. 
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The T&C industry by the end of the 1990s composed of three different groups 
of enterprises in terms their relationship with the government. They were non-SOEs, 
local SOEs, and central SOEs. Administrative connections between the central 
government and different groups of enterprises varied.  
Sectoral reforms in the 1980s prevented the central government from directly 
supervising the SOEs that came under the control of the local governments (Table 
5.2). The SBT shared authority with local governments in certain areas like 
management, including production plan, capital investment and asset management. 
The SBT controlled only 20% of export quotas and left the majority to the MOFTEC 
(Lu, 2001: 14). 
Table 5.2 The SBT’s Effective Control of the Local SOEs in 1999 
Items Degree of 
control 
Items Degree of 
control 





6. Procurement of the 
materials 
Little 
2. Capital investment Partial 7. Alliance management Little 
3. Allocation of wage and 
bonus 
Little  8. Price Little 
 
4. Asset management Partial 9. Internal organisation Little 




10. Sales Little (exports 
quotas) 
Source: compiled by author 
 
Although the SBT had gradually lost its administrative control of the local 
SOEs, its control of the central SOEs remained effective. As the absolute majority 
stakeholder (over 50% of the share) or the relative majority stakeholder (less than 
50% of the share) of the central SOEs, the SBT managed the day-to-day affairs in all 
ten areas mentioned earlier.66  
As for the non-SOEs, the SBT had little effective control of them. The share of 
the non-SOEs in the sector in terms of output value, added-value and taxes has been 
                                               
66
 See Zhongguo fangzhi gonghui xingshi guoyou guquan xingwei guifan yijian (China National Textile Council’s 
opinions regarding the practice of its rights of holders of state-owned shares), 3 June 1997. 
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growing significantly since the early 1980s. For example, the non-SOEs’ output value 
accounted for 70% of the national total in 1999 (Table 5.3). Accordingly, the central 
agency felt less capable of controlling the whole sector.  
Table 5.3 Performance of T&C Enterprises of Different Ownerships 
in 1999 (%) 





Share of gross output 
value 
29.7 26.6 28.7 15 
Share of added-value 32.6 24.8 30.6 12 
Share of total value of 
profits and taxes 
27.5 24.5 29.4 18.6 
Note: State sector refers to SOEs and majority state-owned enterprises  
Sanzi enterprises refer to Sino-foreign joint investments, Sino-foreign 
cooperative projects and wholly owned foreign investments) 
Source: Almanac of China’s Textile Industry. (2000: 2) 
 
A brief survey of the administrative relations between the central government 
and various forms of the enterprises indicated that the SBT, in the late 1990s, had 
little control (or 8.75%) of the T&C sector.67 The T&C sector was relative “low 
stake” as it enjoyed a lot more autonomy than the other sectors. The next section 
explores the fiscal/financial tie between the central agency and the T&C sector. 
 
5.2.5 Fiscal/financial Connection between Government and Industry in the T&C 
sector by the End of the 1990s 
Before the 1978 reform, the local bureaus were the revenue collecting 
authorities of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) which would then redistribute the 
money to different ministries and provinces through central planning. There was no 
fiscal connection between the central agency and the SOEs in the T&C sector.  
                                               
67
 This author estimates that the central SOEs’ output value accounted for 5% of the national total. The SBT was 
able to fully control the central SOEs. Among the 10 areas of autonomy in local SOEs whose output value 
accounted for 25% of the national total, full control was coded as 100% control, partial as 50%, and little as zero. 
Accordingly, the administrative connection between the SBT and the T&C sector in 1999 was 
(AC)=70%*0+25%/10*(50%+50%+0+50%+0+0+0+0+0+0)+5%*100%=8.75%   
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The MTI operated separately from the MLI in 1978 to become a specialised 
economic department supervising the SOEs. The MTI’s data indicates that the 
Ministry allowed 60% of the SOEs to retain part of their profits in 1980. The rest of 
the SOEs were granted the same autonomy by the end of 1981. In practice, the SOEs 
were allowed to retain 10.8% of the profit that was further distributed between the 
local bureau of the MTI and the enterprises. The rest of the profit (89.2%) would be 
transferred to the central government.68 The MTI retained 30% of the profit from the 
SOEs as the Fixed Capital Asset Depreciation Fund (guding zichan zhejiu jijin).  
With fiscal decentralisation in 1984, the Fixed Capital Asset Depreciation Fund 
was transferred to local governments. After 1987, the SOEs have been allowed to 
retain the revenue (Wu ed., 1999: 145). According to Moore (2002: 146), the T&C 
manufacturers, by the early 1990s, paid an annual “nominal, lump-sum fee” to the 
MTI. In return, the ministry provided the enterprises with a limited amount of 
investment funds. The CNTC, the successor of the MTI since 1993, has relied on 
administrative budgets allocated by the MOF and the membership fee paid by 
enterprises in the sector.69 Apart from revenue generated by levies on local SOEs and 
non-SOEs, the CNTC/SBT raised revenue from share dividend payments held in the 
central SOEs it was directly affiliated with.70 However, there were only 20 SOEs 
directly under the supervision of the central agency. There was scarcely any financial 
connection between the SBT and the T&C sector.  
                                               
68
 Huiyi jilu, quanguo fangzhi gongyeting juzhang huiyi de xingkuang huibao (the record of the report at the 
national textile bureau governor meeting), December 20, 1983. The rate was determined by the State Economic 
Commission and the Ministry of Finance. 
69
 Li Lanqing fuzongli zai fangzhi zonghui chengli dahui shang de jianghua (speech by vice-premier Li Lanqing at 
the meeting of celebrating the foundation of the CNTC), 21 June 1993 
70
 See Zhongguo fangzhi zonghui guanyu jiaqiang zonghui zhishu qiye caikui gongzuo de yijian (China’s National 
Textile Council’s opinions on improving the accounting system of CNTC-affiliated enterprises), 1 March 1996; 
and Zhongguo fangzhi gonghui xingshi guoyou guquan xingwei guifan yijian (China’s National Textile Council’s 
opinions on the practice of its rights as state-owned shareholders), 3 June 1997. 
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To conclude, in China, the fiscal and administrative connections between the 
T&C sector and MTI/CNTC/SBT have been diminishing significantly since the early 
1980s. By the end of the 1990s, the T&C sector became “low stake”, resulting in a 
divergence of interests between the government and industry. The SBT had little 
incentives to protect the sector with a large number of non-SOEs whose output 
accounted for almost 70% of the national total.  
 
5.3 Sectoral Interests on Trade Negotiation  
The export of T&C products experienced rapid growth in the last 40 years 
(Lardy, 2002) and contributed to more than one fifth of the national export annually 
(Table 5.4). 71  Generally speaking, China’s T&C sector at that time was very 
competitive in global trade in spite of some minor disadvantages. In order to reduce 
and finally lift the export quotas from importing countries, the sector was supportive 
of China’s WTO accession. 
 
 
Table 5.4 Export Value and Share of T&C Sector from 1970 to 1998 
Item 1970 1980 1990 1998 
Export value (US$ million) 495 4409 16786 42889 
Share in national (%) 21.9 24.1 27 23.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, various years. 
 
The evaluations of China’s advantages in the T&C sector were generally based 
on the variables of labour cost, vertically integrated structure and developmental 
phase. Cheap labour cost was China’s major advantage (Anderson and Park, 1989). 
The large pools of unemployed and underemployed labour in rural China would 
sustain its comparative advantage for a long time (Zhong and Yang, 2000: 188). 
                                               
71
 The MTI adopted an industrial policy of giving priority to exports in 1986 (Zhong and Yang, 2000: 178). 
According to the statistics from Almanac of China’s Textile Industry (1997-99), most of China’s T&C products 
led the market share in global trade. 
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Abernathy and Volpe (2006: 2214) argued that China, together with India, was 
competitive in terms of cost of labour, material and freight. As for the vertically 
integrated structure, China has the capability of carry out all stages of production 
itself and is not dependent on importing raw materials like many other producers 
(Blume, Rohwetter, and Tenbrock, 2005, quoted from Comino, 2007: 827). Shi 
(2000: 136-8), by adopting Toyne et al’s. (1984) model of progressive shift of 
comparative advantage, argue that earlier accession to the WTO brought better 
prospects to China’s T&C industries, as the sector had moved from a golden phase of 
development in the 1990s into a mature phase in the 2000s.  
Economists might agree that although China’s T&C sector in general was 
competitive, the clothing industry would fare better than the textile industry. Chi and 
Kilduff (2006), adopting the RSCA (Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage) 
analysis, argue that China was competitive in the T&C sector with all but the low-
income group. Generally speaking, China’s competitive strength decreased in the 
textile industry, but increased in the clothing industry during the period of 1985 to 
2003 (Table 5.5). Yang and Zhong’s (1998) simulations of the GTAP model predicted 
that China would benefit more than ASEAN, but less than NIEs, South Asia, and 
Latin America in respect of the export of textiles through trade liberalisation.72 As for 
the export of clothing, China would benefit more than NIEs, ASEAN and Latin 
America, but less than South Asia. However, Chen and Shin (2004) argue that it 
would be difficult for the clothing manufactures to stay in business because they were 
largely small non-SOEs that had little access to information and suffered from unfair 
competition. 
 
                                               
72
 GTAP is a multi-sector and multi-region global general equilibrium model. It was developed under the Global 
Trade Analysis Project led by Thomas Hertel of Purdue University. See Yang and Zhong (1998: 13, fn.8). 
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Table 5.5 Summary of China’s Revealed Comparative Advantage with Selected 
Countries for T&C 1985-2003 
Country group Country Average 
RSCA 1985-













Japan 0.69 - 0.97 + 
United 
States 




Mexico 0.72 - 0.70 - 




Turkey -0.09 - -0.26 + 
Thailand 0.43 - 0.24 + 
Low income 
countries 
India -0.15 - 0.04 + 
Bangladesh -0.22 + -0.56 - 
Note: a positive RSCA refers to comparative advantage and a negative RSCA refers to 
comparative disadvantage. 
Source: Chi and Kilduff, (2006: 184-5) 
 
Economists also pointed out that China’s competitiveness was dampened by 
some diminishing advantages in the major fields and some disadvantages in the minor 
fields. In the major fields that significantly determined the comparative advantage, 
like the cost of labour force and input materials, China’s competitive margin had been 
shrinking. For example, China’s advantage in cheap labour cost had been diminished 
because of latecomers, like India and Pakistan (Zhang, 1999). China’s advantage in 
cheap input material, like cotton, also disappeared.73 In the minor fields, Shi (2000: 
135-6) warned that China’s T&C productions were poor in terms of quality, after 
sales service, packaging, damage control, etc. Crowley, Findlay, and Gibbs (1992), by 
analysing China’s export marking performance in Australia, also point out that 
China’s T&C sector was not competitive in packaging, fashion content, the time to 
finalise an order, responses to messages, language problems, delayed shipments and 
the flexibility in responding to adjustments in orders.  
                                               
73
 The domestic price of cotton increased from 65.47% of international price in 1988 to 93% of international price 
in 1990 (Tang and Shen, 2000: 101). 
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To conclude, the T&C sector was competitive in global trade in the 1980s and 
1990s. The sector would benefit from the phasing-out of the MFA requested by 
GATT/WTO rules. The enterprises were generally supportive of China’s WTO 
membership as it would help to finally lift export quotas from importing countries. 
Although the T&C manufacturers had common final goals, they disagreed on certain 
issues. An in-depth analysis of the market structure will be helpful to understand the 
different agenda of WTO accession. 
 
5.4 Sectoral Pressure on Trade Negotiation 
The market structure of the T&C sector in the late 1990s in China can be 
characterised as imperfect competition. The sector consisted of a very large number of 
enterprises producing homogeneous products. The SOEs, collective enterprises and 
Sanzi enterprises had roughly equal weight in the market. 74  As discussed in the 
previous section, enterprises in the sector were generally competitive in global trade. 
However, state intervention is a contributing factor to the difference in agenda to 
China’s WTO accession for enterprises with different relationships with the 
government. 
China’s central-planning system tended to emphasise the importance of heavy 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Non-state actors were allowed to exist in the T&C 
sector because of a shortfall in state budget.75 After 20 years of development since the 
1978 reform, the T&C sector has become a pluralist industry with enterprises of 
different ownerships having an equal weight. As listed in Table 5.3, SOEs, collective 
enterprises, and Sanzi enterprises, each accounted for almost one third of the sector in 
terms of output value, added value, and taxes and fees. Of the number of enterprises 
                                               
74
 Sanzi enterprises refer to Sino-foreign joint investments, Sino-foreign cooperative projects and wholly owned 
foreign investments. 
75
 Before reforms, the non-SOEs accounted for less than 20% of the whole T&C sector (Qiu, 2005: 10). 
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in the sector, less than one quarter were accountable to the government in any 
meaningful way in the 1990s (Moore, 2002: 128). However, most of these were large- 
or medium-sized manufacturers in the more capital-intensive branch of the sector, like 
cotton textile industry, while having little presence in the most labour-intensive 
branch, like clothing industry (Table 5.6).76 This supports Chadee and Jing’s (2003, 
224) claim that China’s T&C industries had yet to be dominated by state sector by the 
end of the 1990s. 
Table 5.6 Share of SOEs in Enterprises in the T&C Sectors in 1995 (%) 






Primary manufacturing industry of natural fibre 7.10 60 33.33 
Cotton textile industry 9.67 63.92 78.70 
Wool textile industry 11.19 49.21 71.90 
Bast fibre textile industry 27.62 75 79.31 
Silk textile industry 7.46 45.21 68.71 
Knitting industry 6.35 56.54 67.09 
Clothing industry 3.82 19.86 31.67 
Source: Compiled from data in China National Textile Council, 1996 
 
The sector as a whole was competitive in global trade, so T&C enterprises 
usually competed with each other rather than with foreign companies. Economists 
disagreed on the comparative advantages of SOEs and non-SOEs that in turn led to 
different implications. One group argued that SOEs were less competitive than non-
SOEs. For example, Williams, Kong, and Shen’s (2002) findings indicated that very 
few SOEs were ready and able to take advantage of new opportunities after China’s 
WTO entry and the others would decline for their lack of sophistication and for the 
reason that competitive pressure eroded their domestic market. Yeung and Mok’s 
(2004) research indicated that the reduction of Chinese import tariffs and export 
quotas by importing countries benefitted foreign-financed enterprises more than 
locally funded ones in the sector. This implies that SOEs were less eager to enter the 
                                               
76
 According to Crowley, Findlay and Gibbs (1992: 123), the textile industry tends to be more capital-intensive 
than the clothing industry. 
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WTO. However, Wu’s (1996) research indicated that SOEs were more competitive in 
terms of availability of better machineries and skilled workers and therefore higher 
technical efficiency. Industrial restructuring since 1998 has accentuated Wu’s 
argument by removing the constraints of “administratively imposed high cost 
structures, the employee welfare obligations and inflexibility of the State-owned 
Enterprises” that used to dampen the competitiveness of SOEs against the TVEs 
(Brown, Waldron, and Longworth, 2005: 106). Their argument led to an opposing 
implication that the SOEs were more eager to enter the WTO. 
State intervention was a determining factor in the analysis of SOEs’ relative 
competitiveness. Constrained by the international regime of MFA, state intervention 
in China at that time was in the form of granting trading permits and allocating export 
quotas. The prospect of getting trading permits and export quotas was one of the top 
concerns of enterprises in the face of WTO accession. 
Trading rights were granted exclusively to large- and medium-sized SOEs in the 
sector (Almanac of China’s Economy, 1989: V-60-64). T&C exports by large- and 
medium-sized SOEs accounted for 70% of total value in 1998 (Almanac of China’s 
Economy, 1999: 172-4). Most non-SOEs without trading rights sold their products 
through trading companies. The prices of their products were subject to the 
manipulation by these intermediary players. 
Both the SBT and the MOFTEC were authorised to distribute export quotas. 
The SBT preferred to distribute the quotas among SOEs, primarily the central SOEs, 
because of their administrative and financial linkages. On the other hand, the 
MOFTEC preferred to give the quotes to non-SOEs, especially the TVEs, as it was 
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easier for MOFTEC local branches to bargain with small enterprises for their rent-
seeking profit.77 
By considering the variable of state intervention, this section concludes that the 
sectoral interest in terms of WTO accession was diversified. Although enterprises in 
T&C sector were supportive of WTO membership to increase their export, they 
disagreed on the time frame for removing export quotas imposed by importing 
countries and trade restriction imposed by Chinese government. The large SBT-
affiliated SOEs could easily obtain the trading permit and export quota from the SBT. 
Though they would like to increase their export, they were generally comfortable with 
quotas with a specified time frame that could at least provide them with secured 
orders from foreign companies. Non-SOEs that were able to get the trading permit 
and export quota from the MOFTEC generally had the interest in common. However, 
they had more reasons to ask for an earlier reduction of the quotas and termination of 
trade restriction. Their contracts with the MOFTEC were at risk of being taken 
advantage of by the supervising agencies. The entry into the WTO would benefit 
those non-SOEs in the long run. For many T&C manufacturers—both non-SOEs and 
small local SOEs—that were unable to obtain these privileges, they hoped for an 
earlier lifting of export quotas and deregulating of trading permits. They also expected 
to be protected by WTO rules.  
Fragmented interests in the T&C sector accounted for the lack of unified 
pressure on the government prior to the WTO negotiation. It increased the possibility 
of a divergence in interests between the government and industry. A study of 
government interest becomes necessary. 
 
                                               
77
 See Zhu Rongji fuzongli zai quanguo fangzhi gongyeting juzhang huiyi shang de jianghua (The speech by vice-
premier Zhu Rongji at the meeting with governors of national textile bureaus), 26 December 1991. 
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5.5 Bureaucratic Interests on Trade Negotiation 
The MOFTEC was responsible for negotiating with American representatives on 
China’s GATT/WTO accession and communicating with the SBT through domestic 
coordination. The MOFTEC, SBT and T&C sector did share some interests but not 
all.  
The MOFTEC was supportive of China’s WTO accession for the reason of 
expanding exports. Its vested interest was to promote exports, which were not 
necessarily relevant to the profits of domestic manufacturers, and maximise its foreign 
exchange revenue and administrative accomplishments (zhengji). Accordingly, the 
MOFTEC was willing to help reduce export quotas on T&C products. However, the 
situation was more complicated than this. Because of China-US trade disputes and 
strong pressure from American negotiators, the MOFTEC could not insist on a 
reduction of quotas for fear of triggering retaliation from the United States. The 
MOFTEC implied that it would not let the quota issue disrupt the overall trade flow in 
other sectors. Besides, the MOFTEC had the authority of distributing exports quotas 
to mostly domestic T&C enterprises for its rent-seeking gains. As a result of these two 
factors, both the MOFTEC and the trading companies under its control were willing 
to maintain the quotas against China’s exports during the transitional period after the 
accession (Lu, 2001: 14).  
As for the SBT, its administrative and fiscal interests were largely based on a 
small number of central SOEs in the sector. The market mechanism had already taken 
root in the sector since devolution. The SBT’s administrative control was limited to 
granting some trading permit and distributing export quotas. In order to keep its 
institutional existence meaningful and the central SOEs profitable, the SBT would be 
reluctant to give up this supervisory role. It might have foreseen its demise in the near 
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future and would like to slow down the process by accepting American requests of 
maintaining the quotas.  
In short, the sectoral interest was fragmented at that time. As discussed in 
section 4.3, the enterprises in the T&C sector were supportive of WTO membership 
as it would potentially increase their export. However, they disagreed on the time 
frame for the reduction of quota by importing countries and the permit deregulation of 
the central government. A loose connection between the government and industry 
increased the possibility of a divergence in interests. This throws light why the 
MIT/CNTC/SBT was indifferent to China-US negotiations throughout the 1990s. 
 
5.6 China’s WTO Commitment and Its Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
5.6.1 Concessions in the T&C sector 
The interests of the MOFTEC and SBT differ from those of the T&C sector on 
the issue of export quotas. A tiny pressure from the United States would be enough 
for the central agency to make concessions. Prior to the negotiation, the SBT was 
informed to be prepared for any possible concession. The SBT accepted the decision 
without any complaints (interview, January 2009).  
To keep China’s quotas on the imports of foreign cars and spare parts till 2005, 
the MOFTEC in November 1999 allowed other countries to keep their quotas on 
Chinese textile and clothing products till the same year when the MFA expires. 
According to the agreement, as shown in Table 5.7, Chinese negotiators allowed 
86.5% and 73.3% of textile products under American and European Union quotas to 




Table 5.7 Number of Tariff Lines under Quota: All Textile and Clothing 
Market Figures Number % % 
US US 10-digit tariff lines subject to ATC integration 3654 100 - 
Lines under quota in 2000 2067 56.6 100 
Lines under quota in 2001 2015 55.1 97.5 
Lines under quota 2002-05 1788 48.9 86.5 
Lines under quota after 2005 0 0 0 
EU EU 8-digit tariff lines subject to ATC integration 1410 100 - 
Lines under quota in 2000 730 51.8 100 
Lines under quota in 2001 677 48.0 92.7 
Lines under quota 2002-05 535 37.9 73.3 
Lines under quota after 2005 0 0 0 
Note: ATC stands for Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
Source: Dickson (2001), quoted from Williams et al. (2002: 580) 
 
5.6.2 China’s Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
As a “low stake” sector, the T&C industry did not receive enough support from 
the SBT during the negotiation. The SBT was abolished in 2000. The duty of 
supervision came under the SETC and transferred to the SDRC when the SETC was 
abolished in 2003. The central SOEs that used to be affiliated with the SBT became 
the subsidiaries of the SASAC. After the 2003 government restructuring, SDRC and 
SASAC became the major players in T&C sector. The former was to draft sector-wide 
policies and the latter was to supervise the central SOEs. Although the supervisors 
had been changed, the government-industry relation in T&C sector remained the 
same. The government had little difficulty complying with the commitment because 
there was little to give up. 
The matter of compliance was, to large extent, on the American side rather than 
on the Chinese side, as the elimination of export quota from importing countries was a 
major concern in the sector. The Chinese government had timely implemented tariff 
rate reduction in the T&C sector since its entry to the WTO (The law offices of 
Stewart and Stewart, 2005: 135). However, this had nothing to do with the American 
quota. Figure 1.2 clearly shows that WTO agreement on T&C sector had effectively 
restricted the growth of exports from China. Without a keen protector in the central 
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government, the sector’s competitiveness in global trade was dampened by the 
protection from importing countries. The Yeung and Mok’s (2004: 948) field survey 
revealed that Chinese-based firms had complained of a lack of regulatory authorities 
responsible for protecting sectoral interests in trade disputes, like anti-dumping 
suits.78  
China’s T&C exports reached its potential in 2005 when the MFA was phased 
out in December 2004. The Chinese government foresaw that the flood of Chinese 
products in American market might threaten the T&C sector in the United States that 
could resort to adopting special protectionist measures. To prevent trade disputes, 
China has voluntarily imposed tax on its own exports of selected T&C products since 
2005. However, the effort has little impact on slowing down the increase in its global 
market share. Under the pressure of the EU, China’s Ministry of Commerce imposed 
its own control on licensing requirement of T&C exports in 2008 to restrict export 
restriction, but refused to continue with the practice in 2009 (Lu, 2009). 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In sum, among the sectors in the negotiation package, the T&C industry was the 
one that expected to gain from WTO accession. Chinese negotiators tended to make 
concession on T&C sector because of loss-aversion on other sectors. Enterprises in 
the sector that disagreed on the time frame for the quota reduction from importing 
countries failed to exert a unified pressure on the negotiators. Finally, as it was a low 
stake sector to the government at that time, the government preferred to pursue 
bureaucratic interests over sectoral interest. Accordingly, the SBT was relatively 
indifferent to the final result, compared to the supervising agencies of other sectors.  
                                               
78
 For an analysis of the institutional vacuum and its impact on the T&C sector, especially the wool textile 
industry, see Brown, Waldron, and Longworth (2005:111-3). 
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Trade concessions gave other WTO members the opportunity of retaining their 
quotas against China’s T&C exports. That explains why WTO accession was 
irrelevant to the growth trend of China’s T&C exports. In contrast, the WTO 












































The global automobile industry is dominated by a few oligopolies featured with 
tensions and frustrations between a state-based political economy and the economic 
outlook of essentially transnational cooperation (Munkirs et al, 1993). As the industry 
is capital intensive, technology intensive and labour intensive (Chen, 1997: 107), it is 
not easy for late entrants to become competitive in a short time. Governments have 
played a key role in overcoming these difficulties in emerging economies like South 
Korea, Brazil, China and India (Mukherjee and Sastry, 1996). The success of South 
Korea’s automobile sector provided a model of developmental state for Chinese 
decision makers to follow (Huang, 2002). However, China’s automobile industry was 
extremely fragmented in the early 1980s (Yang, 1994). Few scholars understand the 
relationship – cooperative or uncooperative – between different developmental 
agenda at central and local levels, which could influence decision on trade 
liberalisation in China’s automobile sector.  
This chapter argues that the existence of a developmental, corporatist or 
entrepreneurial state at local level could lead to regional protectionism and relative 
production overcapacity that could undermine the effectiveness of a developmental 
state at the national level. The central state, especially the State Planning Commission 
(SPC), managed to gradually centralise supervision authority over major automobile 
manufacturers to regain its control of the industry. After strengthening relations with 
enterprises at the expense of disrupting local developmental plans, the central state 
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became more interested in and capable of protecting the sector from foreign 
competition. 
 
6.2 Government-Industry Relations in the Automobile Sector 
6.2.1 The Automobile Industry 
By the end of the 1990s, the automobile sector was divided by the Chinese 
government into eight different subsectors, namely presenting truck, off-road vehicle, 
dumper, trailer, special purpose vehicle, bus, passenger car, and semi-trailer (China 
Automotive Technology and Research Centre, 1990: 25). First Auto Works (FAW), 
Dong Feng Motors (Second Auto Works) and Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation (SAIC) were the major auto manufacturers in the sector. The “Big Three” 
concentrated their efforts in certain subsectors in the late 1990s. They dominated the 
passenger car industry, leaving the subsectors of commercial vehicles, mainly buses 
and trucks to small and medium SOEs (Lee, 2000: 281-4; Lee, 2003: 288) (Table 6.1). 
The presence of the “Big Three” in “fragmented” auto parts sector was also negligible 
(Maxton, 1994: 34). The total sales value of the top 10 auto parts manufacturers 
accounted for only 18.2% of the market in 1999 (Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade, 2002: 3). Among the 150 major categories of auto parts, the “Big 
Three” were the largest producers in only 16 categories (China Automotive Industry 







Table 6.1 Auto Production in 1999 
  Total production (unit) The Big Three’s share (%) 
Truck Heavy 47074 77.2 
Medium 184847 96.5 
Light 386698 25.7 
Bus Heavy 7641 13.8 
Medium 29426 57 
Light 184397 23.4 
Car Mid-high 24734 94.2 
Medium grade 270164 93.8 
Common 134821 86.1 
Source: Compiled from data in China Automotive Industry Yearbook (2000) 
 
6.2.2 Supervising Agencies in the Central Government 
The immediate supervising agency of the automobile industry in the central 
government experienced dramatic changes in the 1980s and 1990s. The sector first 
came under the State Bureau of Automobile Industry (SBAI), to be later replaced by 
the China National Automotive Industry Cooperation (CNAIC) 79and then the China 
National Automotive Industry Federation (CNAIF)80 . The CNAIC81later regained 
control of the sector, again to be later taken over by the SBAI 82 . The current 
supervising agency is the State Bureau of Machine Building Industry (SBMBI)83 
(Figure 6.1). Throughout these changes, the SPC that was renamed the State 
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) in the 1998 Administrative Reform 
retained ultimate power of decision making in the sector. 
                                               
79
 The State Economic Commission initiated a plan to replace the SBAI under the First Ministry of Machine 
Building (1st MMB) with CNAIC in December 1981. The CNAIC was founded in 1982. The number of personnel 
was about 200. Accordingly, the SBAI under the 1st MMB was abolished. 
80
 The CNAIF replaced the CNAIC in 1987. The federation was relatively autonomous from central control, 
compared to the CNAIC. It composed of voluntary companies and institutions. However, the CNAIF was still 
under the administration of State Machinery Industry Commission (SMIC). The appointment of council members 
had to be approved by the SMIC. The administrative expense and necessary subsidies also came from the 
government. 
81
 The CNAIC was re-founded in 1990. It was under the administration of the Ministry of Machinery and 
Electronics Industry (MMEI) as a bureau. The CNAIF was replaced by the China Automotive Industry 
Association (CAIA) that was under the CNAIC (Almanac of China’s economy, 1991: III127-8).   
82
 In 1993, the Ministry of Machine Building (MMB) operated separately from the MMEI. The State Bureau of 
Automobile Industry (SBAI) was constituted under the MMB in December 1993 to directly control the sector. The 
MMB took back the regulatory power from CNAIC that consequently became a normal corporation like the First 
Automobile Group Corporation. The restructuring indicates the government’s will to tighten its control over the 
automobile sector (Almanac of China’s economy, 1994: 168-70). 
83
 Between 1998 and 2002, the sector was regulated by the SPC/SDPC and the State Bureau of Machine Building 
Industry (SBMBI) under the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). The MMB was downgraded in 1998. 
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Figure 6.1 Evolution of Supervising Agencies in the Automobile Sector from 1980-2000 
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    1st MMB: First Ministry of Machine Building; CNAIC: China National Automotive Industry 
Corporation; CNAIF: China National Automotive Industry Federation; CNHTC: China National 
Heavy-duty Truck Corporation; DFM: Dong Feng Motors; FAW: First Automotive Works; LGs: 
Local governments; MMEI: Ministry of Machinery and Electronics Industry; OMs: other ministries, 
including Ministry of City Construction, Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry of 
Communications, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Light Industry, Ministry of Military, and Ministry 
of Rural Industry; SAIC: Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation; SBAI: State Bureau of 
Automotive Industry; SBMBI: State Bureau of Machine Building Industry; SCCG: State Council 
Coordination Group on Rehabilitating Automotive Sector; SDPC: State Development and Planning 
Commission; SEC: State Economic Commission; SETC: State Economic and Trade Commission; 
SMIC: State Machinery Industry Commission; SPC: State Planning Commission,  
Source: compiled by author 
 
6.2.3 Centralisation of the Automobile Sector  
The theme of reforms at the start of the 1980s was to decentralise the economy. 
However, the restructuring of the automobile sector (Figure 6.1) saw a reverse in 
trends. There was an attempt by the Beijing government to take control away from the 
local governments and to put automobile manufacturers into enterprise groups under 
the direct control of the central government (Marukawa, 1995: 334; InterChina 
Investment Consulting Company, 1997: 24). Unlike other sectors, the automobile 
industry was directly supervised by the SPC/SDPC in the late 1990s. The 
intermediary agency, unlike the Ministry of Information Industries in the 
telecommunications sector, gradually lost its functions of regulating the auto industry. 
The SPC/SDPC-led centralisation of automobile sector in the 1980s and 1990s 
took place in three phases. In the first phase (1987-1993), the FAW, DFM and China 
National Heavy-duty Truck Corporation (CNHTC) were identified as central SOEs 
and were removed from the jurisdiction of line ministry and local governments. The 
second phase (1994-1998) saw the imposition of certain control on both central and 
local SOEs through the promulgation of an industrial policy in 1994. In the third 
phase (1999), which was at the threshold China’s WTO accession, the SDPC 
restructured the industry by devolving the CNHTC but centralising the SAIC. 
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6.2.3.1 Direct Supervision of the FAW, DFM and CNHTC by the SPC, 1987-1993 
The SPC/SDPC began its direct supervision of a small number of auto 
manufacturers by naming them central SOEs in 1987. The FAW, DFM and CNHTC 
became independent planning units under the auspices of the SPC through the 
centralisation.84 The SPC directly appointed the president of each of the three central 
SOEs. The high-level managers were responsible for achieving the production plans 
and reporting to the central government. Meanwhile, the SPC adopted a partial control 
of the internal organisation of these SOEs. It allowed the enterprises to choose 
different management structures,85 but follow the same principle of highly centralised 
functional lines (World Bank, 1993: 51). The other automobile manufacturers were 
supervised by either the local authorities or other ministries in the central government. 
For example, the SAIC, along with the “Small Three” (Beijing-Cherokee, Tianjin-
Charade and Guangzhou-Peugeo) in passenger-car industry, was controlled by the 
local governments. And the “Mini Two” (Chang An Automobile Co., Ltd. and 
Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp.) came under the administration of the Ministry of 
Aviation and Space Flight. 
 
6.2.3.2 Strengthening Control of both Central and Local SOEs by the SPC, 1994-
1998 
The Automotive Industrial Policy of 1994 was promulgated by the SPC to 
strengthen its control of both central and local SOEs. The SPC was authorised to issue 
                                               
84
 A Third Automotive Works specialising in heavy-duty truck industry was planned in 1978. However, the plan 
was abandoned in 1981 due to a shortfall in state budget (Lo, 1992: 35). Accordingly, the CNHTC was selected to 
be the central SOE in the subsector.  The SPC had informally announced that the FAW and DFM would be treated 
differently from other automobile manufacturers in 1984. The decision was promulgated formally by the SPC in its 
Industrial Policy of 1987. 
85
 For example, the FAW established a central management committee to institutionalise the leading decision-
making role of the top management, while the DFM built a management structure around a Board of Directors. 
See University of Michigan (1992: 3-36), Lo (1992: 37), and Mok (1994: 247). For a detailed explanation of 
DFM’s internal structure, see Chen (1997: 113-7). 
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approval certificates and approval marks for approved products and decide on 
approved product lists (Harwit, 1995: 46-7). The enterprises could only design or 
manufacture the products after they were approved by the SPC. The SPC’s control of 
the investment on passenger car production was exclusive. The industrial policy 
clearly steered financial aid to major auto manufacturers and banned domestic 
investments that were not on the projects designated by the SPC (Huang, 2002: 
546).86 Enterprises’ decision of acquiring capital from foreign investment or issuing 
stocks also required the approval of the SPC, ultimate decision maker in the State 
Council (Automotive Industrial policy of 1994, Chapter 5, Clause 23 and Clause 6).87 
The nationwide allocation of input materials also came under the SPC and 
Ministry of Material Supply (MMS), which gave priority to central SOEs. The SPC 
also strengthened its control of international procurement through “local content 
strategy”. Sino-foreign joint ventures of assembly makers gradually lost their 
autonomy of purchasing auto parts from outside. 88  The authority to approve the 
procurement of foreign equipment and technology by the enterprises was transferred 
from the China National Automotive Import and Export Corporation which was under 
the CNAIC to the SPC by the end of the 1990s.89 
The SPC also firmed up its control of alliance management between Chinese 
enterprises and foreign companies through a list of requirements in the industrial 
                                               
86
 The Construction Bank, the largest lender of capital investment to the automobile sector, was controlled by the 
SPC (University of Michigan, 1992: 3-35). 
87
 Small foreign investment would be approved by the SEC/SETC and MOFERT/MOFTEC. Project that exceeds 
the quota should be approved by the SPC.  
88
 Between 1980 and 1995, China imported 687,000 sets of auto parts mainly through foreign companies that were 
in joint ventures with local firms (Zhao, 2003: 193). China National Machinery and Equipment Import/Export 
Corporation under the administration of the MMI handled the import and export of automotive equipment before 
the 1998 administrative reform. 
89
 The international procurement was nominally controlled by the CNAIC. The import that exceeds the quota 
should be approved by the SPC. The SPC strictly controlled international procurement of auto parts through import 
quota. See “Jiwei fuzhuren Zeng Peiyan jianghua,” (SPC’s vice director Zeng Peiyan’s speech), Guojia qiche 
gongye zhengce xinbian (Collection of New Auto Industry Policies), 1994-1995: 94. 
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policy.90 The SPC/SDPC would determine the joint venture projects of both central 
SOEs and other enterprises. Li Lanqing, Vice-Premier in 1993, clearly stated that all 
foreign companies would have to seek approval from Zeng Peiyan who was the vice-
director of the SPC at that time.91 Foreign enterprises were not free to choose their 
joint venture partners (Dennelly, Mellahi, and Tally, 2003: 202).92 
 
6.2.3.3 Centralisation of the SAIC and Devolution of the CNHTC by the SDPC, 1999 
By the end of the 1990s, the SDPC restructured its subsidiaries by centralising 
the SAIC and devolving the CNHTC to further strengthened its control of the sector. 
The SAIC was the biggest producer of passenger cars (44.9% of total production) and 
generator of the highest tax revenue (34.11% of total revenue) (Almanac of China’s 
Auto market, 2000: 7-8). 
On one hand, the supervision of the SAIC was transferred from Shanghai 
municipal government to the SDPC in 1999. The move was proposed at the National 
Machinery Industry Conference from 6-10 January 1999. Prior to 1999, the SAIC was 
mainly affiliated with local authority as 75% of its capital assets were owned by the 
municipal government and the rest by the Shanghai International Trust and 
Investment Company, the financial arm of the municipal government (Thun, 2006: 
103). Although the SAIC “would not divert its development efforts from the 
municipality” in a short time (ibid: 189), the administrative relationship had made 
                                               
90
 For example, the Chinese party’s share in the joint venture must not be less than 50%; the establishment of a 
research and development centre for the purpose of indigenisation is a must; and a single foreign company could 
not engage in more than two alliance management practice to produce the same type of vehicle (Automobile 
Industry Policy, 1994, Clause No.28, 31, 32). For data on the share of stake in each joint venture, see InterChina 
Investment Consulting Company (1997), Wang and Liu (1999: 233). 
91
 See Guowuyuan fuzongli Li Lanqing zai zhongqi jituan shenhua gaige he fazhan huiyi shang de jianghua (Vice-
premier of the State Council Li Lanqing’s speech at CNHTC’s meeting on deepening reforms and development) 
22 December 1993. 
92
 The Chinese government had the upper hand of initiating joint venture projects because of the growth in the 
Chinese automobile market and the production overcapacity in developed countries in the 1990s (Lee, 2003: 291). 
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several changes after the introduction of the Board of Directors requested by the 
SDPC. 
On the other hand, the automobile enterprises affiliated with the CNHTC were 
devolved to local governments. The devolution started with the Sinotruk (Zhongguo 
Jiang Zhengdun Qicheye, 1999: 44). The immediate supervising agency—SBMBI—
previously in charge of project approval and production planning—was assigned to 
supervise the devolution (Chen et al., 2004: 290).  
The next two sections analyse the administrative and fiscal connection between 
the SDPC and the two groups of auto enterprises, namely the central SOEs and the 
other enterprises. The finding is that the SDPC in 1999 exerted extensive 
administrative control over the sector but remained fiscally unattached.  
 
6.2.4 Administrative Connection between Government and Industry in the 
Automobile Sector by the End of the 1990s 
As mentioned in previous section, the FAW, DFM and CNHTC were 
independent planning units under the auspices of the SPC/SDPC from 1987 to early 
1999. As the SDPC restructured its subsidiaries by centralising the SAIC and 
devolving the CNHTC in 1999, the central SOEs changed from “FAW-DFM-
CNHTC” to “FAW-DFM-SAIC”. The other automobile manufacturers were 
supervised by local authorities. Enterprises in the sector had to comply with industrial 
policies imposed by the SPC/SDPC. 
The SDPC’s administrative control of automobile sector involves the following 
areas: (Table 6.2) 1) Plan of production management. The enterprises could start 
designing or manufacturing the products only after they were approved by the SPC. 
The replacement of getting approval (shenpi zhi) with filling the record (bei’an zhi) 
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did not loosen the SDPC’s control of the sector. The practice became more arbitrary 
instead (Interview, January 2009). The SDPC would scrutinise the annual plans for 
production after approval for the three central SOEs, but left the other enterprises to 
local governments. 2) Capital investment. The SPC/SDPC reviewed and approved all 
capital investment of more than US$ 30 million. However, local governments 
circumvented the rules by breaking up the investment into several small ones (World 
Bank, 1993:37; Wang and Liu, 1999: 241).93 3) Allocation of wage and bonus. Both 
central and local SOEs were granted the autonomy of determining workers’ wage and 
bonus within the limits imposed by the SDPC.94 Compared to central SOEs, local 
SOEs and other enterprises’ autonomy of determining the salary and bonus received 
less intervention.95 4) Asset management. The SDPC retained the nominal rights to 
reallocating manufacturing equipment, production lines and associated skilled 
workers among the central SOEs, but became less and less inclined to disrupt their 
production.96 All the enterprises had been granted the autonomy of leasing, upgrading 
and replacing their fixed assets. However, the introduction of Complete Knock Down 
(CKD) was still subject to the approval of the SDPC. 5) Personnel and labour 
management. The SDPC retained its control through the appointment of the President 
and high-level managers of each of the three central SOEs. The SDPC has delegated 
the authority of recruiting, promoting and dismissing workers to the enterprises and 
labour bureaus of the local governments since the 1980s (University of Michigan, 
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 To prevent this circumvention, the People’s Bank of China centralised the banking system whose local branches 
used to be the major financial sources for local governments (InterChina Investment Consulting Company, 1997: 
29; for details, see Chapter 7). 
94
 The central SOEs have been allowed to experiment with reforming the allocation system left from the central-
planning period since 1980 (Jiang, ed. 1986: 255-7). Although the SPC retained the ultimate power of approval, it 
seldom disrupted the implementation if the allocation scheme was proved to be effective during the experimental 
stage. For example, in DFM, the allocation scheme was to divide the profit retention into three parts: 70% for 
development fund, 20% for welfare fund, and 10% for workers’ bonus (Jiang, ed. 1986: 45). Also see Dier qiche 
zhizaochang neibu gongzi gaige shixing banfa (Tentative methods of reforming wage system in the SAW), 1984. 
95
 For an analysis of salary system of the SAIC before 1999, see (Maxton, 1994: 21) and Thun (2006: 119-21). 
96
 The FAW had greatly suffered from the disruption from the central government in the 1980s. 
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1992: 3-33).97 The enterprises used to shoulder huge social burden of employing 
unskilled workers imposed by either central or local governments (Byrd, 1992: 406; 
Thun, 2006: 177). With industrial restructuring, this problem was rectified in the late 
1990s. 6) Procurement of material. For domestic procurement, both central SOEs and 
other enterprises had gradually got the autonomy of procuring raw materials from the 
MMS and auto parts from the CNAPAC (China National Automotive Parts and 
Accessories Corporation) under the CNAIC.98 However, international procurement 
remained subject to the intervention by the SDPC. 7) Alliance management. The 
central government had loosened its control of alliances among domestic enterprises 
for the purpose of promoting the formation of a “horizontally divided division-of-
labour system” (Marukawa, 1995: 332).99 However, alliance management between 
Chinese enterprises and foreign companies were still controlled by the SDPC. 8) 
Price. The SPC gradually allowed enterprises to determine the prices of the 
commercial vehicle, but retained tight control of the prices of the passenger cars 
(Chen, 1997: 112; Chen, 2002b: 144). In 1994, the SPC adopted a guidance price 
system for the passenger car sector, allowing the enterprises to adjust their prices not 
more than 10% higher or lower than SPC’s guide prices. 100  The system was 
challenged by Shanghai-VW in 1996 and 1997 by decreasing the selling price of its 
Santana by 20% for the purpose of getting more market share through domestic 
competition (Wang and Liu, 1999: 240). To prevent price competition among the 13 
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 For example, the mayor of Shenyang appointed the head of the Gold Cup Automotive Manufacturing 
Corporation in the 1980s (Mok, 1994: 250). For the analysis of personnel and labor management of the SAIC, see 
Thun (2006: 103-21). 
98
 Central SOEs retained more administrative link with the SDPC than other enterprises to enjoy the privilege of 
preferential allocation of resources, especially during the period of shortfall in resources. According to a survey by 
(Zhongguo qiye guanli xiehui zhuanhuan jingying jizhi diaoyan pingjia ketizu), central allocation of input 
materials in to the central SOEs decreased from 100% to 10% by the year 1995. 
99
 Vice-premier Li Lanqing in 1994 indicated that the practices of alliance management in the DFM and FAW 
were voluntary agreement among enterprises that were encouraged by the central government. See Li Lanqing 
fuzongli dui qiche dongye fazhan de yici tanhua (Vice-premier Li Lanqing’s talk on developing automobile 
industry), Guojia qiche gongye zhengce xinbian (Collection of New Auto Industry Policies). (1995: 79). 
100
 See Guojia jiwei guanyu dui guochan jiaoche shixing zhidao jiage de tongzhi (Notification by the SPC 
concerning implementing guide pricing on domestic-made passenger cars), 2 September 1994. 
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major manufacturers, the SDPC stepped in and tightened the price controls (Almanac 
of China’s economy, 1999: 237-42; Sit and Liu, 2000: 663). 9) Internal organisation. 
The SPC adopted a partial control of internal organisation in central SOEs. The other 
enterprises were left to the monitoring of the local authorities. For joint ventures, 
Chinese partners usually gave or were forced to give managerial control to 
international partners through negotiation and compromise for the purpose of learning 
advanced management know-how (Robinson and Stones, 1998: 138-9; Maxton, 1994: 
21; Mukherjee and Sastry, 1996: M-77; Gallagher, 2006: 51). 10) Sales. The central 
government had significantly loosened its control of the marketisation of automobile 
products.101 In 1980, automobile manufacturers were obliged to turn over 92.7% of 
their products in accordance with mandatory planning (Byrd, 1992: 375). The share of 
these products had been decreasing over time, from 58.3% in 1984 to 22.2% in 1989, 
15% in 1992 (Zhang, 2003) and 4% in 1995 (InterChina Investment Consulting 
Company, 1997: 105). 102  A market had been gradually established to replace 
mandatory planning by 1996 (Wang and Liu, 1999: 231). But the SDPC retained its 
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 According to Yang (1995: 132-3), the Ministry of Material Supply was unable to procure all the products due to 
budgetary constraints in the early 1980s. 
102
 However, the aim of creating a nationwide integrated market was undermined by local governments that used 
regulations and policies to favour the purchase of vehicles produced within their jurisdictions (Mok, 1994: 251).   
103
 In the early 1980s, the two-track system was allowed. In fact, the sale of passenger cars was the responsibility 
of the SPC and not the SDPC.  
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A brief survey of the SDPC’s control of central SOEs and other enterprises 
indicated that the SDPC in 1999 had a close administrative connection with the 
automobile sector as a whole (or 33.97% of full control). 104  The SDPC’s 
administrative control was the strongest in the passenger car industry (or 47.9%), 
moderate in truck industry (or 37.5%) and bus industry (or 31.5%), and weakest in the 
auto parts industry.105 The automobile sector was relative “high stake” as it enjoys 
much less autonomy than the sectors of agriculture and textile. The next section 
explores the fiscal tie between the SDPC and the automobile sector. 
 
6.2.5 Fiscal Connection between Government and Industry in the Automobile Sector 
by the End of the 1990s 
Generally speaking, the SPC/SDPC had no fiscal connection with any specific 
sector or individual enterprises. The profit retention system introduced by the State 
                                               
104
 Calculating by gross output value, the share of central SEOs in 1999 was 35.87% and the share of other 
enterprises was 64.13% (Table 5.6). Among the 10 areas of autonomy, full control was coded as 100% control, 
partial as 50%, and little as zero. Accordingly, the administrative connection between the SDPC and automobile 
sector in 1999 was: (AC)=35.87%/10*(100%+100%+0+50%+50%+50%+50%+50%+50%+0)+ 
64.13%/10*(50%+50%+0+0+0+50%+50%+50%+0+0)=33.97%   
105
 Calculating by the number of output, the share of central SOEs in 1999 in passenger car, truck, and bus industry 
was 91.4%, 50.8%, and 27.5% respectively (Table 5.1). 
 121
Council in the early 1980s gave the intermediary agencies in each sector a chance to 
exploit the system. In order to protect the automobile enterprises from being taken 
advantaged of, the SPC allowed the enterprises to retain most of their profit after 
taxes by taking away the authority from the immediate supervising agency.  
Within the State Council, the responsibility of the SPC/SDPC was to plan the 
expenditure while the collection of revenue went to Ministry of Finance (MOF). 
Before the 1978 reform, all the revenue collected by the local bureaus were 
transferred to the MOF and redistributed to different ministries and provinces through 
a central plan formulated by the SPC.  
In the early 1980s, the central government introduced the profit retention system 
in automobile industry. The SPC had successfully prevented the central SOEs from 
being subject to various rent-seeking practices through its developmental agenda. For 
example, the DFM requested for retaining certain amount of the profit for self-
financing development. The DFM’s request was supported by the SPC but opposed 
by the MOF, as the profit was supposed to be transferred to the MOF rather than the 
SPC. Finally, the SPC helped the DFM overturn the MOF’s rejection (Mok, 1994: 
258-60). According to Mok (Ibid: 259), the DFM could retain 40% of profits, 60% of 
depreciation funds and 50% of major repair fund to form a “enterprise self-raised 
fund” in the early 1980s. Since 1983, the State Council has allowed the DFM to 
transfer the profit, at an annual growth of 7%, from a base of RMB 140 million in the 
year of 1982 (Jiang, ed. 1986: 38; Byrd, 1992: 388). In 1986, the base of transferred 
profit for the DFM increased to RMB 200 million (Byrd, 1992: 387-8; Mok, 1994: 
262). The CNAIC, as the immediate authority between the SPC and DFM, took the 
opportunity to exploit the profit retention system. As Wang and Liu (1999: 231) 
document, the CNAIC tried to improve its revenue income by “taking away some 
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profitable and strategic segments of business from the enterprises” (also see Yang, 
1995: 133 and Byrd, 1992: 385). After complaints from the enterprises, CNAIC’s 
privilege of collecting various taxes from the enterprises was terminated by the SPC 
in the early 1990s.106 The profit retention system was also introduced to the FAW in 
the 1980s (Table 6.3).  
Table 6.3 Ratio of Profit Retention to Gross Profit in the 1980s (%) 
Enterprise/year 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
FAW 11.9 58.8 82.6 56.9 -196.2* 
DFM 36.1 54.5 57.1 71.5 38.0 
Note: *: The FAW received a capital injection from the government in 1990. 
Source: Mok (1994: 263, 335) 
 
At the time of providing generous packages of profit retention to the central 
SOEs, the SPC had to bargain with local authorities for the fiscal control of local 
SOEs. However, the fiscal connection between local SOEs and the SPC/SDPC had 
been loose, especially in regions where the authority was financially capable of 
supporting its subordinating enterprises and politically powerful to negotiate with 
central government. Thun’s (2006: 132) interview revealed that the Shanghai 
municipal government controlled-SAIC turned down the SPC’s request to transfer 
half of its proceeds to the central government in the early 1990s. Although the SAIC 
had to turn a portion of the proceeds over to the centre, it was fiscally unattached to 
the SPC. 
To conclude, in terms of administrative supervision, the SDPC in 1999 exerted 
significant control over the automobile sector. With regard to fiscal connection, the 
SDPC did not rely on the automobile sector for revenue generation. Among the 
subsectors, the SDPC’s role varied from a developmental agency in the passenger car 
industry facilitating the growth of a few central SOEs to a regulatory agency in the 
auto parts industry providing relatively impartial market rules. Its efforts to protect a 
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 Guowuyuan guanyu zhongguo qiche gongye zonggongsi tizhi youguan wenti de pifu (Official Reply by the 
State Council concerning relevant questions to the CNAIC’s managerial system), 22 October 1993 
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sector were dependent on the roles played. The following sections will examine 
sectoral interests and bureaucratic interests at the threshold of China’s WTO 
accession. 
 
6.3 Sectoral Interests on Trade Negotiation 
It was widely agreed by economists, entrepreneurs, government think tanks and 
politicians that China’s automobile sector was not competitive in global trade at the 
time of negotiation. An extensive research conducted by economists after the China-
US agreement in November 1999 indicated that the severest blow from international 
competition would be in the automobile sector. For example, Chen and Feng (2000), 
Zhou (2001), and Yin and Gates (2002) predict that China’s automobile industry 
would suffer from international competition after its entry into the WTO. Cheap input 
resources and labour cost would figure strongly in the textile and clothing sector but 
not the automobile sector. For Dennelly, Mellahi, and Tally (2003: 204), the most 
important factors are technological managerial know-how, highly trained workforces 
and excellent information system. China’s automobile sector was weak in all of these 
factors. Zhang (2004: 87-90) provides a list of the major comparative disadvantages 
of China’s automobile sector, including fragmented industrial system, low 
concentration ratios, poor research and development (R&D), low production 
efficiency, high production cost and insufficient capital supply.107 Zhao’s (2003: 185-
6) analysis of the economy of scale shows that China’s automobile manufacturing 
enterprises were lagging far behind their foreign counterparts in this area.108 After 
breaking down the whole sector into different subsectors, the economists generally 
agreed that domestically produced normal trucks and buses enjoyed a comparative 
                                               
107
 See also Cooke (2008: 123-7). 
108
 Generally speaking, large manufacturers enjoy cost advantage over small ones. 
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advantage in terms of prices, but not in the case of passenger cars and advanced 
commercial vehicles (World Bank, 1993: 54; Almanac of China’s auto market, 2000: 
16) (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Comparison of Domestic and International Prices in 1999 
  Inferior-quality products High-quality products 
Truck Heavy Competitive Competitive 
Medium Competitive Competitive 
Light Competitive Uncompetitive 
Bus Heavy Competitive Uncompetitive 
Medium Competitive Uncompetitive 
Light Competitive Uncompetitive 
Car Mid-high Uncompetitive Uncompetitive 
Medium grade Uncompetitive Uncompetitive 
Common Uncompetitive Uncompetitive 
Source: Compiled from data in Almanac of China’s auto market. (2000: 16) 
 
Harwit’s interviews with entrepreneurs in different time periods showed a 
growing confidence in their products in spite of the coming competition.  In 1992, his 
interview with SVW’s Chinese managing director recorded that “at the moment, we 
are not competitive. If they were to open the market, we could not compete” (1995: 
171). In 2001, another interview revealed “guarded optimism” from several joint 
venture company leaders.109 Finally, nearer date to China’s WTO accession, SVW 
officials showed much confidence when they replied that “(W)ith good quality, we 
will have no disadvantages against imports” (2001: 166). 
The governmental think tanks and politicians generally agreed that the 
automobile industry expected to see huge loss after WTO accession. A research by the 
Development Research Centre of China’s State Council concluded that China’s 
automobile sector was not competitive at that time because of its inferior technology, 
high pollution, high prices, and low productivity (Thun, 2006: 207-8; Gallagher, 
2006: 26). The Industrial Policy of 1994 released by the SPC clearly stated that 
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 Harwit (2001) conducted interviews with the following companies in Beijing and Shanghai in the summer of 
2000: Asimco, Beijing Jeep, Shanghai Volkswagen, Shanghai General Motors and Toyota.  
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China’s automotive industry was still not internationally competitive (Industrial 
Policy of 1994, Chapter 7, Clause 34). Chinese officials again in 1998 expressed their 
concern for the future of the automobile sector, estimating that China needed at least 
nine years to be competitive under WTO rules (Harwit, 2001: 662). 
Although many scholars and officials were very pessimistic about China’s 
automobile sector after its WTO accession, Yang (2000a: 438) holds a more positive 
view that “when the government monopoly in the automobile manufacturing is 
abandoned, private Chinese automobile manufacturers may develop the most 
competitive automobile manufacturing sector in the world within quite a short period 
of time”.110 However, the prospect of developing the private sector was not favourable 
in the government-controlled automobile industry. A study of market structure in the 
automobile sector in the next section reveals that one of the reasons for governmental 
protection was to prevent private actors from entering the sector. 
 
6.4 Sectoral Pressure on Trade Negotiation 
In the early 1980s, China’s automobile industry composed of a large number of 
small and medium state-owned auto manufacturers. Thanks to the industrial 
restructuring, the sector gradually developed into an oligopoly, but remained 
fragmented.  
 State ownership is significant in the global automobile industry as in the cases 
of Renault and Volkswagen. As Sit and Liu (2000: 654) summarises, state 
intervention was one of the major factors for establishing an auto industry in the 
developing countries. 111  China was no exception. Generally speaking, the SOEs 
dominated the automobile industry in the 1980s. Their domination started to decline 
                                               
110
 Also see Hu (1999: 20-3). 
111
 Although the automobile enterprises in South Korea were privately owned, they still relied on governmental 
planning to survive the competition from giant multinational corporations (Chaudhuri, 1989).  
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in the 1990s with the introduction of foreign companies in the form of joint ventures. 
However, the state sector remained the most important force before China’s WTO 
accession (Table 5.3). Thanks to governmental protection, the SOEs were “extremely 
sheltered from all sources of competition”, especially from private actors and foreign 
companies (World Bank, 1993, xi). They were the status quo players who did not 
want to see any changes after WTO accession, particularly the entry of private players 
(Huang, 1993, 88). The private enterprises were competitive, as they did not have to 
shoulder social burdens. The first application in 1997 by Geely did not reach the SPC, 
the decision-making body. It was turned downed by the local government. Chery 
Automobile, another private manufacturer, had no choice but to join the SAIC. It 
surrendered 20% of its share to the SAIC to produce the passenger car under SAIC’s 
production licence (Interview, February 2009; Chen, et al., 2004: 214). The SOEs 
were also willing to keep the import quota and high import tariff rates that were used 
to protect the sector from foreign intrusion. According to Posth (2002: 75), purchase 
prices of imported passenger cars were 250-300% higher than comparable prices 
abroad. These measures guaranteed a huge profit for domestic automobile 
manufacturers.112 Thus, the SOEs in general did not have any incentive to voluntarily 
liberalise the sector. Foreign direct investment was allowed to enter the sector as long 
as it did not challenge domestic state control.113 By the end of 1995, there were 381 
sanzi enterprises (Sino-foreign joint investments, Sino-foreign cooperative projects 
and wholly owned foreign investments). Among them, there were 214 enterprises 
(56.325%) with shares controlled by the Chinese, 106 enterprises (27.895%) with 
share controlled by foreigners and 60 enterprises (15.79%) with equal domestic share 
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 For example, a Xiali passenger car was sold at RMB 94,000 with the net profit of RMB 20,000-30,000 in 1993. 
See “Xiali, Meiling, Yilaguan…” Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 1993.3 
113
 For example, in the early 1980s, several Beijing automotive manufacturers set up Sino-foreign joint-investment 
venture with American companies. In the late 1980s, the FAW set up a Sino-foreign joint-investment venture with 
German Volkswagen Company. 
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and foreign share (Interview, January 2009). In 1999, domestic firms still dominated 
the sector (Table 6.5). The majority of state ownership was not allowed to be 
challenged.  
Table 6.5 Market Structure of the Automobile Sector in 1999 (%) 
Item Domestic Firms HKMT Sanzi 
Total SOEs 
Share of number of enterprises 88.61 45.09 3.85 7.54 
Share of gross output value 69.62 34.52 3.62 26.76 
Share of added value 66.76 34.53 4.79 28.45 
Note: Domestic firms include SOEs, collective-owned enterprises, share 
cooperatives, domestic joint ventures, closely held corporations (youxian zeren 
gongsi), publicly held corporations (gufen youxian gongsi) and private 
enterprises. HKMT: investment from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan; Sanzi: Sino-
foreign joint investments, Sino-foreign cooperative projects and wholly owned 
foreign investments 
Source: Compiled from data in China Automotive Industry Yearbook, 2000: 291-2. 
 
Although the SOEs in general did not have any incentive to voluntarily 
liberalise the sector, their voice of protection was not as unified as those in the 
telecommunications sector and banking sector. The interest in state protection was 
slightly divergent between central SOEs and local SOEs. The strongest request for 
protection in the automobile sector came from the central SOEs whose share of gross 
output value account for only 35% of the sector (Table 6.6), compared to China 
Telecom’s 91% in telecommunications services and the “Big Four” state-owned 
commercial banks’ 71% in the banking industry. Accordingly, the state sector in the 
automobile industry needs further scrutiny.  
Table 6.6  Performance of the Three Central SOEs in the Automobile Sector 
in 1999 (%) 
Item FAW DF SAIC Total of the three 
Share of gross output value 13.31 7.12 15.44 35.87 
Share of added-value 13.56 5.94 18.72 38.22 
Share of total value of profits and taxes 13.61 3.24 34.11 50.95 
Share of vehicle production 18.69 11.23 13.97 43.89 
Share of passenger car production 17.31 7.10 44.90 69.31 
Source: Almanac of China’s Auto market. (2000: 7-8) 
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Although most enterprises in the domestic automobile sector were state-owned, 
they were in various situations that were largely determined by the positions of their 
supervisors. The central SOEs had tried to prevent competition from not only private 
actors and foreign companies but also local SOEs. The government policy at that time 
was primarily formulated to benefit the central SOEs. It had prevented local SOEs 
from entering the sector with the control on production licence, investment and input 
supply. The SPC in 1987 allowed only three companies to manufacture passenger 
cars. They were the FAW, DFM and SAIC. FAW’s products were meant for reducing 
domestic demand of foreign cars and DFM’s products were planned for export (Lin, 
1987). The administrative control of the SAIC was initiated by the municipal 
government after extensive lobbying effort to obtain approval of the central 
government. Private enterprises or even the local SOEs did not have the channel to 
lobby for the production licence of passenger car assembly (Ngo and Chen, 2009: 
175). The development of the central SOEs was also guaranteed by the state budget. 
In order to meet the SPC’s plan of developing the automobile sector, the government 
expected an investment of RMB 150-180 trillion — including RMB 40 trillion for the 
“eighth five-year plan (1991-1995)”, compared to a gross investment of RMB 22 
trillion from 1949 to 1990 —when actually RMB 58.8 trillion was needed. As the 
amount of investment exceeded state budget, the government decided to mobilise 
domestic and international capital market. The central SOEs were strategically 
positioned to receive financial benefits from these channels.  For example, in 1999, 
the FAW got RMB 8.6 billion, about 80% of its total debt owing to the state banking 
system, as a favourable “switch from debt to equity” from the central government 
(Ping, 2001: 4). Finally, local SOEs were not able to turn their production plan into a 
physical reality when there was a shortfall in good- quality materials, which were 
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primarily supplied to the central SOEs through the nationwide allocation system 
supervised by the SPC and MMS.  
As discussed, there were certain barriers that prevented the local SOEs from 
competing with the central SOEs. By keeping foreign players away, the central SOEs 
had the priority of receiving limited investment and good- quality input materials in 
the closed market. The FAW, according to Harwit (2001: 662), “was among the most 
vocal of the large companies to express its worries”. One FAW official in 1999 
expressed that they need another two or three years before the automobile sector 
could be opened up (Businessweek Online, 22 November 1999, quoted from Harwit, 
2001: 662). For the local SOEs, the gradual opening- up not only invited foreign 
competition, but also lifted domestic barriers that had been preventing their 
development. Superior to private enterprises but inferior to the central SOEs, the local 
SOEs presented a mixed stance towards market liberalization. A survey of 80 
domestic automobile manufacturers including both local and central SOEs in 1994 
showed that the request by local SOEs for lowest import tariff rate and minimal 
foreign entry was lower than the requests from the central SOEs (Interview, January 
2009, for details of the average, see Table 6.7). The request for lowest import tariff 
rate by the sector in general was much lower than the nominal rate (Table 6.8). The 
automobile industry as a whole failed to present a unified opposition to market 
liberalisation. 
Table 6.7 Request for Lowest Import Tariff Rate and Minimal Foreign Entry 
from the Automobile Sector 
 Lowest import tariff rate allowed 
(average, %) 
Minimal foreign entry allowed 
(average, %) 
Year 1994 1995 2000 1994 1995 2000 
Passenger cars 96.67 70.00 43.33 46.67 43.33 16.67 
Other vehicles 51.83 45.67 24.67 15.60 19.00 35.50 
Spare parts 40.04 38.63 25.76 27.98 28.27 33.81 
Source: compiled by author (Interview, January 2009) 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of Industry-Required Protection and  
Government-Enforced Protection in the Automobile Industry 
 Passenger car Imported engine 
Year 1994 1995 2000 1994 1995 2000 
Lowest import tariff rate 
required by the industry 
(average, %) 
96.67 70.00 43.33 20 20 19 
Government-enforced  
tariff rate 
180 110 80 35 35 35 
Minimal foreign entry 
allowed (average, %) 
46.67 43.33 16.67 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Practical foreign entry (%) 40 29 3 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Source: compiled by author, data of nominal tariff rate from Tariff System of Peoples 
Republic of China (various years from 1995 to 2001) 
 
6.5 Bureaucratic Interests on Trade Negotiation 
Both the central and local governments opposed to the opening of the 
automobile industry to foreign competition, but for different reasons. At the central 
level, the SPC has taken a great interest in the automobile sector since the second half 
of the 1980s (Hope and Jacobson, 1989: 103). The automobile sector was promoted 
by the SPC as the important national “pillar industry” in 1987. “The Guidelines on the 
1990s National Industrial Policies” (90 niandai guojia chanye zhengce gangyao) 
looked at the distribution of limited resources of selected sectors—including 
machinery electronics, automobile, chemical and construction—through various 
preferential policies on bank loans and foreign investment. Their supervising 
ministries would have to work with the SPC on the implementation of these industrial 
policies. However, the SPC was not financially capable of supporting these sectors 
except the automobile (Quan, 2002: 236; Sun, 2007: 189). The automobile industry 
was the only pillar industry that the SPC was capable of promoting. The development 
strategy including output, tax, investment and tariff was planned till 2000 by the SPC 
from the early 1990s. The SPC was not ready to give up its developmental plan during 
the period of WTO negotiation. 
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However, the SPC’s developmental plan was hampered by the local 
governments. In the early 1980s, a large number of under-specialised manufacturers 
competed for investment and material resources to produce as diverse variety of 
outputs. The central government failed to prevent the development of small and 
median-sized manufacturers (Almanac of China’s economy, 1990: III132-3). The 
early attempt to solve the problem of duplicate construction (chongfu jianshe) among 
regions was to form enterprise groups, like the DFM and FAW, by transferring the 
ownership of these enterprises from local governments to central government. For 
example, the SOEs belonging to the local governments of Kunning, Liuzhou, 
Hangzhou and etc. were transferred from local to central government to form the 
DFM (Chen, 1997: 114). The decision was well accepted by local authorities of loss-
making enterprises were loss-making but resisted by those with profit-making 
subsidiaries (Byrd, 1992: 413; Yang, 1995: 134-5). Besides, the effort to form 
integrated domestic market and develop a nationwide resource allocation system to 
foster the growth of giant SOEs had never been successful (Mok, 1994: 244). The 
sector was extremely fragmented because of local protectionism (Gao, 1999: 78; 
Yang, 1995: 176-7; InterChina Investment Consulting Company, 1997: 27; Dennelly, 
Mellahi, and Tally, 2003: 205). Regional protectionism by local governments had 
hampered the central state’s schedule of upgrading the whole sector to international 
standards (Gallagher, 2006: 41). The disruption prevented the central government 
from giving concessions to foreign negotiators at an earlier date. The divergent 
interests between central government and local authorities had influenced China’s 
GATT/WTO accession. 
The central and local governments also had different incentives to keep high 
import tariff rates. The central government had adopted a series of protective 
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measures, including import quotas, foreign trade licences, and foreign exchange 
control to protect the domestic industry, especially the central SOEs. Local 
governments that were against market liberalisation usually had two concerns. The 
first one was to protect their regional automobile enterprises. However, as the 
authorities had been gradually recentralised they were no longer interested in 
protecting the sector. The second was to profit from the loopholes of a highly 
protective trade regime, like the smuggling practice in Hainan province in 1984 
(Posth, 2002: 77). A large number of foreign passenger cars flooded China’s market 
through illegal means, jeopardising the development of the domestic infant industry 
(Figure 6.2). If the central government could effectively prevent the rent-seeking 
opportunities of the local governments, the two parties would not have the preference 
in common.114 
 







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Legal Importation Smuggling
                   
Source: Zheng (2007: 75), quoted from Li (2009: 8) 
 
To conclude, in the early 1980s, the automobile sector was uncompetitive in 
global trade and in a domestic market populated by a large number of SOEs. A series 
                                               
114
 Protecting their auto sector from the importation of cheap and good- quality products after the deduction of 
tariff rates was not the prior concern of the local governments. Instead, domestic competition from conglomerates 
supported by the central government was their major concern at that time.  
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of industrial policies were promulgated by the SPC to restructure the sector. The SPC 
gradually centralised its control to give further to the central SOEs at the expense of 
private actors, foreign companies and local SOEs, but at varying degrees. Disrupted 
by local developmental plans, the central effort to nurture the infant industry proved 
futile.115 The sector was reluctant to lift the barriers for foreign competition, but failed 
to exert a unified pressure on the government to protect the sector. Thanks to the 
centralisation of administrative control, the SPC/SDPC became active in protecting 
sectoral interests, especially the central SOEs’ interests. The next section explains the 
outcome of WTO negotiation in the automobile sector.  
 
6.6 China’s WTO Commitment and Its Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
6.6.1 Little Concessions in the Automobile Sector 
The automobile industry was one of the least competitive manufacturing sectors, 
one of the least open, and one of the most vocal in terms of requesting a protectionist 
trade policy (Li, 1999: 253). The MOFTEC was responsible for coordinating with the 
automobile sector and the SPC/SDPC in the WTO negotiation. In face of strong 
opposition from the SDPC, the MOFTEC did not offer much concession on the 
sector.  
In the end, Chinese negotiators decided to protect the automobile sector by 
sacrificing the textile and clothing sector. In order to sustain the import quota of 
foreign automobile products till 2005, they allowed other countries to keep their 
quotas on Chinese textile till the same year. They also managed to negotiate with 
American negotiators for a reduction in the tariff rate from 80%-100% to 25% by the 
                                               
115
 The fact was widely accepted by Chinese politicians in the national convention of 1992. 
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year of 2006 instead of 2005. In exchange, the Chinese guaranteed a faster reduction 
in the first few years after its entry to the WTO (Table 3.3). 
 
6.6.2 China’s Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
The automobile industry as a “high stake” sector received tremendous support 
from the SDPC during the negotiation. The SDPC which was renamed SDRC in 2003 
took over the authority from the State Bureau of the Machinery Industry under the 
SETC in the same year (Noble et al, 2005: 13). At the same time, the central 
government made a further effort to centralise control of the sector from local 
governments by abolishing all the local rules (Nine PRC agencies launch campaign to 
rectify auto market, 2004). The sector enjoyed little autonomy and even less six years 
after WTO accession. The SDPC/SDRC was responsible for protecting the sector. It 
would be very difficult for the SDPC/SDRC to give up its control of the sector, 
although its top-down intervention approach was not compatible with its WTO 
commitment. 
Dong Yang from the State Bureau of the Machinery Industry indicated 
immediately after the conclusion of the WTO agreement that there would not be any 
significant change in pricing within the next two years of China’s entry to the WTO. 
Although Chinese negotiators promised to reduce the average tariff rate on foreign 
cars to 25% by 2006, the supervising agencies believed that they could develop a way 
of sustaining their protection of the sector (Zhang ed., 2001: 174). The import quota 
was one of the measures. The United States Trade Representative (2007: 30-1) found 
that the import quota system in the auto sector was one of the most difficult to deal 
with among the sectors, which disrupted wholesale and retail operations of imported 
vehicles. Through US pressures, the import quota system was finally phased out by 
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January 2005 as scheduled. Besides, the Industry Policy of 1994 was considered by 
US negotiators as incompatible with WTO rules. Although China agreed to revise the 
policy in a separate agreement before the entry, it has not fulfilled its promise since its 
entry (USTR, 2004: 48). Instead, in 2003, the SDRC drafted a new automobile 
industry policy to limit foreign-ownership to 50% and half of all sales in China to 
“wholly owned domestic firms using their own technology” by 2010 (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2005: 83). The Industry Policy released in 2004 “raised barriers” for 
foreign entry by setting large minimum investment requirements at RMB 2 million 
and local content requirement (Noble et al, 2005: 14). A series of regulations that 
contained discriminatory policies against auto imports were promulgated by the 
central government in the following years.116 The United States, together with the EU 
and Japan, expressed their concerns accordingly (USTR, 2004: 48). In 2006, the 
United States brought WTO case against China’s use of prohibited local content 
requirements in the sector (USTR, 2007: 3). The WTO’s Appellate Body judged in 
December 2008 that “China has been applying WTO-inconsistent taxes on imported 
auto parts whenever they are used in the assembly of motor vehicles that fail to meet 
certain local content requirements” (USTR, 2008: 5).  
Thanks to the efforts of government protection in terms of non-tariff barriers, 
the automobile sector did not do badly after WTO accession. Although the tariff rate 
was reduced especially in the first two years of entry, foreign automobile products did 
not enter Chinese market freely. Considered as one of the most uncompetitive sectors 
before WTO accession, the passenger car industry experienced a slight increase in 
market share of imported passenger cars in the first two years to shrink again in the 
                                               
116
 These regulations were Implementing Rules for the Administration of Brand-Specific Automobile Dealerships 
by MOFCOM, the SDRC and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) in February 2005, 
Measures on the Importation of Parts for Entire Automobiles issued by the SDRC in February 2005, Rules for 
Auto External Marks by the SDRC in November 2005, and Implementing Rules for the Evaluation of Eligibility of 
Auto General Distributors and Brand-specific Dealers in January 2006 by the MOFCOM. 
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following years. In 2006, foreign passenger cars accounted for only 3% of sales in 
Chinese market. China’s trade surplus in the automobile industry turned positive in 
2005 to grow dramatically in the following year (Figure 6.3). The automobile industry 
became one of the major beneficiaries of China’s WTO accession. 
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Source: compiled from data in China Automotive Industry Yearbook, various issues 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In the 1980s, the SPC adopted a national developmental agenda to enhance the 
competitiveness of China’s domestic automobile industry in the international market. 
However, the existence of a developmental state at the local level had undermined the 
effectiveness of the industrial policies promulgated from Beijing. To overcome local 
constraints, the SPC had gradually centralised its control of the enterprises with 
partial success. The close government-industry relation guaranteed the convergence of 
interests between the SDPC and sector, which remained slightly fragmented. The SPC 
had effectively protected the sector in the 1990s, as the tariff rate in 2000 was much 
higher than the bottom line requested by the automobile enterprises (Tables 5.7 and 
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5.8). Its successor was equally effective in the WTO accession. The agreement 
protected the sector that was considered “high stake”, uncompetitive and fragmented. 
Continuous intervention in the automobile sector casts doubts on its compliance in the 
post-WTO period. It also prevented the sector from gaining more autonomy or 










































Chapter 7: MPT/MII and Telecommunications Services 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Scholars on China’s telecommunications services usually assumed a close tie 
between the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT)/ Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII) and major enterprises in the sector but failed to provide 
detailed explanations. For example, Zhang (2001: 478) asserted that the MII and local 
postal, telephone and telegraph branches (PTTs) share common values in ideology, 
ownership, and ultimate goals. But he overlooked the intervening role of the local 
governments. Mueller and Lovelock (2000) suggested that there was an effective 
alliance of interests between China Telecom and the “state”, which gave rise to a 
bargain whereby China Telecom was effectively shielded from foreign competition in 
return for advancing the state’s interests in the expansion of infrastructure into more 
remote areas of China. However, they failed to identify the fragmented nature of the 
central state that implied that the interest of the “state” as a whole was not always 
representative of the individual ministries. Both studies could not uncover to what 
extent the interests of the ministry and sector converged and how this relationship 
varied in different time periods. It might not be a concern for Yang (2004: 38) who 
believed that the creation of the MII as a “regulatory power” in 1998 was “used not to 
monopolize but to promote competition through a breakup of China Telecom and the 
entry of new players”. According to Yang, the emergence of the “regulatory state” in 
the telecommunications sector would have helped to liberalize the industry by 
allowing more foreign entry. The contending evidence shows that some Chinese 
authorities allowed foreign companies to hold more than 70% ownership from 1995 to 
1998, which was much higher than stated in the final agreement with WTO members 
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in 1999. The evidence also cast a doult on the simple explanation that the 
telecommunications sector was too strategically important to give up for negotiators. 
Thus, government-industry relations in the telecommunications sector is worthy of 
study as its evolution by the end of the 1990s influenced the result of WTO 
negotiations that in turn impacted their relationship in the future. 
This chapter argues that administrative structure in telecommunications services 
in the 1990s was fragmented as Lu and Wong (2003: 21) had observed. 
Uncooperative behavior between China Telecom (supervised by the MPT) and China 
Unicom (supervised primarily by the Ministry of Electronic Industries (MEI)) 
jeopardized their monopolistic profits in the sector and created loopholes for foreign 
entry. Both China Telecom and China Unicom came under the MII’s supervision in 
1998 in an effort to terminate their uncooperative actions. The breakdown of one 
monopoly (China Telecom) was an attempt to created four monopolies in their 
respective subsectors. Under the umbrella of the MII, their dominance would not be 
challenged by the entry of new players. Having successfully protected its subsidiaries 
through the negotiation of WTO accession, the MII would continue with its political 
intervention after the entry. The regulatory body in telecommunications services is not 
taking shape yet. 
 
7.2 Government-Industry Relations in the Telecommunications Services 
7.2.1 The Telecommunications Services 
The MPT had been solely providing telecommunications services in China till 
September 1994 when China Unicom was set up by the State Council for the purpose 
of “bringing in some competition to the sector” which was defined as “controlled 
competition” by DeWokin (2001: 632). In response, China Telecom, separating from 
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the MPT, became an “independent” company. In 1999, China Telecom was divided 
into four companies, namely China Telecom, China Mobile, Guoxin, and China 
Satellite, each specialized in the services of fixed-telephone lines, mobile 
communications, paging, and satellite transmissions respectively.  
 
7.2.2 Supervising Agencies in the Central Government 
The MPT changed its role from service provider to supervising agency since 
China Telecom was carved out in 1995. The founding of China Unicom in 1994 
brought the MEI, the Ministry of Railway (MOR) and the Ministry of Electric Power 
(MEP) in supervising group. The MII was created in 1998 during administrative 
reform to supervise the industry. The newly established “super ministry” incorporated 
the MPT, the MEI, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT), the State 
Radio Regulation Commission (SRRC), the satellite administrations of the China 
National Aerospace Industry Corporation, and the Aviation Industries of China. 
Telecommunications equipment manufacturing officially separated from the 
sector in 1984 when the State Planning Commission (SPC) mandated that the 
Ministry of Machine Building and Electronics Industries (MMBEI) was the main 
telecommunications equipment manufacturer and the MPT was the primary user. The 
development of two sectors was subject to different industrial policies. The 
manufacturing sector has followed China’s overall pro-foreign investment policy with 
a conventional goal of helping indigenous manufacturers to acquire foreign capital, 
advanced technologies, management knowledge, and market accesses. In contrast, the 
“no foreign direct investment” policy has been instituted in China’s service provision 
sector, based on its economic, political, and social concerns (Tan, 2002: 18; Mueller 
and Tan, 1997). The telecommunications manufacturing sector was liberalized earlier 
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and closely connected with the MEI. The MEI supervised the manufacturers that 
dominated three quarters of the market share in the sector.117 Accordingly, the MEI 
was mainly responsible for coordinating telecommunications equipment 
manufacturing and the MPT/MII was mainly responsible for telecommunications 
services throughout the GATT/WTO negotiations. Although the MII incorporated 
both supervising agencies through administrative reform in 1998, the manufacturing 
sector was in the trade category of goods while the service sector was in the trade 
category of services. This chapter focuses on the MII’s effort to protect the service 
sector.  
 
7.2.3 “Decentralisation” in the Telecommunications Services  
Government-industry relations in telecommunications services experienced 
three periods of development in the 1980s and 1990s. The first period started from the 
MPT’s attempt to clarify the division of labour between the central MPT and local 
PTBs in 1984. The second period was marked by the entry of China Unicom that led 
to uncooperative behaviour among the monopolies in 1995. The third period 
commenced from the administrative reform in 1998 when the MII strengthened its 
control of the sector through incorporating China Unicom.  
 
7.2.3.1 Clarifying the Division of Labour between Central and Local Authorities in 
the Telecommunications Services, 1984–1994 
Before the 1980s, the telecommunications administration system was 
dysfunctional. The MPT could not effectively control the local branches (Lu and 
Wong, 2003: 36). In 1979, the MPT, no longer tolerant of the administrative structure 
                                               
117
 The other telecommunications equipment manufacturers were affiliated with MPT or MOR or cooperated with 
foreign companies in the form of joint venture (Liang and Ding, 2001: 73-4). 
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that fragmented its management, filed a report to the State Council to fight for its lost 
administrative power. In 1984, by recognizing the authority of local governments, the 
MPT clarified the division of labour between the central MPT and local Post and 
Telecommunications Bureau (PTB). By doing so, the MPT effectively regained 
administrative control.118 
The central MPT took full administrative control of the inter-provincial, 
national, and international telephone services, while granting some autonomy to the 
provincial PTBs on intra-provincial telephone services. Rural telephone networks 
were operated by companies owned and run by county-level or town-level 
governments. Enterprises at village level were collectively owned by peasants. The 
MPT did not have any administrative or fiscal control of the rural telecommunications 
service providers (Lu, 1994). However, their gross assets and revenue were so little 
that their presence in national-wide statistics was negligible. Thus, rural telephone 
networks are not included in this study.  
Intra-provincial telephone services throughout China were supervised by 
provincial authorities. The PTBs were more closely aligned with the local 
governments than the central MPT (Ken, 1994: 88–9). However, the MPT did retain 
the power of overriding the will of local government in certain areas (Table 7.1). A 
closer look at the central MPT’s administrative control of the local PTBs reveals the 
following: 1) plan of production management. The MPT, in consultation with the 
provincial government, developed annual contracts with the PTBs on the basis of 
production quotas; 2) capital investment. The local governments were allowed to 
approve the capital investment of less than RMB 20 million that was usually 
sufficient for the intra-provincial network construction (Wan, 2001: 168); 3) 
                                               
118
 See “MPT report on the reorganization of the management system of posts and telecommunications 1979”, in 
China transportation yearbook 1986 (Beijing: China Transportation yearbook press, 1986), 342-3, quoted from 
Zhou (1997: 74).   
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allocation of wage and bonus. After remitting the revenue to the MPT and the state, 
the PTBs had the decisive role in allocating the wage and bonus within the bureau; 4) 
asset management. By signing contracts with the PTBs, the MPT authorized them to 
manage their own assets; 5) personnel and labour management. The MPT retained its 
right of appointing senior officers of the PTBs while leaving other personnel and 
labour management to the local branches;119 6) procurement of material. The MPT 
controlled nation-wide procurement through its supervision of the China National 
Postal and Telecommunications Appliance Corporation (CNPTAC). For state-
allocated equipment, the PTBs were willing to purchase through the CNPTAC for a 
cheaper price. For imported equipment, the PTBs preferred to bypass the CNPTAC 
through the use of provincial trading companies; 7) alliance management. It was not 
allowed. The PTBs were still local branches of the MPT. Investment was allowed on 
the precondition that the investors would not be directly involved in internal 
management;120 8) price. The MPT adopted a price cap system and allowed the PTBs 
to float their charges of installation fee and intra-province calls below the cap, subject 
to the approval of local governments’ price control authorities;121  9–10), internal 
organisation and sales. The MPT also significantly restrained itself from disrupting 
organizational management and sales after having devolved authority to local 
governments.  
To conclude, the MPT fully controlled the inter-provincial, national, and 
international telephone services. It also effectively controlled certain functions in 
                                               
119
 Since 1986, 4-year appointment was signed between the central MPT and local director. The MPT decided if 
the directors should be reappointed, promoted, or dismissed, basing on their performance (Xu and Pitt, 2002: 22).  
120
 There might be some horizontal alliance between them and non-MPT companies as Lin Sun (1993: 185) 
argued. However, this kind of management alliance remained informal and mainly concentrated in manufacturing 
area. 
121
 The MPT started to authorize the PTBs to collect installation fees since 1980. In 1990, the decision making 
regarding installation charges has been completely decentralized to the local bureaux. At the end of 1990, the MPT 
set a price cap on the intra-province telephone rates according to the local telephone company’s average costs plus 
a mark-up for profit (Sun, 1992: 36-7).  
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intra-provincial telephone services, although its influence varied in different 
provinces in what by Harwit (2008: 36) calls a “double administrative system”.122 The 
administrative connection between the MPT and telecommunications sector was close 
(or 65%)123 in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
Table 7.1 Effective Control by the MPT by 1994 
Items Degree of 
control by the 
MPT 
Items Degree of 
control by the 
MPT 








2. Capital investment Little (above 
RMB 20 M) 
7. Alliance management Full 




8. Price Partial 
 (price cap) 
4. Asset management Little 9. Internal organisation Little 




10. Sales Little 
Source: compiled by author 
 
7.2.3.2 Entry of Rival Players in the Telecommunications Services, 1995–1997 
The relationship between the MPT and its local PTBs did not experience 
significant change in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 1988, the MPT set up the 
Directorate-General of Telecommunications (DGT) to build, manage, and operate 
domestic long-distance and international services. The DGT was supposed to be  an 
independent body in 1994 and incorporated as China Telecom in 1995 (Lovelock, 
2009). However, the creation of China Telecom was not followed by any change to 
the administrative system (Chen, 2001: 203–4). The DGT and later China Telecom 
did not own any telecommunications assets or provide any services per se. The PTBs 
reported directly to the MPT (Liang and Zhang, 2001: 1). China Telecom remained as 
                                               
122
 According to Mueller and Tan (1997: 32-3), the Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin PTBs had the most autonomy 
because their first responsibility was to the municipal government. Wealthy and distant provinces, like Gongdong, 
had also achieved more latitude than many others. According to Ken (1987: 15), the nearer the province is to 
Beijing, the more deference is likely to be made to the MPT’s planning sentiments.  
123
 This author codes the division of function between the central MPT and the PTBs as 50%-50% division. 
Among the 10 areas of autonomy in the intra-provincial telephone service operated by the PTBs, full control was 
coded as 100% control, partial as 50%, and little as zero. Accordingly, the administrative connection 
(AC)=50%+50%/10*(50%+0+0+0+50%+50%+100%+50%+0+0)=65%   
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one of the subordinate departments of the MPT that still fully controlled areas such as 
investment, finance, and personnel (Xu, 2001: 517; Xu and Pitt, 1999; Gao and 
Lyytinen, 2000: 722).  
However, the setting up of China Unicom and Jitong Network Communications 
Company (Jitong) in 1994 did make some but minimal changes to the government-
industry relations in telecommunications services. China Unicom was controlled by 
the MEI, MOR, MEP, and some other SOEs. Jitong was under the MEI to oversee the 
so-called “three golden projects” (Golden Bridge, Golden Customs, and Golden 
Card). Neither of the two telecommunications service providers was required to report 
to the MPT. Conflict between the enterprises usually needed arbitration from the State 
Council (Xu and Pitt, 2002: 71). Consequently, the MPT’s administrative connection 
with the sector diminished until 1998.  
 
7.2.3.3 Incorporation of the Rival Players by the MII, 1998–1999 
The MII was founded during the 1998 Administrative Reform to incorporate 
both the MPT and the MEI.124 At the core of the new ministry was the old MPT 
whose officials claimed eight of the thirteen directorates. These included leadership of 
the most politically sensitive areas of the MII’s activities: policy, planning, regulation, 
economics, wireless administration, personnel, and foreign affairs (Lovelock, 2009). 
The newly established MII did not carry out the restructuring programme of 
separating China Telecom from the Ministry as requested by Premier Zhu Rongji. 
Premier Zhu ordered Minister Wu to submit a restructuring plan for China Telecom 
four times without a satisfactory answer (Johnson, 1999c). Instead, the Ministry 
                                               
124
 The MEI controlled the telecom equipment manufacturing before the merger. The MII started to control both 
service suppliers and equipment suppliers since it incorporated the MEI. The service supply was fully controlled 
by the SOEs, while the equipment supply was provided by not only the SOEs but also non-state actors (Fernandez 
and Fernandez-Stembridge, 2007: 231). 
 146
started to grab administrative control of China Unicom.125 The MII gradually rooted 
out the MEI and China Unicom’s former leadership from the government and the 
enterprise. Liu Jianfeng, former chief of China Unicom, was removed from the 
position of MII vice minister. The MPT’s Yang Xianzu, MII’s vice minister, became 
the chairman of China Unicom in February 1999. Wang Jianzhou, director of the 
MII’s planning department, took the position of China Unicom’s executive vice 
president and became CEO in 2000. Shi Cuiming, director-general of China Telecom, 
was also transferred to China Unicom as director. Their inauguration led to a 
complete termination of Li Huifen’s leadership authority in the company.126 After 
gaining control of the top-level management, the MII started to impose effective 
control on China Unicom’s local branches through the regulation of personnel and 
labour management that was previously applied to China Telecom (Caijing Zazhi 
Bianjibu, 2003: 65). 
Having failed to separate the MII from the enterprises during the 1998 
Administrative Reform, the State Council took further efforts to restructure the sector. 
However, these also proved unsuccessful. For example, the decision of dividing China 
Telecom into four companies—China Telecom, China Mobile, Guoxin, and China 
Satellite—which was made in early 1999 and implemented in 2000 did not make any 
changes to the administrative system. They became four monopolies in their 
respective subsectors and their businesses were restricted to their designated services 
(Zhang, 2001: 472). The Central Enterprise Working Commission (CEWC) was 
established for the purpose of supervising the top 100 large-scaled SOEs whose 
managers were directly nominated by the CEWC and endorsed by Wu Bangguo, the 
Vice-Premier of the State Council. Although China Telecom was included in the 
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 The MII’s action of regulating China’s internet since 1998 also revealed its effort of centralizing its 
administrative function through the hierarchical structure. For the details, see Tan (1999). 
126
 For the details of the bureaucratic reshuffling, see Harwit (2008: 62-3). 
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scheme, its relationship with the MII was not changed in practice. In other words, 
China Telecom was not a real corporation; it remained as an administrative agency 
under the MII. As Zhang (2001: 478) observed, the MII still held the power to 
appoint, promote, and dismiss key officials in China Telecom, China Telecom (HKT), 
China Mobile Communication Groups, China Unicom, and provincial PTBs. 
 
7.2.4 Administrative Connection between Government and Industry in the 
Telecommunications Services by the End of the 1990s 
The MPT effectively reinforced its control of telecommunications services in 
the early 1980s by clarifying the division of labor between the central MPT and local 
PTBs. The MPT, fully controlling the business of inter-provincial, national, and 
international telephone services, shared administrative authority with the local 
governments on the business of intra-provincial telephone services. Its administrative 
connection with the sector was close (65%) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
seting up of China Unicom diluted the connection between the MPT and the sector. 
However, the newly established MII regained its control over the previous level 
through incorporating China Unicom. The telecommunications services sector was 
extremely “high stake” and had much less autonomy than the agriculture and textile 
sectors. The next section explores the fiscal tie between the MPT/MII and the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
7.2.5 Fiscal Connection between Government and Industry in the 
Telecommunications Service by the End of the 1990s 
Before the 1978 Reform, all revenue collected by the local bureaus were 
remitted to the Ministry of Finance and then redistributed to different ministries and 
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provinces through central planning. There was no fiscal connection between the MPT 
and local bureaus.  
According to Lu Ding (1994: 200), there was no independent accounting at the 
PTB level before 1985. In 1980, the PTBs transferred an agreed amount of profit and 
taxes to the MPT and the state respectively, while retaining the rest of the profit. In 
principle, of the after-tax profit (ATP) calculated by this method, 80% would be 
retained by the enterprise and 20% would be handed over to the central MPT. 
Industrial policy on the telecommunications sector was promulgated by the State 
Council in 1982 to allow the PTBs to remit 10% of its profit as tax to the state which 
was much lower than the tax rate of 55% for other industries. The MPT also 
introduced a contract system with the local bureaus by the end of 1985. According to 
the World Bank (1992), the PTBs should transfer 10% of net allocated profit (AP), 
70% of depreciation of long distance investment (DL), 30% of new technology 
development fund (TF), and Operating Surplus (OS).127 In 1989, MPT decided to ask 
the PTBs to remit 20% of net allocated profit together with other transfers.  
China Unicom was created by the State Council in September 1994 for the 
purpose of bringing in some competition to the sector. The proposal of introducing a 
competitor was initiated by the MEI, MEP, and MOR, each of which had 25% 
ownership along with 13 other state-owned investors. Its revenue was directly 
remitted to the shareholders. After signing the CCF agreement, according to Yu 
Xiaomang, 75% of China Unicom’s profit was handed over to foreign investors. In 
some provinces or cities, foreign companies took as much as 90% of the total profit 
from these local China Unicom branches (Caijing Zazhi Bianjibu, 2003: 48). The 
MPT did not have any fiscal connection with the Unicom. As MPT-supervised 
                                               
127
 Operating surplus=actual profits-allocated profits. For the fiscal data, see East Asia Dept. II., Asia Technical 
Dept. (1992: 17-8).   
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enterprise’s market share (MS) started to decline since 1994, its fiscal connection with 
the sector as a whole was weakened as well. 
Thus, the fiscal connections (FC) between the MPT/MII and the 
telecommunications services in different time periods from 1980 to 1999 were as 
follows: 
 
FC (1980-1985) = 20%ATP 
FC (1985-1988) = 10%AP+70%DL+30%TF+OS; 
FC (1989-1994) = 20%AP+70%DL+30%TF+OS; 
FC (1995-1999) = MS*(20%AP+70%DL+30%TF+OS). 
 
Note: FC: fiscal connection; ATP: after-tax profit; AP: net allocated profit; DL: depreciation 
of long distance investment; TF: new technology development fund; OS: Operating Surplus; 
MS: market share of China Telecom 
 
Although China Unicom came under the MII’s supervision in 1998, their fiscal 
tie was not strengthened immediately. In order to take fiscal control of the enterprise, 
the Ministry asked foreign investors to withdraw their investment. By September 
1998, all of the foreign investors in the CCF scheme were notified that their 
agreements were to be terminated. The MII, in October 1999, decided not to pay 
revenue to the foreign companies that refused to terminate their contracts. At the same 
time, the state poured RMB 12.6 trillion into China Unicom, including 6.9 trillion 
from MII-supervised Guoxin Paging Corporation and 5 trillion from the Ministry of 
Finance. After fiscal restructuring, the MII became the biggest stakeholder of China 
Unicom, as the share of previous domestic investors was cut to less than 20% of total 
assets (Caijing Zazhi Bianjibu, 2003: 69). Having regained its control of China 
Unicom, the MII’s fiscal connection with the sector was strengthened again.  
Before fully eliminating foreign investment in China Unicom, the ministry 
continued its discriminatory policy against the enterprise even though it had started to 
administratively supervise the enterprise. In 1999, in order to guarantee the profit of 
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China Telecom, the MII stopped China Unicom’s right to provide DII service which 
was extremely profitable (Liu, 1999: 16). In the same year, Minister Mu discouraged 
lower level governments and other agencies from developing the telecommunications 
industry, saying that any unnecessary competition would disrupt the state’s strategic 
plan in the sector (Xinxi chanyebu buzhang Wu Jichuan zhichu, fazhan xinxi chanye 
buneng yihong ershang, 1999: 42). Especially in the business of domestic and 
international long-distance calls that produced a huge profit and had great potential 
for development, the Ministry did not allow any competitor to enter the market.128 
Discriminatory policy against China Unicom was finally ended when the fiscal 
restructuring programme was completed. 
To conclude, in China, the fiscal and administrative connections between the 
telecommunications services and MPT/MII were very tight, in turn leading to a 
convergence of their interests. The next two sections will study the sectoral interests 
and bureaucratic interests in face of trade negotiation. 
 
7.3 Sectoral Interests on Trade Negotiation 
Petrazzini’s (1995) comparative analysis on telecommunications reform in 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America concluded that the status of the 
domestic economy at the moment of liberalization and how investors assessed market 
prospects explained the variations among them. Accordingly, competitiveness of 
telecommunications service providers is a key variable in identifying their stance 
towards market liberalization.  
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 The average charge for telephone call was seven times of that in the United States in the year of 1999 (Jiaru 
Shimao dui Woguo Butong Hangye de Yingxiang, 1999: 33). 
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Generally speaking, China Telecom and China Unicom at the time were not 
competitive in global telecommunications services. In order to protect their interests, 
the sector opposed fierce competition brought about by China’s WTO accession. 
China’s telecommunications services were not competitive in terms of sector 
size, productivity, production efficiency. Measured by sector size, China’s telecom 
revenue was only $37.1 billion in 2000, 21% that of the United States’s and 40% that 
of Japan’s in 1995. As for productivity (revenue per employee), the average world 
level was $126,000 in 1996: $203,000 in the United States and $438,000 in Japan. In 
China, revenue per employee was only $54,000 (Yu, Berg, and Guo, 2004: 728). 
Measured by production efficiency (total subscriber lines—fixed and mobile—per 
employee), Zhang (2001: 470)’s calculation showed that China Telecom only 
accounted for 51.7% of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)’s 
production efficiency in 1997. More seriously, know-how and experience about 
competition were extremely limited. A report by the World Bank in the early 1990s 
showed that the efficiency of telecommunications supply in China was among the 
lowest in the world and service quality was not up to standard (He, 1994: 208). 
Whether the domestic telecommunications sector could survive the competition 
through liberalization was not clear before its entry into the WTO. However, one 
thing was certain: domestic telecommunications providers were not able to get any 
benefits in the near future. Thus, they could not be expected to be supportive of 
lowering the entry barrier for foreign competitive players. In fact, the uncompetitive 
nature became a good excuse for the sector to ask for extending the protection.  
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7.4 Sectoral Pressure on Trade Negotiation 
Cooperative behaviour is usually guaranteed among monopolies, as the 
cooperation guarantees their monopolistic benefits. It is not easy for a latecomer to 
develop into a monopoly, as the incumbent monopolies would prevent new 
competitors from jeopardizing their monopolistic interests. However, it can happen 
when the government intervenes. China’s telecommunications industry in the 1990s 
was a good example. China Unicom was able to become the second monopoly since 
1994 because of state intervention. Two monopolies supervised by different ministries 
led to uncooperative behaviour that in turn created loopholes for foreign entry. 
Administrative reform in 1998 called for an end to uncooperative competition. A 
unified voice against market liberalization was strong, as both China Telecom and 
China Unicom came under the supervision of the same protector—MII.  
The global trend of liberalizing the telecommunications sector, starting from 
Britain and then spreading to Asia and Latin America, took place in the 1980s and 
1990s. However, it did not change the Chinese mindset of protecting the sector. 
China’s telecommunications services were far from privatization and market 
liberalization. State-owned enterprises monopolized the services of international long 
distance calls and allowed only limited competition in local calls, mobile phones, and 
paging services between state-owned providers (Singh, 2000: 886).  
Measured by market share, China Telecom dominated all subsectors in 
telecommunications services (Table 7.2). Its degree of domination varied between 
paging services, mobile phone services, and long-distance calling services. For 
example, there were more than 2,100 enterprises competing in radio paging services 
(Liang and Zhang, 2001: 102). China Telecom, the biggest radio paging operator, had 
34.19 million paging subscribers by the end of 1997. However, its total market share 
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was only 67.68% and floated around 60% in the late 1990s (Liang, Zhang, and Yang, 
1998: 58; Caijing Zazhi Bianjibu, 2003: 20).129  There were only two companies, 
China Telecom and China Unicom, in mobile phone services.130  Although China 
Telecom’s market share started to decline since 1995, it remained as high as 91% by 
1999 (Table 7.3). China Telecom monopolized the services of domestic and 
international long distance calls. It did not allow any competitor in the area.131 In 
2000, the approximate market shares for telecommunications as a whole were as 
follows: China Telecom, 57%; China Mobile, 34%; and China Unicom, 8%. All three 
were supervised by the MII at the time. Their total share was 99%. Other very minor 
players included Jitong and Netcom that were owned by other ministries or state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Wu, 2004: 221–2). 
Table 7.2 Major Players and Their Business in Telecommunications 
Services 




MPT China Telecom China Telecom China Telecom 
Domestic long 
distance calls 
IP long distance 
calls 








Mobile calls  China Telecom China Telecom, 
China Unicom,  
China Telecom, 
China Unicom 
Source: Chen, 1999: 120–30  
 
Table 7.3 Major Players and Their Market Share in Mobile Phone Services (%) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
China Telecom 100 c.100 c.99 97 94 91 
China Unicom - 0.3 1 3 6 9 
Source: Harwit, 2008: 52, 65  
 
                                               
129
 China Unicom’s market share was 6.8% in 1996 and 7.2% in 1997 (Liang and Zhang, 2001: 113). 
130
 Greatwall Telecom, affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had been less than 1% of the market 
share by the end of 1998 (Wan, 2001: 170).  
131
 China Unicom was allowed to offer local fixed telephone services in only three cities: Tianjin, Chengdu, and 
Chongqing. 
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China Telecom as an incumbent in telecommunications services was reluctant to 
share monopolistic benefits with any other players. Throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, the MPT claimed sole monopoly of the sector through its branches. The other 
ministries were eager to enter the sector for the huge profits stemming from 
preferential policy. 132  The monopolistic profit in the sector was huge and not 
transparent. Domestic pressure on reducing the monopolistic profit pushed 
telecommunications services to set the charges for basic telecommunications services, 
but failed. China Telecom could always found ways of maintaining its monopoly, like 
cross-subsidies and dumping strategies. It had successfully minimized competition 
from China Unicom in the domestic market. For example, the State Council pushed 
China Telecom to hand over the business of mobile telecommunications services to 
China Unicom. However, China Telecom refused and postponed the provision of its 
fixed telephone network to China Unicom for its GSM services (Global System for 
Mobile communications). At the same time, China Telecom requested to stop 
charging both end-users (shuangxiang shoufei) in mobile phone services. Its aim was 
to subsidize the mobile phone business with profits from fixed-line telephone services 
(cross-subsidies), while China Unicom whose main profits came from charging both 
end-users could not follow suit. Consequently, China Unicom could not pose any 
serious challenge to China Telecom. In the other subsectors like paging service, China 
Telecom continuously used dumping strategies in the paging business to eliminate 
other competitors. In face of great pressure from the State Council to lower 
monopolistic profit, China Telecom lowered the fees for long-distance calls and 
Internet access. However, it covered the loss by increasing the fees for intra-city calls 
                                               
132
 The telecommunications sector was promoted for priority development in early 1980s by the State Council. 
Accordingly, the government issued the “three 90%” policy, that is, telecommunications enterprises could retained 
90% of their profits , foreign exchange earnings, and central government’s investment as non-repayable loans. For 
the details, see Xu and Pitt (2002: 30-1). 
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and postage. Through this arrangement, the benefits outweighed than the losses for 
the China Telecom. 
China Unicom as a latecomer could not survive without political intervention 
from the State Council. Disadvantaged by scarce budgetary resources, China Unicom 
looked to foreign investors as a solution. It made use of the “China-China-Foreign” 
(CCF) joint investment system. According to the system, a company owned by 
Chinese local government and one of China Unicom’s shareholders could establish a 
joint venture with foreign companies (for the details, see Xu and Liang, 2001: 141–2). 
The practice created loopholes for foreign entry that in turn undermined the coherent 
industrial policy protected the sector from liberalization (Gao and Lyytinen, 2000: 
725). It allowed foreign companies to hold more than 70% ownership, which was 
much higher than stated in the final agreement with WTO members in 1999. 
Administrative reform in 1998 terminated uncooperative actions between the 
dual monopolies through putting both of them under the supervision of the MII. The 
relationship between the two corporations was changed from competition to 
supplementation. China Unicom switched its interests and policies accordingly. 
Having claimed the “CCF” illegal, the MII strengthened its control of the barrier 
against foreign investment in telecommunications services. The sector was able to 
exert unified pressure on the government to protect its uncompetitive service 
providers at the threshold of China’s WTO accession. 
In short, compelled by the nature of uncompetitiveness and state monopoly, the 
sector was strongly against the liberalization requested by the GATT/WTO members. 
Close administrative and fiscal connections between the supervising ministry and 
subordinate sectors caused a high degree of convergence of interests that in turn 
implies that the ministry had strong incentives to protect the sector.  
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7.5 Bureaucratic Interests on Trade Negotiation 
The telecommunications sectors were monopolized by government agencies or 
companies in almost all countries in the 1980s. Krasner’s (1985) argument implies 
that international structural constraints forced Third World countries to protect their 
telecommunications sector through state intervention. State monopoly in the sector 
did not allow any domestic or international competitor to enter the sector that could in 
turn potentially challenge its monopolistic control. The MPT/MII in China’s 
telecommunications services was not an exception. 
The MPT effectively regained control of telecommunications services in the 
early 1980s by clarifying the division of labour between the central MPT and local 
PTBs. The MPT, fully controlling the business of inter-provincial, national, and 
international telephone services, shared administrative authority with the local 
governments in the business of intra-provincial telephone services. For fiscal reasons, 
China Telecom and China Unicom (after 1999) were reliable contributors of revenue 
to the Ministry. China Telecom was one of the largest taxpayers in the country 
(Johnson, 1999c). The revenue of the MPT/MII was one of the highest among the 
ministries. Its revenue grew from RMB 20.1 trillion in 1992 to RMB 85.5 trillion in 
1995, and RMB 278.8 trillion in 1999 (Almanacs of China’s Economy, various issues, 
1992–2000). The MPT/MII was reluctant to give up its administrative authority and 
revenue from the sector as required by market liberalization. 
Close ties between the government and the industry are more tangible when we 
consider the absence of any legal framework or clear policy guidelines in 
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telecommunications services.133 In the early 1990s, the Ministry repeatedly called for 
strengthening the administrative planning of telecommunications and retaining its 
monopoly over the sector (DeWoskin, 2001: 630). The regulations passing through 
the administrative and fiscal links from the MPT/MII to the enterprises became the 
only guidance for the development of the sector. The Ministry did not allow any 
market mechanism or foreign competitors into the domestic sector that would 
potentially disrupt the administrative and fiscal connections. 
The MPT/MII’s exclusive control faced continuous opposition from rivalling 
ministries in the State Council. The MEP, MOR, Ministry of Defence (MOD), and 
Ministry of Petroleum (MOP) wanted to enter the sector and share the monopolistic 
benefits. The MPT saw to it that their participation was extremely limited. Most of the 
ministries, including the SPC, pushed the MPT to reform the sector. They blamed the 
Ministry for keeping the high price of telecommunications services that had become a 
“bottleneck” in economic development.134 However, even the SPC was not capable of 
influencing the sector through its pressure on the MPT/MII. The SPC decided to 
relinquish its control over price and allowed the MPT to collect the installation fee for 
fixed-line telephones in 1979. Since then, the SPC’s role in the sector has been to 
cooperate with the MPT/MII on setting the price of Internet access and 
telecommunications services and funds for infrastructure. However, the Ministry had 
avoided dependency upon the central budget. In 1992 and 1993, the MPT requested to 
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 The sector was regulated by the Ministry without a clear-cut telecommunications law. For example, the 
installation fee of the fixed line remained high and arbitrary. The Ministry refused to cooperate on releasing a 
clear-cut law that might restrain its action. 
134
 Intensive debate between the two groups ensued, with both sides mobilizing their think tanks and drawing 
lessons from other countries to support their argument. Hardy (1980) and Norton (1992)’s works were usually 
cited for reference. Hardy’s analysis shows a positive correlation between the development of telecommunication 
facilities and the growth of GDP. Norton’s finding also implies that the development of telecommunication helps 
to reduce the transaction cost. The idea was instrumental for the MPT to get more budgetary resources from the 
central government and for the rivalling ministries to break up the MPT monopoly. By claiming it as instrumental 
is because the counter thesis that potentially went against their interests never got accepted by the players. For 
example, Gronin et al (1991) argue that the reversed causality can also be supported. For the analysis on the 
negative impact of telecommunications on economic growth, see Sieber (1993).  
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keep all revenue in the Ministry’s hands for the purpose of re-investing in 
infrastructure development (DeWoskin, 2001: 630). The investment in infrastructure 
construction increased from RMB 4.9 trillion in 1990 to RMB 13.7 trillion in 1992 
and RMB 449.4 trillion in 2000 (Almanacs of China’s Economy, various issues). 
Around 80% of the investment came directly from revenue sources (Lovelock, 2009). 
According to Quan Yi (2002: 161), total investment in the telecommunications sector 
from 1979 to 1995 was about RMB 270 trillion, two-thirds of which came from the 
installation fee of fixed-line telephones. As the MPT did not financially rely on the 
SPC, its authority of pricing was relatively independent, compared to other ministries. 
Facing pressure to lower the charges for telecommunications services, the SPC 
organized the Public Price Hearing in 1998. However, the MII refused to make any 
concession. The SPC even recommended having a third party to investigate the MII’s 
accounting system (Li). 
The situation changed slightly when the MEI, MOR, and MEP entered the 
sector as supervising agencies in 1994. The fragmentation of control in turn caused a 
fragmentmentation of interests in the sector. The rivalling ministries were willing to 
accept foreign investment in the sector. The “illegal” practice of CCF that practically 
lowered the entry barrier for foreign companies was out of MPT’s control. A 
fragmented regulation at the time (1995–1998) might have led to a greater concession 
if the Sino-US final agreement was made in 1997 rather than in 1999, as China’s entry 
into the WTO was considered as a good opportunity for other ministries to break up 
the monopoly of the MPT. 
The MPT evolved into the MII and strengthened its control over the sector. MII, 
a “super agency”, assumed all the authority that was previously shared by the former 
MPT and MEI. The MII had rooted out foreign investors by claiming that the CCF 
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agreement was illegal, and Chinese negotiators did not show any intention of lifting 
the ban during Sino-US talks (Johnson, 1999a). It left little room for domestic 
competition from the other state-owned telecommunications companies controlled by 
the other ministries. In 1998, Minister Wu clearly stated that they were not ready to 
open up the sector (Guojia dianxin zhuguan bumen fuzenren Wu Jichuan shuo, woguo 
dianxin yewu duiwai kaifang tiaojian shangbu chengshu, 1998: 43).  
To conclude, it was very difficult for the negotiators to give concessions in the 
area of telecommunications services as the industry was not competitive at the time. 
The service providers who enjoyed monopolistic status in the sector were able to exert 
unified pressure on the government for protection. The convergence of sectoral and 
ministerial interests helps us understand why the MPT/MII was so proactive in 
protecting the interest of the telecommunications companies in the late 1990s. 
 
7.6 China’s WTO Commitment and Its Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
7.6.1 Little Concessions in the Telecommunications Services 
The telecommunications services sector expected to see more challenges than 
opportunities after entering the WTO. The SETC was responsible for coordinating 
with the telecommunications companies and the MII. In the face of strong opposition 
from the MII, the SETC failed to offer much concession in the sector. 
The final agreement between China and the United States in November 1999 
allowed for 50% foreign ownership in paging services and Internet content provision, 
and 49% for the other basic telecommunications services (Lu and Wong, 2003: 79–
80). The MII’s loose administrative and fiscal control of paging services and Internet 
content provision correlated with the greater concessions in these two subsectors.135  
                                               
135
 The MII’s administrative and fiscal connections with the sector of internet content provision were weak at the 
time. There were four interconnected national networks in China in the late 1990s. They were CERNET owned by 
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7.6.2 China’s Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
The telecommunications services as a “high stake” sector received a lot of 
protection from the MII during the negotiations. The enterprises did not gain more 
autonomy after the WTO accession. Having given relatively more concessions in 
value-added telecom services in the agreement, the authority of approving licences 
was devolved to local governments, especially those in the coastal regions. In 
contrast, the authority of approving licences to basic telecom services providers was 
still retained by the MII (Loo, 2004: 708).  
A fragmented regulation is taking shape again in the sector because of the rise of 
the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the 
decline of the MII. On the one hand, the ownership of the major telecom services 
providers was transferred from the MII to the SASAC when it was established. With 
the approval of State Council, the administration of China Railcom, along with its 
original stocks, was also transferred from the MOR to the SASAC on January 20, 
2004 (China Business News, 2004). By then, the SASAC “owned” all of the six major 
telecommunications service providers. The SASAC’s actions of reshuffling the 
leadership of major telecom companies were suspected of being attempts to gradually 
remove former MPT officials in the sector. On the other hand, the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) was founded in 2008 to incorporate the 
MII. The MII was re-named “State Bureau of Telecommunications” and downgraded 
to sub-ministerial level. Although the Bureau remains the major regulatory body in 
the sector, the SASAC has been aggressively taking over the authority of supervising 
                                                                                                                                       
the Ministry of Education, CSTNet owned by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, ChinaNET owned by MII 
(former MPT), and ChinaGBN owned by the MII (former MEI). They were the only ones that could licence the 
internet content provision. As A large portion of China’s Internet content providers were non-MPT owned 
corporations (Tan, 1999: 271), the MPT/MII’s effective control of the sub-sector was limited. Its administrative 
and fiscal connection with the sub-sector was not as close as those with the fixed line telephone service and mobile 
phone service. 
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the companies.136 A fragmented supervision, similar to the one from 1994 to 1997, 
was re-emerging. 
The sector remained “high stake” six years after WTO accession. The MII bore 
the responsibility of protecting the sector. It would be very difficult for the MII to 
give up control of the sector, although its style of top-down intervention was not 
compatible with its WTO commitment. 
The MII failed to keep to its commitment of separating the government from the 
industry and adopting pro-competitive regulatory principles (USTR, 2004: 75). The 
decision of breaking down the China Telecom into four separate entities was to create 
four monopolies in their respective subsectors, namely fixed-line services, mobile 
services, satellite telecommunications services, and paging services. A competition 
across subsectors was not encouraged. The decision of separating the old China 
Telecom into two components (south and north) in 2002 also cast a doubt on the 
competition across regions. A leadership swap in 2004 among the major operators 
contributed to a rise of their shares in the stock market, as investors believed that the 
action would reduce competition in the sector (CMI, 2004). Again, in 2008, six major 
telecommunications service providers in the sector were merged into three. The move, 
according to Li (2009: 2–3), reflected a “political will” that was not compatible with 
the new PRC Anti-Monopoly Law enacted on August 30, 2007. 
Foreign investors have been frustrated at not being able to enter the Chinese 
market easily. China’s telecommunications services were less developed in the global 
trade of services. The WTO accession would have potentially seen a significant 
inflow of foreign investment but did not. The government adopted a strategy of 
allowing foreign investment through public issue of shares in the stock markets 
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 For example, The SASAC has the authority of asset management in the companies. In 2008, SASAC made 
China Mobile to transfer about RMB 50 billion to China Unicom to boost Unicom’s working capital (ChinaVest, 
2008). 
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abroad rather than direct joint venture. The practice was believed to ensure that “even 
this foreign equity is too thinly distributed to offer any serious problems of control” 
(A Note on FDI Regulations in Telecom, 2004: 10). By 2004, the SASAC held more 
than 75% of equity in all of these oligopolies (CMI, 2004). Although the option for 
forming joint ventures was open, the MII had developed various ways to prevent 
foreign investors from entering the market. For example, it set the requirement of 
registered capital as high as RMB 2 billion for foreign companies. Although the 
requirement was decreased to RMB 1 billion in September 2008, it was still high 
compared to international norms (USTR, 2008: 80). Besides, the application process 
was slow according to the USTR (2004: 76). No application for value-added services 
was completed by the end of 2004. Regarding 3G telecommunications standards, 
China’s regulatory authority continued to promote its unique home-grown TD-
SCDMA standard after having repeatedly committed to technology neutrality (USTR, 
2008: 6). By 2008, there was very little foreign investment in the domestic market, 
especially in basic telecommunication services, like fixed-line telephones and mobile 
phones. Some notable exceptions were Telefonica’s 9% equity stake in China 
Netcom, Vodafone’s 3% equity stake in China Mobile, and AT&T’s participation in 
the joint venture called UNISITI (Hsueh, 2008: 95).137 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
All in all, trade concessions were not made in the telecommunications sector, 
and it remained “high stake”, monopolistic, and uncompetitive. The WTO agreement 
left many loopholes for the government to exercise continuous protection. The WTO 
                                               
137
 According to Chang (2000), the MII approved the establishment of Shanghai Symphony Telecommunications 
Company in December 2000, a joint venture of AT&T, the Shanghai branch of China Telecom and a Shanghai 
municipal government company, to provide broadband networks in the commercial Pudong areas of Shanghai.  
The AT&T was to hold 25% of the equity. 
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mechanism could not help the sector gain more autonomy or become competitive in 
terms of service quality. The political will of the state is still significant in the sector. 
Compared to the other sectors, a proper regulatory entity in telecommunications in 
China was far from emerging. 
Uncooperative behaviour between the two monopolies from 1995 to 1998 
suggests that sectoral characteristics are more significant than variations in national 
characteristics. Japan, which differed in political regime and economic structure, also 
saw a fragmented state control between MITI and MPT over the sponsorship and 
regulation of Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (Wilks and Wright, 1987: 288). Now, 
a fragmented supervising board is emerging again in China. Tensions exist between 
the SASAC that operates the industry and the MIIT that regulates the industry. Their 
relationship determines the future of China’s telecommunications services and its 
























Chapter 8: The Banking Industry as a Planning Organ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Many emerging market economies, with a few important exceptions, had been 
reluctant to open up their banking sectors to foreign competition (Dobson and 
Jacquet, 1998: 2).138  However, as Riedel, Jin and Gao (2007: 111-3) review, the 
impact of foreign bank entry did not inflict any significant damage to the domestic 
sector in three relevant issues: competition and efficiency, banking sector stability and 
allocation of credit across sectors of the economy. For example, Classens and 
Laeven’s (2003) finding indicates that the limited presence of foreign banks has led to 
an improvement in the competition and efficiency of the whole industry (also see 
Saez, 2004). Demirguc-kunt, Levine and Min’s (1998) observation of East Asian 
countries after the 97/8 financial crisis reveal that the existence of foreign banks 
functioned as a stabilising force to the industry.  
Economic logic suggests that an uncompetitive banking industry would not be 
easily flattened after lowering entry barriers. It is thus not surprising if Chinese state-
owned commercial banks could survive the foreign competition after market 
liberalisation. To be exact, Chinese banks have done much better under the WTO 
mechanism with foreign-funded banks actually accounting for “a smaller share of 
bank assets in 2003 than they did in 1997” (Naughton, 2007: 459). According to data 
from the People’s Bank of China, foreign banks’ share of total banking system assets 
has decreased since WTO accession. Their share was only 2.4% in 2007 inspite of the 
                                               
138
 It is common for developing and developed countries to protect their infant industries against external 
competition. In the case of China, Chinese leaders perceived foreign domination of domestic banking sector as a 
threat to their sovereignty. China’s domestic banking sector finances the real economy and guarantees sound 
economic environment through capital reserve, monetary policy, and payment services (Trachtman, 1996: 48-9).   
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Chinese government’s timely commitment to its agreement by the end of 2006 
(Figure 1.4).   
Political intervention was usually cited as the explanation for the phenomenon, 
as the government had erected new barriers against foreign entry that were tolerable 
under WTO mechanism. However, without a cross-sector comparison of government-
industry relations, it is difficult to understand why state protection in the banking 
industry has been so successful before and after WTO accession.  
This chapter argues that the move to separate the government from the 
industries since the early 1980s has not changed the fact that the Chinese banking 
system remains as a “high stake” sector. A convergence in interest between the 
banking industry and its supervisors is enough reason for the central government to 
persist in its protection of the sector. Under a holistic consideration, Chinese 
negotiators adopted a horse trading strategy to protect the banking sector by 
sacrificing the agricultural sector. Compared to other sectors, the concession on the 
banking sector was negligible. The final agreement for WTO accession left Chinese 
government with a lot of room to develop new forms of political intervention for 
protecting the banking sector. This explains foreign banks’ declining share of banking 
assets in the post-WTO era. 
 
8.2 Government-Industry Relations in the Banking Sector 
8.2.1 The Banking Industry 
The banking industry in China by the end of the 1990s composed of three 
different groups of banks, namely “central banks”, “local banks” and foreign banks 
(Table 7.1). The “central banks” consisted of four state-owned commercial banks (the 
Big Four) and three policy banks. The Big Four were the Agricultural Bank of China 
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(ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the Construction Bank of China (CBC) and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).139 The three policy banks, namely, 
the China Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), China Development Bank (CDB), 
and China Import & Export Bank (IEB), have been established to take over the 
policy-lending activities from the Big Four since 1994.140 The “local banks” included 
11 national shareholding commercial banks, 90 city banks and many prefectural level 
urban credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives by 1999. Although some of 
them had branches nationwide, they were usually affiliated to the local governments 
(Naughton, 2007: 457; Guo, 2002: 31).141 The presence of foreign banks in China at 
that time was few with limited business scope (Figure 8.1). The tolerance of foreign 
banks in China reflected decision makers’ concern for facilitating smooth inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) for the development of non-strategic capital-scarce 













                                               
139
 The BOC was established in 1912 as a private bank. It was recreated in 1979 to specialise in foreign exchange 
that was previously controlled by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The CBC was established in 1954. It 
became active again in 1979 to specialise in fixed investment, especially in the manufacturing sector. The ABC 
established in 1979 was responsible for state investment, government procurement, and subsidies in the rural 
sector. The ICBC was established in 1984 to carve out the function of commercial transactions of the PBOC. Each 
of the Big Four enjoyed a monopolistic power in its specialised field of the economy, especially in the early 1980s. 
For a comprehensive analysis of China’s banking industry before 1949, see Kirby (1995). 
140
 The ADB was established to facilitate state procurement of agricultural products and support rural 
infrastructure construction. The CDB was responsible for policy lending on national development project. The IEB 
was to provide necessary fund for national trade flow. 
141
 The Bank of Communications was an exception among the national shareholding commercial banks. Its 
registered capital asset in 1984 was RMB 2 trillion. PBOC, representing the central government, controlled RMB 1 
trillion and allowed local authorities, enterprises, and individuals to share the other half. According to the 
Regulations on Communications Bank, individuals’ share could not exceed 10%.  
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Table 8.1 Performance of Banks in China’s Banking Industry  
in 1999 


















Policy banks 687.607 4.69 0 0 517.557 5.94 






1447.7 9.88 1031.4 9.80 695.7 7.98 




119.8 0.82 95.4 0.91 70.0 0.80 
Rural credit 
cooperatives 
1432.9 9.78 1335.809 12.69 922.559 10.58 
Total 14646.803 100 10522.708 100 8718.022 100 
Source: calculated from PBOC data (2000: 24-5) 
 
 
8.2.2 Supervising Agencies in the Central Government 
During the time of WTO negotiation, the industry was supervised by a group of 
central agencies including the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) with varying degrees of control. The MOF was the 
most influential supervisor, while the PBOC performed as just an intermediary 
regulator in the State Council. The PBOC was administratively closer to the SDPC, 
SETC and MOF than other agencies at ministerial level. In other words, it was less 
autonomous than the other economic ministries. The PBOC was modelled after the 
US Federal Reserve System to prevent intervention from local authorities by 
replacing its nationwide branches with nine trans-provincial offices in 1998 
(Naughton, 2007: 456; Lardy, 2003).142 However, unlike its counterpart in the United 
                                               
142
 The PBOC recentralized all of its lending power from the branches to the head office in July 1993 (The Banker, 
1999a). 
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States, it had little incentive or capacity to carry out independent decision making in 
the central government (Lardy, 1998: 172; Wu, 2005). In terms of incentives, as 
argued by Chow (2007: 239), extensive political pressure from political leaders and 
the incompetency of central bankers made the PBOC less willing to make 
independent decisions. In terms of capacity, the MOF was the sole owner of the Big 
Four (Huang, 2002c: 385; Lardy, 2004: 98). The PBOC had little fiscal power to 
make independent decision that might contradict with MOF’s interests. The board of 
directors of the PBOC included a governor, a deputy governor, vice ministers of the 
MOF and other Commissions, a deputy director of the SPC and the presidents of the 
Big Four (Saez, 2004: 107-8). The governor of the PBOC could not make 
independent decision. The banking reforms since the early 1980s have changed the 
roles of these central agencies. 
 
8.2.3 “Decentralisation” of the Banking Industry  
The SPC controlled the banks through a strict cash and credit plan prior to the 
reforms (Wong and Wong, 2001: 19-20). Economic reforms in the early 1980s that 
included decentralisation of financial resources contributed to the development of the 
banking industry. The MOF has granted autonomy to the PBOC and the Big Four 
since the early 1980s and transformed policy loans from the Big Four to the policy 
banks since 1994. In 1995, the PBOC decided to impose its control of the “local 
banks” that have been allowed to enter the sector since 1986. In order to constrain 
local authorities’ administrative intervention of the “central banks”, the PBOC 
centralised its control in 1998 by restructuring their local branches. Before WTO 
accession, the MOF remained the most influential supervisor in the banking sector. 
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8.2.3.1 Separation of State-Owned Banks from the MOF, the early 1980s--the early 
1990s 
The banking industry has become prominent in China’s economy since the 
introduction of the Bogaidai policy (replacement of state budget with bank loan) by 
the SPC and MOF in the early 1980s.143 Prior to the reform, savings deposits in the 
banks primarily came from the central government and the SOEs. The MOF was 
responsible for funding the SOEs according to the allocation plan by the SPC. The 
decentralisation of financial resources led to a boom in household savings. According 
to Tong (2002: 38), the share of gross domestic savings by households increased from 
23.6% in 1979 to 70.5% in 1991. In the early 1980s, when the banking sector saw a 
significant growth of household savings, the central government decided to pass the 
financial burden of investing in state-owned sectors from the MOF to the PBOC (Cull 
and Xu, 2000: 5; Chen and Shih, 2004b: 6; Chiu and Lewis, 2006: 190).  
The banking industry before 1978 was characterised by a mono-bank system 
dominated by the PBOC that was under the supervision of the MOF, with a moderate 
presence of rural credit cooperatives in the countryside. It was a part of the central-
planning system that guaranteed monetary supply to the SOEs. It did not have any 
influence in lending decisions however (Roland, 2008: 52). In 1979, the PBOC broke 
away from the MOF to become a separate agency. Following its footsteps, the Big 
Four also separated from the PBOC to become policy-lending agencies in their 
individual subsectors in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, the PBOC was transferred to 
become a super “regulatory agency” and gave up engaging into the profit-making 
                                               
143
 The Report Concerning Investing Basic Construction through the Means of Loan was first initiated by the SPC 
and MOF in August 1979. The policy was tested in the sector of light industry and textile industry in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong Province. The experiment was carried out in other sectors and nationwide in 1985. 
Another regulation passed by the SPC, MOF and CBC in December 1985 showed that the government decided to 
abolish the Bogaida policy and return to government allocation in ten sectors, including national defence, science 
and education, public administration, and etc, that were not able to pay back the bank loan. See the State Planning 
Commission, Ministry of Finance and China Construction Bank (1985). The Bogaidai policy was replaced by the 
Daigaitou policy (replacement of loan with investment).  
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business. However, it was practically reluctant to do so in the end of the 1990s (Zhou, 
2008: 145; Cai, 1999: 171).  
After the reform, the SPC’s role in the Big Four was restricted to two areas, 
namely the credit plan and loan market. The Big Four were responsible for 
channelling the savings to the SOEs according to the annual plan by the SPC (World 
Bank, 1991b). The credit plan remained closely supervised by the SPC in the 1980s 
and early 1990s (Branstetter, 2007: 31; Shih, 2008: 33). According to Park and 
Sehrt’s (2001: 616) interview with provincial governors and Big Four managers, the 
SPC “determined credit targets for each bank branch in each province”. The SETC 
became involved by the end of the 1990s, as it decided which loss-making SOEs were 
eligible for debt-equity swaps. 
The MOF retained its ultimate authority of capital investment, wage and bonus, 
asset management, and interest rates of savings and loans. It also determined capital 
investment in the Big Four and three policy banks.144 The PBOC set the reserve 
requirements in the banking sector with the approval of the MOF (Dernberger, 1999: 
610). The requirement was raised from 13% to 20% in 1992, but gradually decreased 
to 6% in 1999 (Roland, 2008: 62). The banks could not write off their non-performing 
loans (NPLs) without the permission of the MOF (Peng, 2007: 15; Karacadag, 2003: 
155). However, this restriction was relaxed when the Big Four were allowed to make 
special provisions to write off loans caused by bankruptcies and mergers (Mo, 1999: 
98). Besides, both interest rates paid for deposits and interest rates for loans were set 
by the PBOC, together with the MOF holding the approval authority (Duncan, 1995: 
                                               
144
 The MOF established the policy banks in 1994 by channelling investment from the Big Four. For example, the 
registered capital of the CDB—RMB 50 billion—was paid by the MOF (Duncan, 1995: 46). As the policy banks 
could not get funding from household savings, their funds primarily came from the central government. As Tong 
(2002: 57) calculates, in 1996, more than 70% of the funds in SDB and IEB were issued by financial bonds that 
were purchased by the Big Four through the requirement of the MOF, while some 85% of funds in ADB came 
from PBOC’s loans (also see Yang, 2003: 40). 
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33; Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1994; Cousin, 2007: 22).145 The Big 
Four have enjoyed some freedom of floating interest rates within the suggestive rates 
since the late 1980s. The autonomy was withdrawn in 1989, but granted again in 
1993. The MOF decided to narrow the floating range in 1996 but expanded it again in 
1999. 146   As for wages and bonuses, managers of the Big Four started to sign 
employment contracts with the central government that determined their wages and 
bonus in the late 1980s (Park and Sehrt, 2001: 619). The salaries of lower-level 
employees remained under the strict control of the MOF. They were considered as 
governmental employees with a fixed salary irrespective of their performance (Chen 
and Shih, 2004b: 26-7).  
The three policy banks have been established to take over the policy-lending 
activities from the Big Four since 1994.147 The Big Four have taken a market-oriented 
approach to selecting the customers since then. They have been formally allowed to 
extend their loans to small and medium enterprises since 1997 (Firth et al, 2009). 
Only 80% of the credit plan in 1997 was fulfilled, as the Big Four became more 
selective of their customers (Mo, 1999: 100). However, a significant portion of their 
lending was still directed to financing infrastructure constructions, bailing out of loss-
making SOEs and purchasing bonds from policy banks (Table 8.2, also see Lardy, 
1998, 1999; Cull and Xu, 2000).148 
                                               
145
 By imposing an interest rate ceiling, the central government was able to guarantee a provision of cheap credit to 
the SOEs (Riedel, Jin, and Gao, 2007: 71). In contrast, the interest rate for the private enterprises was much higher 
than that for the SOEs. For example, Nanan District Committee of Jiusan Academic Organization’s (2000) field 
study in Chongqing reveals that the interest rate for the private enterprises (7-8%) was 3% higher than that for the 
SOEs (4.5-5%). 
146
 According to Roland (2008: 61-2), the interest rate ceiling for commercial banks decreased from 20% of the 
suggestive rate in 1993 to 10% in 1996 to be consistent with the floor rate (10%). The ceiling rate reached a final 
30% by 1999. The ceiling rate by rural credit cooperatives increased from 40% to 50% in 1998 (Chen and Shih, 
2004: 9). In 1999, the commercial banks were allowed to choose between fixed rate loans and floating rate loans 
(Guo, 2002: 97). 
147
 The policy banks in principle only lend to customers identified by the SPC/SDPC (Lardy, 2003: 76). However, 
according to Tong (2002: 58), they could also reject some policy loans mandated by the SPC. For example, 10% of 
proposed projects were rejected by the SDB in 1994 for not meeting the SDB’s lending requirements. 
148
 Vice Premier Wen Jiabao in 1999 clearly mandated that the Big Four should place their priority on supporting 
the SOEs, especially the ones in strategic sectors (Financial Times, 1999). By the end of 1999, over 80% of 
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Table 8.2 Bank Loans Received by Non-SOEs  
from 1991 to 1997 (as % of gross bank loans) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Bank loans from all financial 
agencies  
8.76 9.93 10.66 13.27 12.38 12.83 14.24 
Bank loans from state-owned 
banks  
7.16 7.50 7.51 9.05 7.98 8.10 8.85 
Source: Fan (2000) 
 
8.2.3.2 Centralisation of Local Banks from Local Authorities by the PBOC, 1995 
The entry of “local banks” since 1986 has brought local governments onto the 
supervising board.149 City banks, like the Bank of Shanghai or Bank of Beijing, have 
mushroomed across the country since the mid 1990s. As the “local banks” were 
largely former rural cooperatives or urban cooperatives, their majority shareholders 
were usually local governments (Roland, 2008: 57). They were administratively and 
fiscally controlled by local authorities. A sample survey in 2005 showed that local 
governments hold an average of 24.2% share in the capital of the sample and another 
73.6% through wholly owned subsidiaries (Cousin, 2007: 254). The MOF also 
allowed the local governments to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of their 
subsidiaries, while retaining its say on interest rates on savings and loans. Unlike the 
policy banks and the Big Four, “local banks” were not subject to the credit control of 
the central government (Wong and Wong, 2001: 30; Duan, 2003: 35). 150  Credit 
ceiling plan on “local banks” was abolished in 1995 and 1996 (Brandt and Zhu, 2007: 
104).  
The 1995 Central Bank Law of China helped the PBOC to centralise “local 
banks” to prevent the local authorities from exercising exclusive control of personnel 
                                                                                                                                       
outstanding loans extended by Chinese banks were channelled to the SOEs (He, 2002: 146; Yang, 2003: 39). 
Lardy (2004: 102)  also points out that loans to households accounted for only 0.2% of the loan portfolio of 
Chinese banks in 1997. 
149
 The Bank of Communications was re-founded in 1986 while the Shenzhen Development Bank and China 
Merchants Bank were established in 1987. Guangdong Development Bank was established in 1988. 
150
 As major shareholders of these banks were mostly SOEs or local governments, they did not have full autonomy 
of choosing the customers, either. 
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and labour management, alliance decisions and internal organisations of their 
subsidiaries. All commercial banks in China would also have to abide by the 
Commercial Banking Law of 1995 that set the education background and skill 
requirements of their employees (Chen and Shih, 2004b: 4). For example, at least 
60% of the employees should hold a degree in finance at minimum college level or 
have working experience in the banking sector. As for alliance management, “local 
banks” were allowed to go into mergers based on commercial principles (Zhu, 1999: 
308) that were, nevertheless, subject to the intervention of local governments or SOEs 
as shareholders. Alliance between domestic banks and foreign investors were 
exclusively determined by the PBOC. Finally, although the PBOC abstained from 
interfering in internal organisation of “local banks” (Duan, 2003: 35), it supervised 
organisational expansion through quotas on the establishment of new branches in each 
year (Wong and Wong, 2001: 29).151  
Besides, the PBOC was authorised to approve the inclusion of some marginal 
financial products and determine their associating fees for the “local banks”. For 
example, the marketing of new financial products, like mortgage, car loans and 
consumer credit, was subject to the approval by the PBOC (Tong, 2002: 148).152 The 
interest rates and service fees for these financial products provided by the “local 
banks” were also determined by the PBOC.153 
 
8.2.3.3 Centralisation of Central Banks from Local Authorities by the PBOC, 1998 
Banking reforms since the early 1980s have not only invited the local authorities 
to develop their subsidiaries but also given them an opportunity to intervene in the 
                                               
151
 It evolved as a discriminatory policy against the “local banks” through controlling their expansion (Karacadag, 
2003: 164). 
152




business of the Big Four’s local branches. For example, the implementation of the 
credit plans was interrupted by local authorities because of their regional investment 
projects (Zhou and Zhu, 1987). The actual lending between 1991 and 1996 exceeded 
the central plan by an average of 31.9% (Shih, 2008: 36). Mr Li Guixian, governor of 
the PBOC, was removed from the position in 1993 for his incapability of controlling 
its branches in the regions (Leung, 1993: A11).  
The problem of NPLs was a damper on the development of the banking industry 
as the banks have to play the role of an effective planning organ after the reform. The 
Big Four and two credit cooperatives (Urban Credit Cooperatives and Rural Credit 
Cooperatives) determined their credit loans based on the SPC’s selective loan 
policy.154 The reforms since 1978 have not hardened budget constraints. Instead, the 
budget constraint for the SOEs in these sectors became softer over time.155 The SOEs 
gradually realised that they did not have to settle the loans with the state banks just as 
they had done in the government allocation system. Although state-owned banks were 
in financial difficulties to write-off their NPLs,156 or paid off the outstanding debts in 
case of bankruptcy, they were not threatened. They knew that the government would 
always step in to help them out. At the same time, the central government was also 
                                               
154
 Credit loans to enterprises were extended based on three major criteria: industrial sector, length of loan and 
ownership structure (Pei, 1992: 34). Guided by the SPC’s selective loan policy, the banks would prefer short-term 
loans to SOEs that were in strategic industry or “pillar industry”. Long-term loans to non-state-owned enterprises 
that were not in strategic industry were always disallowed. For example, the TVEs, compared to the SOEs were 
discriminated by the financial policies. Total credit going to the TVE sector was no more than 8 percent of the total 
outstanding loans, despite the fact that this sector produced more than 25 percent of total industrial output at that 
time (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 1992). The situation for private enterprises was even worse. Only 
0.46% of the loan went to private enterprises in 1996. In the year 1989, “about three million TVEs went bankrupt 
or were taken over by other TVEs. In the same year almost all loss-making state-owned enterprises were bailed out 
by the state” (People’s Daily, 1990). 
155
 Dewatripont and Maskin in 1989 explained the institutional cause of soft budget constraint in centralised 
economy. According to Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), a soft budget constraint is not necessarily a bad policy, as 
it is essentially useful for the completion of long-term projects. A diversified financial policy, including both soft 
budget constraint and hard budget constraint, can effectively prevent the dilemma of a soft budget constraint. But 
the positive effect of soft budget constraint was hardly noticeable in China because of the absence of hard budget 
constraint at the same time.  
156
 For example, in 1991, capital assets (zibenjin) of Chinese banks against gross capital assets was lower than 8%, 
the standard set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The rates were 3.6% for ICBC, 4.9% for ABC, 
5.6% for BOC and 7.0% for CBC (Chen, 1993: 15). 
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aware of the need to maintain a healthy banking system. The SPC indicated that the 
priority of the ninth FYP for the tertiary industry was to develop the banking sector 
and insurance sector (95 sanchan fazhan zhongdian, 1996: 41).157  
The effort of reforming the banking sector became urgent in the wake of the 
97/98 Asian financial crisis (Huang, 2001: 384; Mar and Richter, 2003: 50; Naughton, 
2007: 461). The PBOC copied the model of the US Federal Reserve System and 
replaced its 30 provincial branches with 9 cross-provincial regional branches in 1998 
for the purpose of completely eliminating local incentives. With centralisation, the 
PBOC had the authority of appointing the senior staff and trans-provincial Head of 
the Big Four (Wu, 2005: 231). The managers of the Big Four were ranked as vice-
ministers and branch managers were also appointed with corresponding official ranks 
(Peng, 2007: 8).158 The Head of PBOC’s cross-provincial branches that had a higher 
administrative rank than the local governors were empowered to resist political 
intervention. The central government thus regained its effective control of the banking 
industry’s credit plan (Shih, 2008: 38) even though the branches at lower levels 
remained less regulated than those at upper levels (Shin, Zhang and Liu, 2007: 18; 
Branstetter, 2007: 33). In the same year, the credit plan was replaced by a more 
flexible ratio management that granted more autonomy to the Big Four as long as the 
loans did not exceed the asset/liability ratio set by the PBOC to guarantee the stability 
of banking industry. Although they gained more freedom from local authorities in the 
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 To deal with NPLs, the MOF launched a special bond of RMB 270 billion to increase capital assets of the Big 
Four (Feng, 1999: 24). Another RMB 1.4 trillion of NPLs was passed to the four state-owned asset management 
companies (China Xinda, China Oriental, China Great Wall, and China Huarong) established by the MOF in 1999 
(Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 2000: 15).   
158
 As mentioned by Johnson and Leggett (2000), the employees were still treated as “civil servants” with rigid 
evaluation and pay systems. 
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determining of loans for each year, the new approach did not effectively prevent the 
intervention of the central government (Yang, 2003: 39).159 
 
8.2.4 Administrative Connection between Government and Industry in the Banking 
Sector by the End of the 1990s 
The banking industry differs from primary and secondary sectors in its 
production of financial products rather than physical goods. The business scope of 
Chinese banks by the end of the 1990s was overwhelmingly limited to deposit-taking 
and credit-lending, while the other banking activities were relatively underdeveloped 
(He, 2002). According to Li (2000), the share of net interest income in 1998 
accounted for 96.84% of total banking income in the Big Four, and 84.32% in 10 
national shareholding commercial banks. Thus, by the late 1990s, the Chinese 
banking industry had developed its own terminologies. For example, plan of 
production management in secondary sectors is credit plan for the banking industry; 
procurement of material refers to deposit-taking; price corresponds with interest rate 
on loan and sales are equivalent to loan market in the banking industry.  
In 1999, the three groups of banks had established their own kind of relations 
with the government. The policy banks were fully controlled by the central 
government, except for partial autonomy in floating interest rates on loan. Having 
transferred policy loans to the policy banks, the Big Four were able to enjoy 
autonomy in deciding their credit plan and selecting loan targets. Unlike “central 
banks”, the “local banks” had much less administrative intervention from the central 
government. However, the central government retained the right to recruiting and 
                                               
159
 The co-existence of credit plan and asset/liability ratio was named as “dual management” (Shih, 2008: 35). 
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managing staff, managing alliance and internal organisation, and setting interest rates 
for both deposits and loans. 
Government-industry relations in 1999 also varied among ministries in the State 
Council. The SDPC did not give up its control of the credit plan and loan market, but 
it allowed commercial banks to adopt more market-oriented loan-lending policies and 
a more flexible ratio management of credit planning. The SETC has been active in 
requesting the Big Four to finance debt-equity swaps in loss-making SOEs since 
1998. The MOF was the final decision maker on the issue of interest rates of both 
savings and loans. It also controlled capital investment if it was the major stakeholder, 
determined wage and bonus for the “central bank” and closely supervised capital asset 
management especially regarding NPLs. The “local banks” were free from MOF’s 
supervision in these areas. Finally, thanks to the Commercial Banking Law of 1995 
and the sectoral restructuring in 1998, the PBOC was authorised to look into 
personnel and labour management, alliance management and the internal organisation 
of both central and local banks. However, it still had to share the authority of 
supervising “local banks” with local governments.160 
To sum up (Table 8.3), considering the market share of different banks, the 
MOF had the strongest administrative control of China’s banking industry (or 37.5%), 
especially the Big Four (or 45%).161 The PBOC, an intermediary regulator in certain 
areas under the MOF’s approvals, had less control of the banks as an ultimate 
                                               
160
 Unlike state-owned banks, the governors of shareholding banks were nominated by the board of directors who 
enjoyed certain autonomy from the central government (Jia, 2009: 79), while the managers of the city banks were 
appointed by the municipal government. As Cousin (2007: 48) documents, managers of “all banks” were subject to 
the supervision of different levels of authorities.  
161
 Among the 10 areas of autonomy in banking industry, full control was coded as 100%, partial as 50% and little 
as zero. The share of banks’ asset, according to Table 7.1, was put as 5% for policy banks, 70% for the Big Four, 
and 25% for the “local banks”. Accordingly, the administrative connection between the MOF and banking sector 
in 1999 was: (AC)=5%*(0+10%+10%+10%+0+10%+0+5%+0+0) + 70%*+ 
25%*(0+0+0+0+0+10%+0+5%+0+0)=37.5%. The administrative connection between the MOF and the Big Four 
was: (AC)= 0+10%+10%+10%+0+10%+0+5%+0+0=45% 
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decision maker (26.25%).162 The SDPC and SETC also had some interest in the sector 
(8% and 3.5% respectively). 163  Together, the four agencies held 71.75% of the 
authority. The government’s stake in the banking sector was the “highest” among the 
sectors covered by the study. The next section explores the fiscal ties between central 
agencies and banking industry. 













1. Credit plan Full SDPC Partial SDPC Little SDPC 
2. Capital 
investment 
Full MOF Full MOF Little MOF 
3. Allocation 
of wage and 
bonus 








Full PBOC Full PBOC Partial PBOC 
6. Deposit-
taking 
Full MOF Full MOF Full MOF 
7. Alliance 
management 
Full PBOC Full PBOC Partial PBOC 
8. Interest rate 
on loan 
Partial MOF Partial MOF Partial MOF 
9. Internal 
organisation 
Full PBOC Full PBOC Partial PBOC 
10. Loan 
market 
Full SDPC Partial SDPC/SETC Little SDPC 
Note: LGs=Local governments  
Source: compiled by author 
 
  
8.2.5 Fiscal/financial Connection between Government and Industry in the Banking 
Sector by the End of the 1990s 
As mentioned in the first section, both the policy banks and the Big Four were 
“wholly owned” by the MOF by the end of the 1990s. Local governments and the 
                                               
162
 The administrative connection between the PBOC and banking industry in 1999 was: (AC)= 
5%*(0+0+0+0+10%+0+10%+0+10%+0) + 70%*(0+0+0+0+10%+0+10%+0+10%+0) + 
25%*(0+0+0+0+5%+0+5%+0+5%+0)=26.25%.  
163
 The administrative connection between the SDPC and banking industry in 1999 was (AC)= 
5%*(10%+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+10%) + 70%*(5%+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+5%) + 25%*0=8%. The administrative 
connection between the SETC and banking industry in 1999 was (AC)= 5%*0 + 
70%*(0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+0+5%) + 25%*0=3.5%. 
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SOEs had majority stake in most of the “local banks”, including national shareholding 
banks, city banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives. All of these banks suffered 
fiscal repression by the MOF through the taxation system.   
The primary concern of the MOF was to “maximise its fiscal income” (Langlois, 
2001: 615). Prior to the taxation policy change in 1997, the income tax rate for the 
Big Four, “local banks” and foreign-funded banks were 55%, 33% and 15% 
respectively (Fu, 1998: 212). The Ministry heavily relied on the Big Four for tax 
revenue. For example, in the mid-1990s, about one sixth of central government 
revenues came from the Big Four (Lardy, 1998: 170).164 A new tax remittance system 
in the banking industry was introduced in 1997. According to the new policy, the 
income tax rate for the SOEs in all sectors would be decreased from 55% to 33%, but 
the turnover tax rate imposed on bank loans was increased from 5% to 8%. The 
change in the remittance system did not release the burden of the Big Four. Instead, it 
became the MOF’s further attempt at repressing the sector. The increase in turnover 
tax rate which seemed insignificant was effectively huge, because the levy was based 
on total income that included the interests and fees on NPLs. As a result of the new 
scheme,  the Big Four had to remit an extra RMB 8,915 million to the MOF in 1999 
(Table 8.4). In consequence, the profit margin of the banking sector was marginal. As 
Karacadag (2003: 156) calculates, the effective tax burden on the banks accounted for 
70-80% of their profits.165 Most of it had to be transferred to the MOF. A quoted 
statement by Jin Liqun, Chinese Vice-minister of the MOF, defended that the MOF, 
as a stockholder of these commercial banks, had the right to the revenue as a form of 
dividends (Chow, 2007: 245).  
                                               
164
 As Branstetter (2007: 34) observed, a conflict of interest between the MOF and the Big Four existed, because 
the MOF was reluctant to allow them to write off the NPLs that in turn would reduced their operating income and, 
thus, tax revenue for the MOF. 
165
 According to Lardy’s (1999: 38) calculation of the ABC in 1997, the bank’s effective rate of taxation exceeded 
91%. 
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Table 8.4 Changes in Tax Revenue from the Big Four to the MOF in 1999 
(RMB Million) 
Item ICBC ABC BOC CBC Total 
1. Extra revenue transferred 
after the increase in turnover 
tax rate from 5% to 8%: 
4452 2090 2067 2805 11414 
2. Revenue saved after the 
decrease in income tax rate 
from 55% to 33%: 
865 0* 240 1394 2499 
3. Changes: 2-1 -3587 -2090 -1827 -1411 -8915 
Note: *: ABC’s income in 1999 was in red. Thus, the tax revenue to the MOF was zero. 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2000: 579). 
 
To conclude, the central government, especially the MOF, had been 
administratively supervising the industry and financially relying on it for tax revenue 
generation by the end of the 1990s. The banking sector still functioned as a planning 
organ in “socialist market economy”. There was no doubt that sectoral and 
bureaucratic interests on trade liberalisation were strongly convergent.  
 
8.3 Sectoral Interests on Trade Negotiation 
As a planning organ, China’s banking industry had both advantages and 
disadvantages in the face of foreign competitions in the market. Bonin and Huang’s 
(2002b: 1078) review clearly identified “two extreme sentiments among economists 
and officials” towards the impact of foreign competition on China’s domestic banking 
sector”. They generally refused to give a straightforward answer to whether China’s 
banking industry could survive the liberalisation after the WTO accession.  
Generally speaking, China’s banking industry as a late developer was not 
competitive compared to global giants. It did not perform as efficiently an 
intermediary as their foreign counterparts. Policy lending contributed to many NPLs 
that squeezed their profit (Table 8.5). Primarily devoted to the channelling of 
household savings to the SOEs, the banks offered very few financial products. Their 
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services were also poor for a lack of market incentives. As such, both Chang (2001) 
and Lin (2000) hold a very pessimistic view as they believe that the entry of foreign 
banks, which enjoy advantages in complete service network, better services and sound 
financial position, would put China’s banking industry at a strong disadvantage. Chen 
and Shih (2004b: 86) estimate that competitiveness and security would be major 
concerns of the banking sector for its under-performing assets, high operating costs 
and high non-performing loan ratios (also see Chen, Skully, and Brown, 2005). Yang 
(2003) is worried that the banking industry’s huge burden of financing the central 
plan together with its outdated technology and bad loans problem would lead to a 
financial crisis and contagion. He (2002) also warned of strong competition from 
foreign banks after comparing the factors, including size, profitability, liquidity, 
access to market, sophistication in the provision of services, market reputation, etc 
 
 
Table 8.5 Comparison of the Big Four with the Global Giants in 1997/1998 











1 Citigroup (12/98) 41,889 668,641 9,269 29.4 
2 BankAmerica 
Corp (12/98) 
36,877 617,679 8,048 29.7 
3 HSBC Holdings 
(12/98) 
29,352 484,655 6,591 23.2 
4 Credit Agricole 
Groupe (12/98) 
25,930 457,037 3,765 15.2 
6 ICBC (12/98) 22,213 391,213 417 2.5 
18 BOC (12/98) 14,712 299,007 425 3.4 
65 CBC (12/97) 5,988 203,116 1,215 21.2 
88 ABC (12/97) 4,802 190,095 95 2.0 
Source: The Banker (1999b: 137, 180). 
 
 
However, Chinese banks did enjoy certain advantages by marginal criteria that 
were too significant to overlook. The huge amount of household savings had afforded 
Chinese banks the opportunity of becoming strong, large-sized banks that were 
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comparable to global giants (Table 8.5). The nationwide branches were so convenient 
to customers that they sustained an inflow of financial resources. These advantages 
could be easily amplified through political intervention to prevent foreign entry. Thus, 
some scholars hold an optimistic view towards the upcoming competition. Although 
Mar and Richter (2003: 57) anticipate “enormous pressure” on China’s the Big Four 
“struggling with mountainous bad loans” after WTO accession, they were confident 
that the banks would retain their dominant market share through a gradual opening up. 
OECD’s (2003) calculation indicates that Chinese banks were competitive in terms of 
their extensive branch network and familiarity with the customers, but disadvantaged 
by its low profitability, poor asset quality together with inadequate capital and the 
inability to control loan quality. Taking account of all these factors, foreign banks 
would play an important but limited role in China’s banking industry after 
liberalisation. Woo (2002: 391) is more optimistic as he emphasises on the 
importance of geographic location. He argues that Chinese banks would be extremely 
competitive in the countryside. Huang (2002c) disagrees on the significance of 
geographic location by warning that the negative impact would be huge because 95% 
of the Big Four profits came from the coastal cities (Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Xiamen, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing) that would be the target market for foreign banks. But 
both Woo (2002) and Huang (2002c) believe that the central government would be 
fiscally capable of stabilising the domestic banking industry. 
In short, Chinese banks were uncompetitive in the international trade of 
services. However, their extensive networks across the country guaranteed that they 
would not be easily knocked out in any upcoming competition. Although the industry 
as a whole was reluctant to open up to foreign actors, the banks with different statuses 
in the market might have different agendas. The study of market structure in the next 
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section is to explain whether the Big Four—dominant players in the sector—had an 
interest that was from the others.   
 
8.4 Sectoral Pressure on Trade Negotiation 
The Big Four’s oligopolistic status in the banking industry was not without its 
privileges. The four state-owned commercial banks under the PBOC absorbed 80% of 
the savings and dominated 75% of China’s commercial banking business (Ji and 
Thmas, 2002: 678). The high level concentration of the Big Four in terms of deposits, 
loans and assets reveals that the Chinese banking industry was controlled by these 
four oligopolies (Table 8.1, also see Chen and Shih, 2004b: 13). The high 
concentration allowed the industry to speak in one voice against trade concessions. 
The increase in new commercial banks and the diversification of the ownership 
structure of these banks did not impose any challenge to them. 
Competition among the Big Four was very limited, although some would argue 
that intra-competition has been noticeable since the mid-1990s (Berger, Hasan, and 
Zhou, 2009: 116-7). The establishment of the three policy banks, to a certain extent, 
freed the Big Four from policy loans that in turn contributed to more intense 
competition among themselves (Wong and Wong, 2001: 20; Tong, 2002: 22). 
However, the effort to lift restrictions that were promulgated in 1985 to limit each 
bank to its own designated sector did not introduce any meaningful competition to the 
banking industry because the Big Four lacked the requisite autonomy to compete with 
each other.  A lack of competition among the Big Four prevented uncooperative 
behaviours among the oligopolies. It explains Schlichting’s (2008: 39) assertion that 
state-owned banks were a “strong lobby group” that were heavily interested in the 
protection of their economic interests. 
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However, the status of the Big Four in the banking industry did not guarantee 
oligopolistic profits. 166  Their profits, to a large extent, were influenced by strict 
interest rate controls of the government (Fu and Heffernan, 2009). Onerous taxation 
on the sector further squeezed their profit margin. What was more important was the 
fact that being a planning organ in the sector means more governmental intervention 
on policy lending and more NPLs. Taking into account of these factors, it is 
reasonable to believe that the Big Four’s opposition to trade liberalisation was not 
caused by the concern of a potential loss of oligopolistic profits.  
To conclude, Chinese banks were generally reluctant to lift entry barriers to 
global giants because they were not competitive in the international trade of services. 
Because of the Big Four’s dominant position in the sector, they were able to impose a 
coherent pressure on the government for protection. However, they did not express a 
special resistance to the liberalisation, as their monopolistic position in domestic 
market did not provide them with corresponding profits. The next section explains 
why the MOF and PBOC had been so actively protecting the sector. 
 
8.5 Bureaucratic Interests on Trade Negotiation 
The close relationship between the MOF and banking industry, especially the 
Big Four, implies that the government would protect the interest of the Big Four 
during the process of domestic liberalisation and protect the sector as a whole against 
foreign competition. 
                                               
166
 Jiang, Yao and Zhang (2009) find out that national shareholding banks performed much better than the Big 
Four in terms of profitability. Shih, Zhang and Liu’s (2007) empirical study does not suggest a correlation between 
the size of the banks and their performance in China. Instead, mid-size national shareholding banks perform better 
because of less government intervention than the Big Four and because they are larger in size than the other “local 
banks”. Berger, Hasan and Zhou’s (2009) study of China’s banking industry from 1994 and 2003 reveals that the 
Big Four were the least efficient, although they were the biggest. 
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Although economists have not reached a consensus on the causality between 
banking development and economic growth in China,167 the Party seemed to believe 
that a sustainable banking system was pivotal to national economic development 
(Shin, 2008). The liberalisation of the domestic banking industry was one of the ways 
to sustain growth of the sector. However, the government played a counter move, as it 
refused to cut its relations with the sector. For example, the Commercial Banking Law 
of China in 1995 seemed to promote a more market-oriented banking system (Barth, 
Koepp, and Zhou, 2004: 10), but it did not liberalise the sector. China’s concentration 
ratio in the banking sector, according to Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), has been 
falling since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state actors that might be the result 
of the commercial banking law. However, the central government’s control of 
deposits and loan through the regulation of interest rate, number of branches, policy 
lending, multiple accounts, limits of loans and licencing requirements had effectively 
retained the oligopoly of the Big Four in banking industry (Wong and Wong, 2001). 
Private enterprises were finally allowed to enter the sector.168 China Minsheng Bank 
(established in 1996) was the first bank whose shareholders were mainly non-state 
enterprises.169 However, its total asset of only RMB 20 billion in 1998 could not make 
any change to the monopolistic policy in sector. Even the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MOA), one of the central agencies, was not allowed to enter the banking industry to 
develop its own financial institutions. Although the ABC was reluctant to be fully 
engaged in the agricultural sector that did not generate sufficient returns for the 
                                               
167
 Economists, like Lin and Li (2001), observe a positive relationship between banking development and 
economic growth using provincial level data between 1985 and 1998; Boyreau-Debray (2009) disagrees by saying 
that the banking development in China had a negative impact on economic growth; Aziz and Huenwald (2002) do 
not find any correlation between the two after analysing data from 27 provinces from 1988 to 1997.  
168
 The China's Banking Regulations of 1986 forbids local governments and individuals from setting up banks. The 
need for financial support from private enterprises, TVEs and even small-sized SOEs led to the emergence of an 
underground banking system (dixia qianzhuang). In 1996, the loan from the underground banking system 
accounted for more than RMB 100 trillion. See “1996 nian zhongguo minjian jiedaie yi gaoda 1000 duoyiyua 
renminbi,” (Loan from underground banking system was more than RMB 100 trillion in 1996), Inside Information 
on Economic Reform, No.9 (1998), 45 
169
 But its major shareholders, according to Chiu and Lewis (2006: 195), were state-owned corporations. 
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investment (Woo, 1999), the MOA’s request for legitimising the existence of rural 
cooperative foundations was rejected by the PBOC.170 
The government had been a lot more careful in opening up to foreign 
competition. The regulations on foreign banks imposed strict controls on the operation 
of foreign banks in China through the minimal amount requirement of working 
capital, maximum rate of deposit on the bank’s assets and a limit to the scope of 
business. As Lu (2007: 55-9; also see Fu, 1998: 209) documents, in 1985, each of 
foreign banks’ branches should have a minimum RMB 40 million as working capital. 
This was increased to RMB 100 million in 1995. In 1990, the deposits of foreign 
banks in China were not allowed to exceed 40% of their assets. The maximum rate 
decreased to 30% in 1995. As for the business scope, the foreign banks primarily 
served foreign customers in China to facilitate the inflow of FDIs. Beijing was 
reluctant to open the renminbi business to them. Two short-term experiments were 
however conducted in two foreign banks in 1988. The HSBC (Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Cooperation) and IBPS (International Bank of Paris and Shanghai) 
were allowed to accept deposits in renminbi in 1997 on an experimental basis (Fu, 
1998: 211). These moves were in preparation of possible concession in the banking 
                                               
170
 The MOA required the ABC to play the fundamental role of investing in the agriculture sector (MOA, 1990: 
38). However, there was no feedback to its request. The data shows that the loan in the agriculture sector from the 
ABC was extremely low. For example, of ABC’s RMB 100.7 trillion bank loan from 1986 to 1989, only 30.6% 
(RMB 30.9 trillion) was used to procure agricultural products (Xiao, 1990: 23). MOA’s effort in creating its own 
financial agencies in the agriculture sector was turned down by the PBOC. It was a bottom-up approach from the 
underground finance in the countryside. Because of the scarce financial resources in the agriculture sector, 
underground finance began as borrowings and lendings between relatives and friends. It was at zero interest and 
not for commercial purpose. The purpose of the loans was then mostly for agriculture production; this gradually 
changed to investment for private enterprises and TVEs. Underground finance took a variety of forms, like rural 
cooperative foundations (nongcun hezuo jijinhui), private money houses (siren qianzhuang), pawnshops (diandang 
hang), etc. A survey of 24 cities or counties in 15 provinces in China 2001 shows that various kinds of 
underground finance could be found in 95% of the locations (Wen, (2005). The emergence of underground finance 
was supported by the MOA. In December 1992, the MOA promulgated A Few Comments on the Standardization 
and Institutionalization of the Rural Cooperative Foundations (Guanyu jiaqiang nongcun hezuo jijinhui guifanhua, 
zhiduhua jianshe ruogan wenti de yijian). In 1993, MOA No.8 Document affirmed the advantages of having rural 
cooperative foundations as complement to rural finance. However, the existence of rural cooperative foundations 
challenged the monopoly of state-owned banks that were regulated by the PBOC. Accordingly, the PBOC issued 
Measures to Eliminate Illegal Financial Institutions and Illegal Financial Business (feifa jinrong jigou he feifa 
jinrong yewu huodong de quid banfa) in July 1998. Six months later, the State Council decided to eliminate the 
rural cooperative foundations (Kuang: 2007). 
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sector after WTO accession. Zhou Xiaochuan (2008: 175), governor of the PBOC 
since 2003, comments that all of these supervising agencies were reluctant to give up 
their control of the industry; as a result, a voluntary reform of the sector was not 
possible without a significant external force.  
In short, an extensive survey of administrative and fiscal relations between the 
government and industry reveals a concordant effort by central agencies to protect the 
Big-Four-dominated, uncompetitive banking industry. The conclusion was consistent 
with Huang’s (2002b: 121) observation that the “Chinese banking system, in effect, 
acts as a giant redistributive mechanism to transfer savings from the private sector to 
finance the investment and social obligations of the state sector”. The relationship 
implies the difficulty of market liberalisation and WTO negotiations. 
 
8.6 China’s WTO Commitment and Its Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
8.6.1 Little Concessions in the Banking Industry 
Internal coordination was not easy in the case of divergent interests and 
imbalanced status among the central agencies. For example, the MOFTEC’s priority 
was to finalise WTO accession agreements with possible concessions from all 
industries, including the banking sector. Its request was not well accepted by the MOF 
that relied on the Big Four as the last resort for its macroeconomic policies (Lardy, 
1998: 221). The MOFTEC was usually less capable of pushing the PBOC and MOF 
to liberalise their subordinating sectors, because they were of the same administrative 
level. The MOF was in fact more powerful than the MOFTEC in the decision making 
of finance and banking (Yang, 2004: 40). As a consequence, no concrete concession 
in the banking industry was made by the MOFTEC-led coordination group.  
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The internal coordination group was restructured, replacing the MOFTEC with 
the SETC to coordinate with the tertiary sector in 1999 in the hope of finalising the 
agreement by the end of the year. The MOFTEC could not deal with the resistance 
from the MOF nor could it put pressure on the Ministry of Information Industry 
(MII), a super agency after the 1998 administrative reform. Thus, the SETC, a 
commission that was at a higher level than ministries in the State Council had been 
assigned to replace the MOFTEC. The SETC as a new coordinator also needed short-
term support from the Big Four because its priority at that time was to restructure 
loss-making SOEs through debt-equity swaps. As such, the SETC with a special 
interest in banking industry exerted less pressure on the MOF than on the MII. 
The rearrangement of domestic coordination implies the government’s decision 
to protect domestic banks. The key success was to impose a 49% equity ceiling on 
foreign investment in banking industry. The agreement to gradually opening up the 
domestic banking industry included allowing American banks to do foreign currency 
business with Chinese clients one year after China’s accession. China would allow 
local currency business with Chinese enterprises two years after accession, and allow 
local currency business with Chinese individuals five years after accession. China 
should allow the joint-invested bank on accession and allow the joint-invested bank to 
become an American bank five years later.  
Immediately after the negotiations, Mr Long was optimistic about the future of 
the domestic banking industry, as he publicly stated that although the agreement 
“allowed” foreign investors to have 49% of the share in banking industry, it did not 
necessarily mean that they were able to achieve this goal; the agreement also allowed 
the government to develop new barriers to delay and frustrate foreign investors from 
entering the domestic market. 
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8.6.2 China’s Compliance in the Post-WTO Period 
The banking industry as a “high stake” sector received a lot of protection from 
the MOF during the negotiation. In the post-WTO period, a competition for the 
control of the Big Four took place in the central government. In 2003, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to take over the regulatory 
power of the PBOC. In the same year, the ownership of the BOC and CBC was 
transferred from the MOF to the PBOC-led Huijin Investment Company through the 
purchase of shares (He, 2003). In response, the MOF “forced” the PBOC to sell these 
shares to the MOF-led China Investment Corporation (Anderlini, 2008). Huijin was 
handed over from the PBOC to the MOF. By October 2009, the MOF-led Huijin 
owned majority stakes in all of the Big Four with 35.42% in the ICBC, 76.53% in the 
BOC and 57.09% in the CBC (AFP, 2009).171 The PBOC ended up as the loser as it 
has surrendered its regulatory control of the sector and failed to grab the ownership of 
the Big Four. However, the division of functions between the PBOC and CBRC is not 
clear as they have overlapping control of the sector. The banking sector remained 
“high stake”. It did not gain any autonomy in the restructuring of the supervision 
board. Regardless of the agency governing the sector, it would have difficulties 
complying with the WTO commitment. 
The government had committed to the agreement timely, but imposed new non-
tariff barriers immediately to buffer the devastating impact of foreign competition. As 
such, foreign banks’ share of the total banking system assets was only 2.4% in 2007, 
roughly the same as that in 2000—one year prior to the WTO accession (Figure 3.4). 
                                               
171
 By 2005, the largest foreign stakeholders in the CBC were the Bank of America Corporation (9%) and Temasek 
(6%). The largest foreign stakeholders in the BOC were the Royal Bank of Scotland-Merrill Lynch-Li Ka-shing 
(10%), Temasek (about 10%) and the United Bank of Switzerland (1.6%) (Podpiera, 2006: 6-7).  In January 2006, 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Allianz AG and American Express Co. bought a total 10% shares of ICBC (Berger et 
al, 2009: 119). 
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The first commitment was to allow foreign currency business in 2002. To qualify, a 
foreign branch was required to have a working capital of no lesser than RMB 500 
million, a new criterion set by the PBOC in the same year. In comparison, a domestic 
bank branch requires only RMB 300 million to qualify. Besides, foreign banks were 
not allowed to open more than one branch in a year (USTR, 2008: 81-2). The second 
commitment was to allow domestic currency business with Chinese enterprises as 
from 2004. At the same time, the working requirement was reduced by RMB 100 
million and the restriction of new branches was also removed. However, the 
government restricted the establishment of Chinese-foreign joint banks. The equity 
share of a single foreign investor in a joint bank was limited to 20% and the total 
equity share of all foreign investors was limited to 25% (Ibid: 82). The third 
commitment was to allow the domestic currency business with Chinese enterprises 
and individuals since 2007. Many additional requirements were imposed on foreign 
banks, however. Foreign banks must be incorporated in China as the first step. The 
requirement of incorporation is to have a representative office in China for two years 
and have total assets exceeding US$ 10 billion. After incorporation, they need to 
prove that they have been in operation in China for three years and with profits in two 
consecutive years. After meeting these requirements, they are allowed to take 
domestic currency deposits of RMB 1 million or more from Chinese individuals but 
not issue any domestic currency loans to Chinese individuals (Ibid: 83). These 







The banking industry performed the role of a planning organ by the end of the 
1990s. The central government, especially the MOF, administratively supervised and 
financially relied on the banking industry through its close relationship with the Big 
Four. The Chinese banking industry expected a great deal of competition after WTO 
accession. A concordant effort by the vested SETC, MOA and PBOC successfully 
avoided giving concession on the sector. To meet the commitment of opening up the 
sector in a step-by-step manner after WTO accession, the government erected a series 
of non-tariff barriers to minimise the impact of foreign competition. China’s WTO 
accession did not help the banking sector develop into a more sustainable system as it 
is still a “high stake” sector. The Big Four is still in control of the sector and the 
industry remains uncompetitive in terms of NPLs, limited business scopes and less 















Chapter 9: Conclusions 
 
9.1 Government-Industry Relations 
The effects of the foot-dragging tactics adopted by economic ministries in the 
central government during the WTO negotiation process are best understood in the 
perspective of government-industry relations. The central government’s decision to 
grant autonomy to firms during the decentralization process casts doubts on the 
convergence of sectoral and bureaucratic interests. The devolution was successful in 
some sectors like the textile industry, but not in others like telecommunications 
services. This means that the relation between the government and industry was 
sector-specific. A close relationship reflects that the government had high stakes in  
its subordinate industry and would do its utmost to protect it. A loose relationship 
implies that the government’s decision is primarily driven by its bureaucratic interests 
and not necessarily beneficial to the industry. 
During the China-US negotiation on WTO accession, the Ministry of 
Information Industry, the Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Commission had 
strongly opposed the trade liberalisation of their respective subordinate industry, 
namely, telecommunications services, banking services and automobile sector, as they 
were closely related to the industries that were not willing to join the WTO. On the 
other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture exerted much less effort to protect its sector as 
the ministry had little control over household production; the sector had seen more 
challenges than opportunities after trade liberalisation. For the textile and clothing 
industry that was willing to join the WTO for greater market, the State Bureau of 
Textile did not fight hard to lift US quota on Chinese products during the bilateral 
negotiation as it had low stakes in the sector.  
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In short, the study of government-industry relations explains the 
convergence/divergence of bureaucratic-sectoral interests. It is the prerequisite to 
understanding the state’s decisions on trade liberalisation. The incorporation of the 
independent variable of government-industry relations into the model of “ministry-
sector horse trading” affords a better understanding of China’s trade concessions for 
WTO accession.  
 
9.2 “Ministry-Sector Horse Trading” Model 
This dissertation develops a “ministry-sector horse trading” model to understand 
China’s trade concession for membership to the WTO. The three independent 
variables are government-industry relations, sectoral competitiveness and market 
structure. A horse-trading strategy was adopted by negotiators after weighing the 
three indicators. It explains the dependent variables of huge concessions on the 
agricultural and textile industry, but little concessions in banking, telecommunications 
and automobile sectors. 
More importantly, the model explains the Chinese government compliance or 
non-compliance with its commitment in the post-WTO period. Having given 
concessions in certain sectors, the government finds it less difficult to fulfill its 
commitment in these sectors. In sectors which the Chinese government was reluctant 
to give concessions to American negotiators, the government receives a lot more 
complaints for its failure to comply with its commitment. In order to protect the 
protected, the government erected new non-tariff barriers that were not consistent 
with the rules of free trade. 
In the agricultural sector, Chinese peasants expected to see more challenges than 
opportunities under the WTO framework. However, in contrast to their counterparts 
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in Japan, Korea and Taiwan (Hayami, 1988), they were not organised enough to 
impose effective pressure on their government for agricultural protection. Though 
peasants are likely to grow in strength, given the dwindling number of producers and 
the resultant ease in mobilisation, a lack of administrative and fiscal connections 
between the agricultural sector and the MOA implies that the sector would face 
sustained discrimination at home and fierce competition from abroad. An evolution of 
protective measures suggested by Anderson, Martin, and Valenzuela (2007) is not 
foreseeable in the near future. 
Among the sectors in the negotiation package, the Chinese T&C industry was 
expected to gain from WTO accession. Chinese negotiators tended to make 
concessions on T&C sector because of loss-aversion in other sectors. Enterprises in 
this sector failed to exert a unified pressure on negotiators to shorten period of quota 
reduction from importing countries. Finally, as the government had low stake in the 
sector during that time, it prioritised bureaucratic interests over sectoral interest. 
Hence, the SBT was relatively indifferent to the final result compared to supervisors 
in other sectors. Trade concessions were made on sectors that were considered “low 
stake”, competitive and less concentrated.  
For the automobile sector, the SPC adopted a national developmental agenda to 
enhance the sector’s competitiveness in international trade in the 1980s. The close 
government-industry relation guaranteed the convergence of interests between SDPC 
and the sector, with the sector remaining slightly fragmented. The SPC had been 
effectively protecting the sector in the 1990s as the tariff rate in 2000 was much 
higher than what the sector had requested for (Table 6.7 and Table 6.8). This 
protective stance was adopted by its successor in the WTO accession. Hence, sectors 
that were “high stake”, uncompetitive and fragmented were protected in the 
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negotiation. Continuous intervention in the automobile sector explains its non-
compliance in the post-WTO period.  
Trade concessions were not made in the telecommunications sector and it 
remained “high stake”, monopolistic and uncompetitive. The WTO agreement left 
many loopholes for the government to exercise continuous protection. The WTO 
mechanism could not help the sector gain more autonomy. The political will of the 
state is still significant in the sector. Compared to other sectors, a proper regulatory 
entity in the telecommunications sector in China was far from emerging. Instead, a 
fragmented governance structure is taking shape in the post-WTO period. Tensions 
exist between the SASAC that operates the industry and the MIIT that regulates the 
industry. Their relationship determines the future of China’s telecommunications 
services and its compliance with the WTO framework. It suggests that sectoral 
characteristics are more significant than national characteristics. Japan, which has a 
different political regime and economic structure, also saw a fragmented state control 
between MITI and MPT over the sponsorship and regulation of Nippon Telephone 
and Telegraph (Wilks and Wright, 1987: 288).  
The banking industry functioned as a planning organ by the end of the 1990s. 
The central government, especially the MOF, administratively supervised and 
financially relied on the banking industry through its close relationship with the Big 
Four. The Chinese banking industry expected great competition after WTO accession. 
A concordant effort by the vested SETC, MOA and PBOC successfully blocked 
efforts to give concessions on the sector. To fulfil its commitment to open up the 
sector in a step-by-step manner after WTO accession, the government erected a series 
of non-tariff barriers to minimise the impact of foreign competition.   
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9.3 “Efficiency-Reducing Trade Concessions” 
The objective behind China-US trade negotiation for WTO accession was to 
liberalise China’s state-controlled trade regime. However, through horse-trading 
bargaining, the government retained most of its rights to issuing licences, quotas, 
permits, approvals, etc. These economic rents provided by the government lured the 
industry for competition. The rent-seeking behaviours created social losses that 
reduce the efficiency that was supposed to be enhanced through WTO accession. The 
negotiation outcome turned out to be “efficiency-reducing” as it gave economic 
bureaucracies some time to decide if it was willing to give up its control of their “high 
stake” sectors, imposed great adjustment costs on sectors that were internationally 
competitive and protected monopolistic profits in concentrated sectors. The 
“efficiency-reducing trade concession” challenges the common beliefs that WTO 
accession would have a huge positive impact on China’s reforms of marketisation. 
Chinese peasants ended up as the major losers of the deal. China’s agricultural 
trade registered losses after WTO accession from a surplus position before. Affected 
by the flood of imports, its comparative advantage in labour-intensive products has 
been declining and its comparative disadvantage in capital-intensive products has 
been worsening dramatically. Similarly, China’s T&C sector did not benefit from the 
WTO agreement. Export quotas were retained. New safeguard measures were 
imposed. Chinese T&C products were extremely competitive in global trade at that 
time. Its export should have experienced notable increase after WTO accession. 
However, China’s WTO membership contributed little to the growth of China’s 
global market share, compared to the period after the phasing out of the MFA. Trade 
concessions helped other WTO members retain their quotas against China’s T&C 
exports. That explains the irrelevance of WTO accession to the growth trend of its 
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exports. On the contrary, the WTO agreement frustrated China’s T&C sector and 
prevented it from exploring its potentials. 
What was worse was that sectors that received state protection failed to grow in 
strength. China’s automobile sector remained subject to state intervention. Foreign 
competition was extremely limited. It prevented the sector from gaining more 
autonomy or becoming competitive in terms of R&D and production efficiency. As 
for the telecommunications sector, state monopoly remained after WTO accession. 
Unfair or illegal competition prevails among service providers. Although the sector 
has become globally competitive in terms of sector size, it remains low in productivity 
and production efficiency.  
Finally, China’s WTO accession did not help develop a more sustainable system 
for the banking sector. The sector is still a planning organ; the Big Four still control 
the sector; and the industry remains uncompetitive in terms of NPLs, limited business 
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